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CREATING MARKETS FOR ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES:
NOTES FROM THE FIELD
JAMES SALZMAN*
Ecosystem services are created by the interactions of living organisms with their
environment, and they support our society by providing clean air and water,
decomposing waste, pollinating flowers, regulating climate, and supplying a host of
other benefits. Yet, with rare exception, ecosystem services are neither prized by
markets nor explicitly protected by the law. In recent years, an increasing number of
initiatives around the world have sought to create markets for services, some dependent
on government intervention and some created by entirely private ventures. These
experiences have demonstrated that investing in natural capital rather than built
capital can make both economic and policy sense. Informed by the author’s recent
experiences establishing a market for water quality in Australia, this Article examines
the challenges and opportunities of an ecosystem services approach to environmental
protection. This Article reviews the range of current payment schemes and identifies
the key requirements for instrument design. Building off these insights, the piece then
examines the fundamental policy challenge of payments for environmental
improvements. Despite their poor reputation among policy analysts as wasteful or
inefficient subsidies, payment schemes are found throughout environmental law and
policy, both in the U.S. and abroad. This Article takes such payments seriously,
demonstrating that they should be favored over the more traditional regulatory and taxbased approaches in far more settings than commonly assumed.

I.
II.

III.

INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................000
AN ECOSYSTEMS APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION....................................................................................000
A. Investing in Natural Versus Built Capital ...............................000
B. Markets for Services ................................................................000
C. Instrument Choice to Protect Ecosystem Services—The
Five P’s....................................................................................000
NOTES FROM THE FIELD..................................................................000
A. New York City..........................................................................000
B. BushTender (Australia) ..........................................................000

* Copyright © 2005 by James Salzman. Professor of Law & Nicholas Institute Professor of Environmental Policy, Duke
University. I am very grateful to the Fulbright Commission for the opportunity to live and study in Australia and for the
generous research support and friendship of Andy Beattie, Donna Craig, and Michael Jeffery at Macquarie University, Judith
Birrell and Rod McInness at the Sydney Catchment Authority, Nick Abel, Steve Cork, David Shelton, Stuart Whitten, and Mike
Young at Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), and Neil Gunningham at Australian
National University. Helpful comments were also provided by Bruce Ackerman, Ian Ayres, Carl Binning, John Echeverria,
Bob Ellickson, Chris Elmendorf, Alastair Grieve, Geoff Heal, Jason Johnston, Michael Levine, Jim Rasband, Carol Rose, J.B.
Ruhl, Josh Sarnoff, Henry Smith, Gary Stoneham, Jonathan Wiener, and from workshops at Yale, Harvard, Duke, Stanford,
Georgetown, Penn, and American. Research assistance was provided by Matt Droz and Kim French.

101

NYU FINAL DRAFT

102

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

9/2/2005 10:22 AM

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:600

C. Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (Costa Rica) .......................000
NOTES FROM THE FIELD—INSTRUMENT DESIGN CHALLENGES ....000
A. What is the Service Being Provided? ......................................000
B. How Is the Service Provided? .................................................000
C. Who Provides the Service and Who Benefits?.........................000
D. How Much Service Is Needed?................................................000
1. Ensuring Service Provision................................................000
INSTRUMENT CHOICE IN ROBERTSON, AUSTRALIA—
PAYMENTS FOR SERVICE PROVISION ..............................................000
A. The Sydney Catchment Authority ............................................000
B. Determining the Optimal Instrument.......................................000
1. Coasean Bargaining ..........................................................000
2. Information Asymmetry .....................................................000
3. Efficiency Analysis.............................................................000
4. Political Analysis ...............................................................000
5. Property Rights Analysis ...................................................000
CRITIQUES OF PAYMENTS AND THEIR (SOMETIMES)
DISTURBING IMPLICATIONS ............................................................000
A. The Polluted Pay Principle......................................................000
B. Subsidies and Their Ills ...........................................................000
1. Holdouts and Free Riders..................................................000
2. Rent Seeking.......................................................................000
3. Moral Hazards...................................................................000
4. Hazards to Morals .............................................................000
C. Instrument Choice Revisited....................................................000
1. Transition Payments ..........................................................000
2. The Dynamic Between Payments and Prescription ...........000
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................000
I
INTRODUCTION

When we bite into a juicy apple we may think of soil and water, but
not of the natural pollinators that fertilize the apple blossom so the fruit can
set. When we drink a cool glass of water from the tap we may think of the
local reservoir, but the real source of the water quality lies many miles
upstream in the wooded watershed that filters and cleans the water as it
flows downhill. When we enjoy a fun holiday at the beach we may think
of the warm sun, but not of the carbon sequestration by plants that
contributes to climate stability.
Largely taken for granted, healthy ecosystems provide a variety of
such critical services. Created by the interactions of living organisms with
their environment, these “ecosystem services” provide both the conditions
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and processes that sustain human life—purifying air and water, detoxifying
and decomposing waste, renewing soil fertility, regulating climate,
mitigating droughts and floods, controlling pests, and pollinating plants.1
Although awareness of ecosystem services is certainly not new, efforts to
identify and calculate these services’ valuable contributions to social
welfare are.
Recent research by ecologists and economists has
demonstrated that the extremely high costs of replacing many of these
services if they were to fail are on the order of many billions of dollars in
the United States for pollination alone.2 Such estimates are inherently
uncertain, of course, but the extraordinary costs required to substitute for
many important services by artificial means are beyond dispute.
One cannot begin to understand flood control, for example, without
realizing the impact that widespread wetland destruction has had on the
ecosystem service of water retention;3 nor can one understand water quality
without recognizing how development in forested watersheds has degraded
the service of water purification.4 The costs from degradation of these
services are high, and suffered in rich and poor countries alike.5 One might
1 Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are Ecosystem Services?, in NATURE’S SERVICES:
SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 1, 3–4 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997)
[hereinafter NATURE’S SERVICES].
2 For discussions of the value and vulnerability of pollinator systems, see Claire Kremen &
Taylor H. Ricketts, Global Perspectives on Pollination Disruptions, 14 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
1226 (2000) (summarizing case studies that assess vulnerability of pollinator systems worldwide)
and Gordon Allen-Wardell et al., The Potential Consequences of Pollinator Declines on the
Conservation of Biodiversity and Stability of Food Crop Yields, 12 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 8
(1998) (establishing consensus regarding extent and magnitude of declines in pollinators and
resulting declines in pollination services).
3 See, e.g., TRUST FOR PUB. LAND, BUILDING GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE:
LAND
CONSERVATION AS A WATERSHED PROTECTION STRATEGY 13 (2000) (discussing impact of
development on water percolation), http://www.tpl.org; Norman Myers, The World’s Forests and
Their Ecosystem Services, in NATURE’S SERVICES, supra note 1, at 215, 215–17 (discussing
impact of deforestation on water flows in downstream territories).
4 See, e.g., TRUST FOR PUB. LAND, AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION: LAND CONSERVATION AND
THE PROTECTION OF CONNECTICUT’S WATER QUALITY 5–8 (1998) (discussing impact of land
development on water purity), http://www.tpl.org; Katherine C. Ewel, Water Quality
Improvement by Wetlands, in NATURE’S SERVICES, supra note 1, at 329, 334–36 (discussing
effects of wastewater discharges on wetlands).
5 Degraded ecosystem services contribute to many natural disasters.
Indeed, many
commentators have argued that the devastation of the recent tsunami in southeast Asia was
worsened by the destruction of mangroves for coastal development. The net effect was
weakening of the ecosystem services of flood and storm buffers. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst.,
Loss of Mangrove Forests Contributed to Greater Impact of Tsunamis!, at
http://www.earthisland.org/map/tsunami.htm#1; University of Wyoming Press Release, UW
Professor:
Tsunami Destruction Could Have Been Reduced, Jan. 5, 2005, at
http://uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/barbier/Tsumani%20document%20-%20UW%20PROFESSOR.pdf.
Consider, as well, the importance of water retention and purification provided by forests:

Widespread flooding in China’s Yangtze River Basin in . . . 1998 left over 3,000 people
dead, hundreds of thousands homeless and destroyed billions of dollars worth of property.
Rapid siltation in hydropower reservoirs in Malawi threatens the future supply of electricity

NYU FINAL DRAFT

104

9/2/2005 10:22 AM

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:600

therefore expect that ecosystem services would be prized by markets and
explicitly protected by the law. Despite their economic value and central
role in provision of important public benefits, ecosystem services are only
rarely considered in cost-benefit analyses, preparation of environmental
impact assessments, or wetlands mitigation.6 Nor, in the past, have
significant markets arisen that capitalize on the commercial value of these
services.
This is starting to change, however. From their origins as an obscure
phrase just nine years ago, “ecosystem services” have gone mainstream,
with new initiatives and markets for provision of services blossoming
around the world.7 The United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), for example, has created a Science Advisory Board on Valuing the
Protection of Ecological Systems and Services.8 In Australia, a high-level
advisory body, known as the Wentworth Group, has called for a new
approach to environmental protection that focuses on provision of
ecosystem services.9 In Costa Rica, the government is administering a
nationwide scheme of payments for services.10 The international climate
change negotiations are closely focusing on policy instruments that
encourage carbon sequestration.11 And this is just the tip of the iceberg. A
recent study documented 287 cases of payments for forest ecosystem
and poor water quality pushes up turbine maintenance costs to unsustainable levels. . . . In a
world where one-fifth of the population lacks access to safe and affordable drinking water
and half the population lacks access to sanitation, improving our understanding of how
markets for forest watershed protection may improve water quality and augment dry season
flows is critical.

NATASHA LANDELL-MILLS & INA T. PORRAS, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV., SILVER BULLET
OR FOOLS’ GOLD? A GLOBAL REVIEW OF MARKETS FOR FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
AND
THEIR
IMPACT
ON
THE
POOR
111
(2002)
(citation
omitted),
http://www.iied.org/docs/flu/psf_silvbullet.pdf.
6 James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 311 (2001).
7 As a recent example, just before this article went to press the popular magazine The
Economist devoted its cover, editorial and lead article to ecosystem service markets. Editorial,
Rescuing Environmentalism, ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 2005, at 11; Are You Being Served?, id. at 76.
As another example, a LEXIS combined newspaper search for “ecosystem service” reveals a
steady increase in citations over time—14 cites in 1996, 69 in 1998, 106 in 2000, and 145 in
2002.
8 Sci. Advisory Brd., Request for Nominations for Experts for a Panel on Valuing the
Protection of Ecological Systems and Services, 68 Fed. Reg. 11,082 (Mar. 7, 2003).
9 See WENTWORTH GROUP, BLUEPRINT FOR A LIVING CONTINENT 3, 14 (2002), at
http://www.ccsa.asn.au/Blueprint_for_a_Living_Continen.pdf.
10 Stefano Pagiola, Paying for Water Services in Central America: Learning from Costa
Rica, in SELLING FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES 37, 37–62 (Stefano Pagiola et al. eds.,
2002).
11 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Mechanisms Under
the Kyoto Protocol: Joint Implementation, the Clean Development Mechanism and Emissions
Trading (describing operation of Clean Development Mechanism in Kyoto Protocol), at
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
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services from around the world12 and an international marketplace website
for services has just been launched.13
Scholarship on ecosystem service provision recently has blossomed as
well, encompassing detailed analyses of the economic barriers to creation
of service markets,14 discussions of institutional design,15 examinations of
the challenges to biophysical and economic valuation,16 and case studies.17
12

LANDELL-MILLS & PORRAS, supra note 5, at 3.
The
Katoomba
Group’s
Ecosystem
Marketplace,
at
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). The author of this Article
serves on the Katoomba Group’s Ecosystem Marketplace Advisory Board. Michael Jenkins, the
president of the nonprofit organization Forest Trends, described the website as a “Bloomberg
meets Google meets CNN” for the emerging environmental services market. World’s First MultiBillion Dollar Green Marketplace Opens, ASIA PULSE, Oct. 12, 2004, LEXIS, News Library,
Asia Pulse File.
14 See, e.g., GEOFFREY HEAL, NATURE AND THE MARKETPLACE: CAPTURING THE VALUE OF
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2000) (examining use of market mechanisms to mitigate environmental
impacts); Lawrence H. Goulder & Donald Kennedy, Valuing Ecosystem Services: Philosophical
Bases and Empirical Methods, in NATURE’S SERVICES, supra note 1, at 23, 23 (addressing need
for philosophical and empirical framework to value alternative uses of nature).
15 See, e.g., Steve Cork et al., A Framework for Applying the Concept of Ecosystem Services
to Natural Resource Management in Australia, in THIRD AUSTRALIAN STREAM MANAGEMENT
CONFERENCE 157, 157–62 (Ian Rutherford et al. eds., 2001) (describing framework for
identifying ecosystem services and encouraging investment in them), available at
http://www.ecosystemservicesproject.org/html/publications/docs/framework_for_ecosystem_serv
ices.pdf; Geoffrey Heal et al., Protecting Natural Capital Through Ecosystem Service Districts,
20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 333 (2001) (providing conceptual framework for governmental authorities
to manage and protect ecosystem services).
16 See, e.g., Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural
Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 253 (1997) (estimating value of world’s ecosystem services at $33
trillion per annum, with confidence interval of $16 trillion to $54 trillion), reviewed by David
Pearce, Auditing the Earth: The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital,
40 ENVIRONMENT 23, 23–28 (1998) (disputing bases for estimate but supporting effort); James
Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 898–99 (1997) (explaining why
economic valuation of services is so difficult).
17 See generally GRETCHEN C. DAILY & KATHERINE ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY OF
NATURE: THE QUEST TO MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE (2002) (studying efforts to
measure, capture and protect ecosystem services); LANDELL-MILLS & PORRAS, supra note 5
(reviewing 287 market-oriented approaches to environmental management); NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, WATERSHED MGMT. FOR POTABLE WATER SUPPLY: ASSESSING THE NEW YORK CITY
STRATEGY (2000) (studying legal framework protecting New York City drinking water and
recommending improvements); Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Economic Returns from
the Biosphere, 391 NATURE 629, 629–30 (1998) (discussing examples of economic instruments
that have allowed returns on environmental assets), available at http://www.p-ir.com/pdfs/papers/151.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2005); Pagiola, supra note 10 (examining Costa
Rica’s environmental service payment system). The most impressive example of current research
efforts is the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. The Ecosystem Assessment is an ambitious
program with over 500 contributors from around the globe. Launched in 2001, the Assessment
focuses on the provision of ecosystem services—how these services affect human well-being,
how provision of services is changing, how changes may affect human well-being, and response
options that could be adopted on local, national and global scales. Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment,
About
the
Millennium
Ecosystem
Assessment,
at
http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/about.overview.aspx? (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
13
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While questions and issues surely remain that have not been fully
considered, it is fair to say that we have achieved a good understanding of
the theoretical issues concerning ecosystem service provision. There is
also a growing literature, though largely anecdotal, that describes some of
the practical issues concerning ecosystem service provision.18 The
problem is that theory and practice often have not been effectively joined
so that one meaningfully informs the other. With rare exception, those
creating markets have not engaged the theoretical literature and, equally,
those developing theory have not participated on the ground in shaping
programs.
With that in mind, I spent from 2002 through 2003 as a Fulbright
Senior Scholar in Australia, working with the Sydney Catchment Authority
and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
(CSIRO) to assess ecosystem service market initiatives Down Under and to
develop a pilot project for the service of water purification in the Sydney
watershed.19 This Article builds on my findings to explore how our current
base of theoretical research can better inform implementation of ecosystem
service markets and how challenges to implementation on the ground can
sharpen our theoretical analyses.
More fundamentally, I examine the contentious policy challenge of
paying for ecosystem services. Despite their poor reputation among policy
analysts, government payment schemes are surprisingly common
throughout environmental law and policy. This Article takes such
payments seriously, demonstrating that they should be favored over the
more traditional regulatory and tax-based approaches in far more settings
than commonly assumed.
Part II of the Article reviews the basics of an ecosystem services
approach, explaining the relative benefits of investing in natural rather than
built capital and the range of policy instruments available to strengthen
service provision. It then explains why, despite the obvious importance of
ecosystem services, service markets have been difficult to establish,
focusing on the obstacles raised by our poor understanding of service
provision, the shortcomings of current institutional arrangements, and the
18 See, e.g., DAILY & ELLISON, supra note 17 (analyzing both promise and problems of
various experiments with ecosystems services markets); SELLING FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL
SERVICES, supra note 10 (containing articles on market-based mechanisms for conservation, such
as watershed services, biodiversity, forest conservation, ecological value-added taxes, and forest
sinks).
19 The Sydney Catchment Authority (SCA) is a public agency responsible for providing clean
water for distribution to the greater Sydney region. Sydney Catchment Auth., About the SCA, at
http://www.sca.nsw.gov.au/about/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2005). The Commonwealth Scientific
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) is an international institute for applied natural and
social science research. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org., About CSIRO, at
http://www.csiro.au/index.asp?type=aboutCSIROIndex (last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
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economic challenges to private provision of a public good. Despite these
obstacles, there are a growing number of ecosystem service markets around
the world.
To begin our understanding of how markets overcome obstacles and
to ensure our analysis is grounded in practical experiences, Part III briefly
tours the globe, describing three major ecosystem service markets.
Building on these notes from the field, Part IV takes a close look at market
design, using theory and practice to identify the key steps and challenges in
crafting service markets in the field—identifying the service, service
providers, beneficiaries, and level of service required.
Because of the public goods problems and the other challenges
described above, fully private markets are difficult to establish for most
ecosystem services. As a result, in most cases government plays a critical
role—typically as the dominant buyer to spur market provision of services.
Part V considers the implications of this role and delves into
implementation details, melding theory with my fieldwork in Australia to
assess instrument choice. Employing a range of analytical frameworks,
Part V explores the circumstances that favor government payments for
services over more traditional regulatory and tax-based approaches.
Such payments are controversial, often derided as wasteful subsidies
or payoffs. Part VI addresses directly the fundamental objections that have
been raised against payments for services—that they violate the polluterpays principle, that they encourage holdouts and rent-seeking, that they
create moral hazards, and that they undermine a land ethic. Part VII
concludes with a survey of the landscape of service markets, charting out
the most promising routes for the future.
This is an exciting time to be working in the field of ecosystem service
markets. Governments at the local, national and international levels are
increasingly aware of the potential for service markets, as are scholars.
Much of the scholarship, though, has been written by proponents of service
markets, with a heavy emphasis on the potential benefits and less
consideration of the potential downsides.
Indeed, despite the impressive growth of service markets, there remain
two powerful reasons why the absolute number of service markets remains
small. One is that they are hard to establish. This Article considers the
practical challenges facing markets and identifies ways to overcome them.
The second reason, however, is more fundamental. While lauded in
specific instances, paying for ecosystem services can have disturbing
implications in broader application. At what point should we pay for
beneficial land uses rather than coerce them through regulation or taxes?
In which situations, and for which services, do payments make sense and
when are they inappropriate? When entitlements are unclear, how should
we determine the allocation between public and private interests? These

NYU FINAL DRAFT

9/2/2005 10:22 AM

108

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:600

difficult questions are inescapable if one thinks seriously about the broader
application of ecosystem service markets. Given the growing number of
initiatives around the world, the time has come to address directly the
challenges they pose.
II
AN ECOSYSTEMS APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

The concept behind ecosystem services is very simple—the
environment offers critically important services for free that, if we had to
pay for substitutes in markets, would command extremely high prices.20
Government policies that recognize this basic fact, and that focus on
landscape management to ensure and provide services, could result in
increased social welfare but would represent a significant departure from
how we currently think about environmental protection, land use controls
and service provision strategies.
A.

Investing in Natural Versus Built Capital

The first insight of an ecosystem services perspective is that investing
in natural capital can prove more efficient than using built capital to deliver
key services.21 As an example, consider the case of flood control. One can
address floodwaters through built capital, such as engineered works (e.g.,
construction and maintenance of dikes and levees) or through natural
capital, such as landscape management (e.g., restoration of wetlands in
flood plains).22 In some instances, perhaps many, landscape management
may prove a better public and private investment strategy for providing
flood control once one accounts for the positive externalities of improved
water quality, wildlife habitat, and recreational amenities.23
A well-known example in the water quality field makes the point in a
concrete setting.24 In the early 1990s, a combination of federal regulation
and cost realities drove New York City to reconsider its water supply
20
21
22

See generally Daily, supra note 1, at 3–6 (describing what ecosystem services are).
As measured by environmental improvement per unit of social cost.
Natural watersheds provide a range of water purification services.
Wetlands and other riparian lands also help provide natural filtration of contaminants
originating in the watershed. Soils filter out some contaminants from local runoff before the
runoff reaches the waterway. Vegetation both slows down runoff, permitting various forms
of solid pollutants to settle out, and stabilizes soil, reducing contamination from siltation.

Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 261,
295 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
23 See, e.g., DAILY & ELLISON, supra note 17, at 100–01 (describing restoration of wetlands
in Napa Valley to control flooding).
24 The Catskills case is explained in more detail in Part III.A. For a detailed description of
the Catskills case study, see generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17 (evaluating
New York City management program).

NYU FINAL DRAFT

June 2005]

9/2/2005 10:22 AM

CREATING MARKETS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES

109

strategy. New York City’s water system provides about 1.5 billion tons of
drinking water to almost nine million New Yorkers every day.25 Ninety
percent of the water is drawn from the Catskill/Delaware watershed, which
extends 125 miles north and west of the city.26 Under amendments to the
federal Safe Drinking Water Act, municipal and other water suppliers were
required to filter their surface water supplies unless they could demonstrate
that they had taken other steps, including watershed protection measures, to
protect their customers from harmful water contamination.27
Presented with a choice between provision of clean water through
building a filtration plant or managing the watershed, New York City easily
concluded that the latter was more cost effective. It was estimated that a
filtration plant would cost between $6 billion and $8 billion to build.28 By
contrast, watershed protection efforts, which would include not only the
acquisition of critical watershed lands but also a variety of other programs
designed to reduce contamination sources in the watershed, would cost
only about $1.5 billion.29 Acting on behalf of the beneficiaries of the
Catskills’ water purification services, New York City chose to invest in
natural rather than built capital. Nor is New York City alone. As of 1996,
the EPA had indicated that over 140 municipalities qualified to use
watershed conservation as a means of ensuring high drinking water
quality.30
Nor is this approach limited to the United States. In the week before
the recent Australian election in New South Wales, Premier Bob Carr
announced that the government would pay farmers A$120 million to
preserve native vegetation, following the recommendation of the
Wentworth Group.31 As Wentworth Group member Peter Cosier described,
“We’re not giving farmers money; we’re buying an environmental service
from them and that environmental service provides a benefit for the whole
25 ERIC A. GOLDSTEIN & MARK A. IZEMAN, THE NEW YORK ENVIRONMENT BOOK 138
(1990) (“The city itself takes more than 90 percent of this cut, just over 1.4 billion gallons.”).
26 N.Y. CITY INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF CATSKILL/DELAWARE FILTRATION ON
RESIDENTIAL WATER AND SEWAGE CHARGES IN NEW YORK CITY 3 (Nov. 2000), at
http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/waterreport.pdf.
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-1(b)(7)(C) (2000).
28 DAILY & ELLISON, supra note 17, at 63. Unless otherwise noted, all currency in dollar
amounts refers to United States dollars.
29 Id.
30 See TRUST FOR PUB. LAND, PROTECTING THE SOURCE: LAND CONSERVATION AND THE
FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DRINKING WATER 20 (1998), http://www.tpl.org.
31 Peter Williams, Carr Does About Face on Farm Vegetation Plan, AAP NEWSFEED, Mar.
15, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, Australia File. This is the equivalent of $90
million. The Wentworth Group is a group of nationally prominent Australian environmental
scientists.
See, e.g., TERENCE JEYARETNAM, WENTWORTH GROUP’S BLUEPRINT FOR
SUSTAINABILITY, at http://ees.ieaust.org.au/pdf/Wentworth_Group.pdf (last visited Feb. 13,
2005).
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community . . . . It’s a radical new way of doing business in the bush.”32
B.

Markets for Services

If the provision of ecosystem services is clearly valuable, then why
don’t more payment schemes exist? Why are markets so hard to set up?
The answer is threefold: ignorance, institutional inadequacy, and the
problems inherent in public goods.
Perhaps the most basic reason we do not pay more attention to the
provision of ecosystem services is that we take them for granted. It may
come as no surprise that many children, when asked where milk comes
from, brightly answer, “The grocery store!”33 Our ignorance of the sources
of goods and services we depend on goes well beyond the average citizen,
however. To design policy instruments that efficiently provide services, at
a minimum policy analysts must be able to identify services on a local
ecological scale—detailing how they are generated and how they are
delivered. We can make empirically sound predictions that actions on a
gross scale, such as clearcutting, for example, will affect nutrient flows and
services, or that a significant loss of animal and plant populations will
reduce ecosystem resiliency.34 In the aggregate, such knowledge can
provide policy guidance in warning against extreme actions. But landscape
context matters. In most cases, our scientific knowledge is inadequate to
undertake meaningful marginal analysis—to predict with any certainty how
specific local actions affecting these factors will impact the local ecosystem
services themselves. For example, it is difficult to predict how developing
thirty percent of this wetland will impact water quality, flooding events, or
local bird populations.
This lack of knowledge is due both to the lack of relevant data and to
the multivariate complexity of the task. Analysis of how ecosystems
provide services has proceeded slowly not only because ecosystem level
experiments are difficult and lengthy, but also because research to date has
focused much more on understanding ecosystem processes than
32

Williams, supra note 31.
See, e.g., Tyrone Cashman, Where Does it Come From? Where Does it Go?, MEDIA &
VALUES, Summer 1990, at 12, available at http://www.medialit.org/reading_room/article49.html;
Roberta Mazzucco, From the Farm to Your Table: Where Does Our Food Come From?, in 7
YALE-NEW HAVEN TEACHERS INSTITUTE, CURRICULUM UNIT: ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN
21ST
CENTURY
(1997),
at
THE
http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1997/7/97.07.07.x.html.
34 See, e.g., Gene E. Likens et al., Effects of Forest Cutting and Herbicide Treatment on
Nutrient Budgets in the Hubbard Brook Watershed-Ecosystem, 40 ECOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS
23 (1970) (classic study on how clearcutting forested watershed fundamentally changes local
ecology); Harold A. Mooney & Paul R. Ehrlich, Ecosystem Services: A Fragmentary History, in
NATURE’S SERVICES, supra note 1, at 11, 16 (noting that species diversity is vital to resilience of
ecosystems).
33
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determining ecosystem services. And how an ecosystem works is not the
same as the services it provides.35
Ironically, this focus has been reinforced and, at times, driven by
regulatory requirements. Federal and state wetland regulations assess the
adequacy of wetland mitigation on the basis of the site’s functional
capacity, not on the basis of the services actually provided and their
benefits to humans.36 Indeed, it is fair to say that our laws were not
designed with ecosystem services in mind. Legal protection of ecosystems
was not a primary objective when the relevant laws were drafted over two
decades ago. Generally speaking, our pollution laws (e.g., the Clean Air
Act37 and Clean Water Act38) rely on human health-based standards. Our
conservation laws (e.g., the Endangered Species Act39 and Marine Mammal
Protection Act40) are species-specific. And planning under our resource
management laws (e.g., the National Forest Management Act41 and Federal
Land Policy and Management Act42) must accommodate multiple and
conflicting uses. Of course, parts of these laws, such as the Clean Water
Act’s Section 404 wetlands permit program and use of water quality
standards,43 the Endangered Species Act’s critical habitat provisions,44 and
the National Forest Management Act’s use of indicator species such as the
spotted owl,45 clearly can help to conserve ecosystem services. The point,
though, is that these laws were not primarily intended to provide legal
standards for conservation of natural capital and the services that flow from
it and, as many authors have pointed out, in practice they usually do not.46
35 Claire Kremen, Managing Ecosystem Services: What Do We Need to Know About Their
Ecology?, 8 ECOLOGY LETTERS 468, 468 (2005) (stating that “we have little ability to predict
how much land must be protected and how nearby land use must be restricted to provide water of
sufficient quantity and quality”); Telephone Conversation with Gretchen C. Daily, Stanford
University Biology Department (Jan. 14, 2003). Unless otherwise noted, the telephone
conversations, interviews, and email communications between the Author and his sources in this
and subsequent footnotes could not be verified by the New York University Law Review.
36 James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law,
53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 648–68 (2000) (examining ability of laws and environmental markets to
capture values of ecosystem services).
37 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000) .
38 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000).
39 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000).
40 Id. §§ 1361–1421h.
41 Id. §§ 1600–1614.
42 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1785 (2000).
43 Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
44 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2000).
45 Id. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
46 See, e.g., David W. Burnett, New Science But Old Laws: The Need to Include Landscape
Ecology in the Legal Framework of Biodiversity Protection, 23 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J.
47, 68–69 (1999) (“[T]he Endangered Species Act will never efficiently protect biodiversity. . . .
There will never be any ecologically optimum sequence chosen through the use of the
Endangered Species Act. The ESA wasn’t designed to even consider the possibility.”); Oliver A.
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A second obstacle to the creation of service markets is institutional.
Political jurisdictions are rarely aligned with ecologically significant areas
such as watersheds; instead, they exercise authority over areas defined by
state, county, or municipal borders.47 Not surprisingly, environmental
problems don’t track political boundaries. The Chesapeake Bay Initiative
is one of a small number of interstate initiatives that have attempted to
align political actors with ecosystem boundaries.48 Some states have
aligned political and natural boundaries within their jurisdictions, for
example, New Jersey’s Pinelands Commission49 and New York’s
Adirondack Park Agency.50 However, these are rare examples. As a result,
consistent efforts to manage landscapes that ensure service provision are
easily confounded by collective action problems. In a fascinating break
from this practice, New Zealand and a number of Australian states in the
last decade have created catchment management bodies that exercise land
use planning authority throughout an entire watershed,51 but these remain a
rare exception.
The last reason there are so few markets, and perhaps the most
important, concerns the role of markets and public goods. A “public good”
Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869, 880–83
(1997) (observing that commercial interests inevitably “wear . . . down” agencies attempting to
implement environmental protection statutes); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line:
Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 295 (1994) (arguing
that “federal public land law runs directly counter to ecosystem management principles” but that
ESA, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), National Forest Management Act (NFMA),
and Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) are beginning to break down boundary
limitations and legal compartmentalization to obligate federal land managers to broaden
management perspective and to vest land managers with authority to experiment with ecosystem
management concepts); J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of
Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U.
COLO. L. REV. 555 (1995) (analyzing NEPA, Clean Water Act (CWA), ESA, and other
environmental regulations and their effects on ecosystem services and concluding that
biodiversity could be better conserved through melding of disorganized system of federal
biodiversity regulation into one single law that is more flexible and less coercive than current
laws).
47 Heal et al., supra note 15, at 354.
48 Chesapeake Bay Initiative Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–312, tit. V, 112 Stat. 2961 (1998)
(empowering Secretary of Interior to identify, conserve, restore and interpret natural recreational,
historical and cultural resources within Chesapeake Bay Watershed).
49 State of N.J. Pinelands Comm’n, New Jersey Pinelands Commission Homepage
(describing history and purpose of The Pinelands), at http://www.state.nj.us/pinelands/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2005).
50 N.Y.
State Adirondack Park Agency, About the Adirondack Park, at
http://www.apa.state.ny.us/about_park/index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
51 Integrated Catchment Mgmt. for the Motueku River, Project Summary (describing
Moteuku
River
Catchment
Authority’s
purpose),
at
http://icm.landcareresearch.co.nz/site_details/programme_summary.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2005); Sydney Catchment Auth., About the Sydney Catchment Authority (describing SCA’s
history and purpose), at http://www.sca.nsw.gov.au/about (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
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is one whose use and benefits cannot be exclusively controlled, such as
national defense or law and order. Unlike an apple that can be bought and
consumed by one person, all those who live in a country with secure
borders and low crime rates benefit from these public goods, whether they
pay taxes or not. Similarly, those who live downstream from wetlands
benefit from the role wetlands play in slowing floodwaters, whether they
paid to conserve the wetlands or not. In fact, most ecosystem services,
ranging from flood control and climate stability to pollination, provide nonexclusive benefits.52
We have no shortage of markets for most ecosystem goods (such as
clean water and apples), but the ecosystem services underpinning these
goods (such as water purification and pollination) are free. The services
themselves have no market value for the simple reason that no markets
exist in which they can be bought or sold. As a result, there are no direct
price mechanisms to signal the scarcity or degradation of these public
goods until they fail (at which point their hidden value becomes obvious
because of the costs to restore or replace them).53 This might not be
critically important if most lands providing services were public property
that could be set aside for conservation, but they are not. Private lands are
vital not only for biodiversity conservation, but also for provision of most
other services.54
A further economic obstacle to the creation of service markets is the
problem of collective action. Markets for services can only be established
if there are discrete groups of providers and beneficiaries. Otherwise,
transaction costs become too high for contract formation. The public goods
nature of many services makes this a real concern. Biodiversity, for
example, benefits agriculture through the insurance service of genetic
diversity and benefits pharmacology through provision of antibiotics and
other medicinal compounds.55 The problem is that we all gain from these
benefits, yet there is no sufficiently discrete class of beneficiaries with
whom landholders can negotiate, and the transaction costs of gathering
enough beneficiaries together to negotiate for the service are too high.
52 They are also non-rival, in that one person’s enjoyment and consumption of the services
does not impair another’s benefits.
53 For a more detailed discussion of the challenges to conservation posed by public goods, see
Heal et al., supra note 15, at 341–42.
54 See David Farrier, Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management
or Compensation for Lost Expectations?, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 310 (1995) (“Existing
areas of publicly owned land are inadequate to conserve representative ecosystems.”). While
many water suppliers own land in key watershed areas, many, as was the case with New York
City and the Catskills and Delaware watersheds, do not. Thompson, supra note 22, at 299–300.
55 Roughly one in four pharmaceuticals are derived from plant sources and another one in
four from animals and microorganisms. See Norman Myers, Biodiversity’s Genetic Library, in
NATURE’S SERVICES, supra note 1, at 259, 263.
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Thus it is no surprise that private purchasers of biodiversity’s benefits are
hard to come by, which explains why there are so few true markets for
biodiversity. Put simply, if a land use provides valuable ecosystem
services but they are widely enjoyed by diffuse beneficiaries, it is unlikely
that a market for services will arise in the absence of government
intervention.56
As a final point, it is worth noting that ignorance and public goods—
the barriers to market creation—are related. Markets create knowledge.
We have a very advanced understanding of how to manage farmland to
maximize production of cash crops for the simple reason that they are cash
crops. It pays to manage land efficiently for crop production. We have a
much poorer understanding of how to manage land for service provision,
not because services have no value but because land owners cannot capture
any of the value their landscape provides. Agricultural markets provide
very clear signals to farmers of the value of clearing remnant vegetation to
grow more crops; but there are no markets for biodiversity, water quality,
or flood control to reflect the loss in benefits once the land is cleared.
Thus, while a wetland surely provides existence or option value to some
people, the benefits provided by the wetland’s nutrient retention and flood
protection services are both universal and undeniable. Tastes may differ
over beauty, but they are in firm accord over the high costs of polluted
water and flooded homes. Yet when we buy a wetland property, we pay
for location and scenic beauty, not its role as a nursery for sea life or filter
of nutrients. These remain positive externalities.
Such circumstances make ecosystem services easy to take for granted.
Because it is difficult to prevent someone who did not pay for an ecosystem
service from benefiting from it, it is equally difficult to get such people to
pay for provision of these services. Why pay for something when you have
always gotten it for free? As a result, a key challenge in implementing an
ecosystem services approach lies in creating a market where none exists—
in capturing the value of the service by compensating the providers. This
approach, notably unlike that of traditional regulatory or tax instruments as
described in the next section, views environmental protection much as a
business transaction between willing parties.
C.

Instrument Choice to Protect Ecosystem Services—The Five P’s

The preceding analysis suggests why the government has a critical
role to play in ecosystem service provision. Because a stable supply of
public goods can provide great public benefit yet little private gain, one
56 For further discussion of government instruments that can spur conservation of ecosystem
services, see infra, Parts V.B. and VI.C., and HEAL, NATURE AND THE MARKETPLACE, supra
note 14, at 33–41.
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would expect that private markets will systematically lead to the underprovision of ecosystem services. To correct this problem of market failure,
as well as that of collective action, government can step in and act on
behalf of the public. As described below, this might take the form of
proscribing behavior, paying for services on behalf of the general public, or
clarifying property rights.
More generally, when choosing which
instrument to use in changing the behavior of landholders, the government
can choose from a toolkit of five basic strategies.57 One might call these
the “Five P’s”—prescription, penalty, persuasion, property rights, and
payment.
Through prescription, the government relies on command-and-control
regulation, mandating certain behaviors, proscribing others, and imposing
penalties for noncompliance. “Thou shalt do this; thou shalt not do that, or
else . . . .”
The norm for pollution control in industrial settings,
prescription has been used indirectly to provide services from wetlands58
and to protect the ecosystem service of biodiversity.59 Such approaches
have met with poor success in the United States (and in the rest of the
world, for that matter) when applied to non-point source pollution.60
Financial penalties and charges modify behavior through the financial
signals of taxes and fees. Such an approach does not ban certain activities
outright but, rather, makes them more expensive (such as charging per head
of cattle to graze on public lands or per kilogram of CFC purchased).61
Persuasion relies on an information approach, educating landholders
of the consequences of their management practices on the landscape and
informing them of alternate approaches. This has been widespread across
America since the Depression and Dust Bowl through the Soil
Conservation Service.62 The goal of this approach is self-regulation. In a

57 These fundamental policy approaches apply to any environmental issue and are described
in greater detail in JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 40–53 (2003).
58 Section 404 of the Clean Water Act requires a permit for the discharge of dredged or fill
material into navigable waters at specified disposal sites. Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. §
1344 (2000). For details on this program and its impact on service provision, see Salzman &
Ruhl, supra note 36, at 648–52.
59 Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act directs federal agencies to “insure” that their
actions are “not likely to jeopardize” the viability or adversely modify the critical habitat of
endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). Section 9 of the act makes it unlawful to
“take” an endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000). See generally SALZMAN &
THOMPSON, supra note 57, at 265–66 (describing regulatory proscriptions of ESA).
60 See infra, Part V.B.4.
61 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 4681 (2000) (imposing tax on sale of ozone depleting chemicals).
62 Douglas Helms, Two Centuries of Soil Conservation, 5 OAH MAG. OF HIST. 24, 24–28
(1991), reprinted in READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE (1992), at
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/about/history/pdf/Readings_in_the_History_of_001.pdf (last visited
Feb. 1, 2005).
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recreational example, informed of harm to coral reefs through dropping
anchors, boat owners have been developing an ethic not to do so.63
The fourth approach is one of property rights. This instrument relies
on privatization and allocation of access to a resource, whether a right to a
particular catch in a fishery64 or the ability to emit a quantity of air
pollution.65 In most programs, such as the acid rain trading program in the
United States, these entitlements may be traded. In
practice,
property
rights instruments often work in combination with other instruments.
Trading programs, for example, rely on regulations to create scarcity.66
The final approach is payment. This usually takes the form of a
subsidy, either as a direct payment or tax break, justified by a public goods
argument—society at large benefits from these activities but because of
market failures does not pay for them. Though less attractive than
regulation because of its impact on government budgets, such an approach
is often popular with landholders for obvious reasons. Serious doubts,
though, have been raised over the efficiency of such a blunt approach, since
payments are usually in the form of a one-size-fits-all scheme (e.g.,
payments for setting aside wetlands are not calibrated to the quality or
service provision of the wetland) and payments could be seen to encourage
holdouts and create perverse incentives.67 As we shall see in the examples
in Part III, payments can be made available on a competitive basis,
effectively creating a market as recipients compete with one another for the
scarce funds. This can avoid some of the efficiency concerns raised above.
To put these different instruments in the context of ecosystem
services, take the example of water quality in Figure 1 below.68 Imagine
63 See, e.g., REEF RELIEF, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEGRIL REEF MOORING BUOY WORKSHOP
& INSTALLATION PROJECT, at http://www.reefrelief.org/jamaica.html; Ocean Watch Foundation,
More About Ocean Watch Foundation, at http://www.oceanwatch.org/moreabout.htm.
64 Individual transferable quotas, known as ITQs, have become a common management tool
for fisheries in Canada, New Zealand, Iceland, and other countries. See generally Alison Rieser,
Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393 (1999).
65 The EPA has implemented trading markets for acid rain, 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2000);
chlorofluorocarbons, 40 C.F.R. §§ 82.5, 82.12 (2000); leaded gasoline, 40 C.F.R. § 80.20(d)
(1973), repealed by Prohibition on Gasoline Containing Lead or Lead Additives for Highway
Use, 61 Fed. Reg. 3832, 3834 (Feb. 2, 1996) (deleting § 80.20, former banking and trading
program implementing lead phasedown program), and other pollutants.
66 Combined instruments also offer regulated parties a choice that may be perceived as more
legitimate and, as a result, facilitate compliance. In most trading programs, for example, parties
can choose whether to trade for pollution allowances and wetlands mitigation banking credits, on
the one hand, or simply to comply with the regulatory limits on emissions or wetlands
development, on the other. The flexibility offered by the trading program is available, but need
not be used.
67 See, e.g., infra note 268.
68 Adapted from Heal et al., supra note 15, at 344 (showing service of water purification
through hypothetical watershed, farmland, river, and reservoir).

NYU FINAL DRAFT

June 2005]

9/2/2005 10:22 AM

CREATING MARKETS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES

117

that the municipal water supplier owns the upland forest, which naturally
filters and cleans water as it flows through the upper watershed. Property
owners in the farmlands are dairy farmers, grazing cows on their fields
beside the stream that flows into the reservoir. The farmers could manage
their land to provide an improved service of water purification by planting
riparian vegetation buffers (i.e., erecting fences to protect strips of plants
alongside the stream from grazing). Such vegetative buffers capture
nutrients and reduce silt before they reach the watercourse.69 Downstream
water consumers benefit from these actions, which provide them with clean
drinking water that does not require extensive pre-treatment. Farmers
might benefit from reduced streambank erosion.
FIGURE 1
[Printer: insert fig1.doc here]
Traditionally, this would be the end of the story. No benefits would
be produced, for few land owners actually would plant riparian buffers.
Farmers may well have been informed of the benefits of this practice for
themselves and for downstream users, but it is unlikely that they would
change their behavior because of the hassle and cost of fencing and the
concerns over the loss of productivity from setting aside pasture. And
those who did fence off their streams would bear all the costs, with no
contributions from those downstream who benefit from the positive
externalities of cleaner water.
So how could the government ensure clean drinking water? The
traditional engineer’s approach (“I’ve never seen a problem I can’t build
around”) would likely involve building a pre-treatment plant. An
ecosystem service approach of riparian buffers, however, would likely be
less expensive. But what role should government play in ensuring
provision of services?
The traditional regulator’s approach would likely impose prescriptive
regulations to require farmers to plant riparian buffers. One could equally
rely on financial penalties, levying a tax on farmers who do not have
buffers, or trying to persuade farmers to put in buffers. As described in
detail in Part V, such approaches have largely proven ineffective in the past
because of overbreadth, strong political opposition, and poor compliance
behavior in the face of what are viewed as punitive or intrusive measures.
One could, however, view the issue from a totally different
perspective. Why not, one might argue, simply recognize this situation for
what it is—the provision of valuable services to consumers—and realize
this through an explicit arrangement of payments for services rendered?
Put another way, why not treat farmers’ provision of ecosystem services as
no different from their provision of other marketable goods? Farmers are
69

See supra note 22.
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certainly well accustomed to contractual arrangements for their agricultural
products. Dairy farmers sign contracts to sell their milk; potato farmers do
the same for their spuds. Why not treat the provision of water filtration
services as a similar business transaction, where farmers manage their land
through riparian buffers and grass swales to “grow the crop of water
quality” much the same as dairy and potato farmers do for their cash crops?
In many respects, provision of ecosystem services would be no
different than supplying traditional farm produce, with the level of
compensation dependent on the quality and level of services provided. In
contrast to the earlier description of subsidies, ecosystem services
payments could focus directly on the quality and quantity of services
delivered. Such exchanges would be arm’s-length payments for services
rendered, creating an ongoing incentive for the landholder to manage the
property so that service provision is ensured rather than the typical one-off
application for funds in grants programs with (in practice) little follow-up
by the funding body to ensure value for money. For cash-strapped farms, it
becomes difficult to justify capital investments with long payback periods,
uncertain returns, and potentially reduced land productivity. Service
payments could address these common concerns by providing consistent
funding sources. The farmers would begin to think differently about the
nature of running a farm, as well, perhaps instilling new attitudes and
priorities toward land management.
III
NOTES FROM THE FIELD

Needless to say, this is a different way of thinking about
environmental protection than the traditional approaches of regulation,
taxes, and subsidies. Such an approach may immediately give rise to a
whole host of objections: How could this work in practice? Are we paying
the polluters? Will this create perverse incentives making things worse?
These are legitimate concerns and we will fully consider them later in the
Article, but they should be put on hold for the moment because such
payments for services are not simply “pie in the sky” musings. As noted in
the Introduction, despite the theoretical objections to, and the practical
difficulties of, creating markets for services, there are examples from
around the world that belie these concerns; and their number is growing.
With the goal of grounding our analysis in fact, this section tells some
stories from the field. It briefly describes three of the most influential
ecosystem service markets around the globe—New York City’s drinking
water protection program, BushTender in Australia, and Pagos por
Servicios Ambientales in Costa Rica. These short case studies will give the
reader a more practical sense of where these markets came from and how
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they operate. Note in particular how the markets have overcome the
obstacles of public goods, lack of information on service provision, and the
institutional barriers described earlier, as well as how the unavailability of
more traditional instruments such as regulation and taxation has led to
payment schemes. There are more stories to tell of other markets, but we
will turn to them in Parts IV and V, which examine and critique specific
market design issues in detail.
A.

New York City

As described in Part II, New York City’s decision to invest in land
management in the Catskills catchment is the best known example of an
ecosystem service market and has effectively become the “poster child” of
ecosystem service advocates. The city’s investment decision was driven by
new drinking water regulations that would have required the construction
of a multi-billion dollar treatment plant.70 The financial attraction of
investing in the ecosystem service of water purification was justified by the
avoided cost of not building the treatment plant. Before deciding to invest,
however, New York City first tried to manage land uses in the upper
catchment solely by regulation.
In the early part of the twentieth century, recognizing the significance
of the Catskills and Delaware watersheds to New York City’s drinking
water, the state assembly granted New York City the right to condemn land
and regulate development in these areas.71 This created the situation,
unusual to say the least, of a city with land use controls over communities
more than one hundred miles away. In the early 1990s, the administration
of Mayor David Dinkins proposed new land use requirements for the upper
catchment that would improve water quality, such as limits on the amount
of paved surface on a property, restrictions on development, obligations to
collect and treat storm water, and limitations on watershed farming
activities.72 Not surprisingly, the efforts of “rich city folk” in New York to
regulate, without prior consultation, how upstate farmers and landholders
managed their properties were met with intense political opposition.73
Faced with the EPA’s concern that New York City could not ensure
the success of this catchment management program, the governor of New
York State stepped in and a stakeholder consultation process emerged.74
After two years and more than 150 meetings, the group finally came up
70 For a more detailed, well-written recounting of the story, see DAILY & ELLISON, supra
note 17, at 61–85.
71 See N.Y. Public Health Law § 73 (1909) (codified as amended at N.Y. Public Health Law
§ 1104 (McKinney 2002)); DAILY & ELLISON, supra note 17, at 69.
72 DAILY & ELLISON, supra note 17, at 73.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 74.
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with a Memorandum of Agreement signed by sixty towns, ten villages,
seven counties, and various environmental groups.75 One participant
described the exhaustive process as similar to a “rolling Thanksgiving
dinner with relatives you only want to see once a year.”76
While often described as the best example of payments for ecosystem
services, New York City’s system, in contrast with the other schemes
described below, makes relatively few payments directly to land
management. The Memorandum of Agreement provides for $1.5 billion of
spending commitments by New York City over ten years, funded by city
water and sewer user charges.77 Of this, $250 million has been targeted to
acquisition of fee title and conservation easements in critical areas.78 In
addition, New York City will spend over $270 million on “partnership
programs” fostering water quality and economic development in the
Catskill/Delaware Watershed, many of which will be administered by the
newly-created nonprofit Catskill Watershed Corporation.79
The key point is that while a few of these programs provide payments
to landholders for management (mostly in pilot projects),80 the majority of
the funds are primarily directed either at infrastructure projects (sewers,
treatment works, storm water drains) or to municipalities and development
interests.81 In the clearest example of this, New York City has provided up
to $9.765 million in “good neighbor payments” for municipal capital
projects in watershed communities.82 Thus, while the Catskills experience
provides an important example of paying to manage a catchment for water
purification services, paying landholders directly to change their practices
represents a relatively small part of the program.
The initiative has had mixed results to date. New York City’s offer to
pay farmers $100 per acre every year for up to fifteen years to plant native
75

Id.
Id.
77 Id.; see generally City of N.Y. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Watershed Agreement Overview
(describing
in
detail
Memorandum
of
Agreement),
at
http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/dep/html/agreement.html#Watershed (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
Information on the water and sewer use charges was provided through personal email
communication with Al Appleton, Former Director of New York City Department of
Environmental Protection (Mar. 21, 2005) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
78 City of N.Y. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., supra note 77.
79 “Watershed Protection and Partnership Programs” established by the Watershed
Agreement range from new sewage treatment infrastructure ($75 million), the Catskill Fund for
the Future (economic development projects, $59.7 million), and storm water infrastructure and
maintenance ($31.7 million) to improved storage of de-icing materials ($10.25 million) and
environmental education ($2 million). New York State has also committed $53 million for a
range of initiatives. Catskill Watershed Corp., Summary Guide to the Terms of the Watershed
Agreement, at http://www.cwconline.org/about/moa/moappp.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
80 City of N.Y. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., supra note 77.
81 Id.
82 Catskill Watershed Corp., supra note 79.
76
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species along streams resulted in only about 400 acres being planted by the
fall of 2000.83 The problem, it turned out, was that corn crops provided a
much greater return per acre.84 Most farmers have, however, made use of
the free consultation service and infrastructure subsidies for fences and
pumps.85 Efforts to purchase land have not met expectations, either.86
While the Memorandum of Agreement commits a great deal of money for
land purchase, ironically this may be a cause of the lack of success in
making purchases.87 When a landholder sees someone walking down the
driveway with a big bag full of cash, the purchase price has a tendency to
rise.
Overall, though, it should be kept in mind that the grand experiment
so far has been successful. A major review by the EPA in 2002 persuaded
the agency to extend the waiver treatment for surface waters a further five
years to 2007.88 The size of the payment scheme is impressive, but given
the special features of the case study—such as New York City’s regulatory
authority over its watershed, the EPA mandate requiring action, the clear
value of the cost avoided in not building a treatment plant, and the ability to
raise capital—it is not clear how transferable the model is.89
B.

BushTender (Australia)

In Australia, the State of Victoria’s Department of Natural Resources
and Environment has developed a pilot program to conserve native
vegetation remnants on private property.90 In exchange for payments from
the state government, the landholders commit to fencing off and managing
an agreed amount of their native vegetation for a set period of time.91 The
program is based on the model of the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP) in the United States, one of the largest ecosystem service payment
83

DAILY & ELLISON, supra note 17, at 80.
Id.
85 Id.
86 While approximately 270,000 acres had been solicited for purchase by 2002, only 33,764
had been acquired, with almost sixty percent of these in high priority areas. City of N.Y. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., New York City’s 2001 Watershed Protection Program Summary, Assessment and
Long-term Plan 47 (2001), at http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/dep/pdf/moapdf/fadplan.pdf.
87 Id. at 30 (noting that as of November 2001, almost $58 million had been spent on land
acquisition).
88 Press Release, EPA Region 2, EPA Grants NYC a New Waiver from Filtering Most of Its
Drinking Water Supply; City to Expand Watershed Protections, Benefitting Upstate Environment
and Economy (Nov. 26, 2002), at http://www.epa.gov/region02/news/2002/02123.htm.
89 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 301–03 (describing unique aspects of Catskills example).
90 See GARY STONEHAM ET AL., AUCTIONS FOR CONSERVATION CONTRACTS:
AN
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF VICTORIA’S BUSHTENDER TRIAL 12–13 (2002) (web-published
paper by members of Department of Natural Resources and Environment and Melbourne
Business School in Australia), at http://eprints.anu.edu.au/archive/00002198/01/stoneha1.pdf.
91 Id. at 10–11.
84
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schemes in the world.92 CRP provides annual rental payments and shares
the cost of conservation practices on farmland.93 First created in the 1980s
to address problems of soil erosion and to support farm incomes at a time
of plummeting crop prices, the program has grown over the years, now
paying for land changes that promote water quality and wildlife habitat.94
As of January 2005, its annual payments exceeded $1.6 billion for activities
on over thirty-four million acres.95 The Farm Service Agency estimated
that as of October 1996, topsoil loss had been reduced on CRP lands by
twenty-one percent and pesticide and nutrient runoff had also been
reduced.96
CRP contracts extend from ten to fifteen years.97 To be eligible for
CRP support, the land must have been planted in four out of the six years
from 1996 to 2001 and must meet a set of requirements ensuring it can
provide services.98 Farmers wishing to enroll in the CRP submit a bid for

92 In 2002 and 2003, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) paid out roughly $1.7 billion
each year to participants in rental and cost-share payments. FARM SERVICE AGENCY, USDA,
CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR SUMMARY 2003 1 (Nov. 2004), at
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/dafp/cepd/stats/FY2003.pdf [hereinafter CRP 2003 FISCAL YEAR
SUMMARY].
93 FARM SERVICE AGENCY, USDA, CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM FACT SHEET, at
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/html/crp03.htm; see also DANIÈLE PERROTMAÎTRE & PATSY DAVIS, CASE STUDIES OF MARKETS AND INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL
MECHANISMS FOR WATER SERVICES FROM FORESTS 37 (2001) (examining three categories of
financial mechanisms, namely, self-organized private deals, trading schemes, and public payment
schemes).
94 JAMES B. JOHNSON & RICHARD T. CLARK, THE CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM
(2003), at http://www.farmfoundation.org/2002_farm_bill/jbjohnson.pdf.
95 FARM SERVICE AGENCY, USDA, CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM MONTHLY
SUMMARY, at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/dafp/cepd/crp_statistics.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2005)
[hereinafter CRP Monthly Summary].
96 For the figure on reduction in topsoil loss, see FARM SERVICE AGENCY, USDA, HISTORY
OF THE CRP, at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/dafp/cepd/12crplogo/history.htm (last visited Mar. 30,
2005), and for information on the reduction in pesticide and nutrient runoff, see INDIANA OFFICES
FOR THE FARM SERVICE AGENCY, THE CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM, at
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/in/crp.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). In the 2003 CRP Fiscal Year
Summary, eighty-five percent of respondents reported improved control of soil erosion and thirtynine percent of respondents reported improvements in water quality. CRP 2003 FISCAL YEAR
SUMMARY, supra note 92, at app. 2. In 2003, the CRP program reported a 446 million ton
reduction in soil erosion, a 655,000 ton reduction in nitrogen application, and 1.8 million acres in
restored wetlands. Id. at iii.
97 CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM FACT SHEET, supra note 93.
98 7 C.F.R. § 1410.6(a)(1) (2005). The land must be physically and legally capable of
growing an agricultural commodity, be a marginal pastureland that is suitable for planting as a
riparian buffer, or be devoted to a new wetland practice or a wildlife habitat buffer practice. In
addition, the land must also be: (1) highly erodible, (2) cropped wetland, (3) dedicated to
beneficial environmental practices (such as filter strips or riparian buffers), (4) subject to scour
erosion, and (5) located in a national or state CRP conservation priority area; or be a cropland
associated with or surrounding noncropped wetlands. § 1410.6(a)–(b).
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their land to be accepted in the program.99 Their offers are ranked by
government field officers according to an Environmental Benefits Index
measuring improvements in erosion control, wildlife habitat, water quality,
air quality, and cost.100 Farmers’ offers are then ranked according to score
and bids are selected from their relative ranking.101
While the CRP has many supporters, its critics point to four major
failings. First, there are concerns over “slippage”—farmers may be
plowing up other land to compensate for land placed in the CRP
program.102 Second, the land eligibility criteria have been interpreted too
broadly, allowing CRP enrollment for lands that do not contribute
significantly to service provision.103 Third, the program can send the wrong
message. As one scholar has written, many farmers became frustrated
because they “had taken too good care of their land and could not qualify
[for CRP funds], even though their land was intrinsically as erodible as
their neighbor’s.”104 In managing their lands responsibly, they had paid for
99 Katherine H. Reichelderfer & William G. Boggess, Government Decision Making and
Program Performance: The Case of the Conservation Reserve Program, 70 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON.
1, at 1–2 (1988). To increase the likelihood of their bids being accepted, farmers can stipulate
that they will accept a lower rental rate than the local market price. Id. at 3.
100 This index is a composite score, with points for wildlife habitat benefits resulting from
covers on contract acreage; water quality benefits from reduced erosion, runoff, and leaching; onfarm benefits of reduced erosion; enduring benefits; air quality benefits from reduced wind
erosion and greenhouse gas sequestration; and cost. FARM SERVICE AGENCY, USDA,
CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM (CRP) SIGN-UP 29—QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, at
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/pas/FullStory.asp?StoryID=1904 (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
101 Reichelderfer & Boggess, supra note 99, at 3. To promote revegetation, CRP pays up to
fifty percent of the eligible costs of establishing new conservation measures. 7 C.F.R. §
1410.41(a) (2005). The CRP determines annual rental payments on a weighted average soil
rental rate based on the relative productivity of the soils within each county and the average dryland cash rent, with an additional incentive payment for certain practices, including continuous
sign-ups. § 1410.42(b). The average per-acre rental payment for farmable wetland was $120.80
in 2003. CRP 2003 FISCAL YEAR SUMMARY, supra note 92, at 1. Farmers can also offer land at
a lower rental rate to increase the likelihood of their being selected for the program.
§ 1410.31(c)(3). The maximum amount of rental payments that can be received by any person
under the CRP is $50,000 per year. § 1410.42(d).
102 See JunJie Wu, Slippage Effects of the Conservation Reserve Program: Reply, 87 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 251, 254 (2005) (finding that leakage accounted for thirteen to forty-five percent
of CRP acreage in Corn Belt and Lake Belt states); Greg Gordon & James Walsh, Success in
Saving Topsoil or Misguided Conservation?, STAR TRIB., June 25, 1995, at 1A (stating that nine
Great Plains states enrolled 17.3 million acres in CRP from 1985 to 1992, but total amount of
harvested cropland only declined by 2.6 million acres).
103 Gordon & Walsh, supra note 102 (noting that as much as seventy-seven percent of CRP
land in Minnesota could be farmed with little ecological harm if proper management practices
were used, and presenting conclusion of General Accounting Office that strategically setting aside
6 million acres of cropland as riparian buffers would protect water quality better than current CRP
program which is six times larger); Reichelderfer & Boggess, supra note 99, at 5.
104 Gordon & Walsh, supra note 102 (quoting Philip Gersmehl, University of Minnesota
geography professor). Personal email communication from Steven Kraft, Professor, Department
of Agribusiness Economics, Carbondale, IL, Southern Illinois University (Feb. 6, 2005) (noting
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conservation measures out of their own pocket and now could not apply for
CRP funds. Finally, perhaps as a result of collusion in the bidding process,
farmers’ bids clustered just below the program’s clearance price (which
was set as a per hectare price) and above local market rental rates.105
BushTender improves upon the CRP through its reliance on a robust
assessment methodology and reverse auction mechanism to set the price of
the contracts.106 The first BushTender trial was completed in 2002 in the
north central and northeast regions of the state.107 With the assistance of
farmers’ associations, the Victorian Department of Natural Resources
(NRE) publicized that it might be willing to pay farmers to conserve native
vegetation.108 Interested landholders contacted NRE, who then sent out
field staff to inspect the sites, explaining to landholders which of their
native vegetation were most significant and what kinds of conservation
activities would be most effective.109 The field staff assessed the value of
each site’s native vegetation on two scales of value. One scale was called
the Biodiversity Significance Score (rating the site’s conservation value
according to scarcity of remnant types) and the other the Habitat Services
Score (assessing the proposed management action’s contribution to
biodiversity improvement, such as fencing or weed control).110
Landholders were informed of the Habitat Services Score, but importantly,
not the Biodiversity Significance Score.111 Thus they were told which land
management changes were most important, but not how significant their
remnants were. Interested landholders then could choose to submit bids,
detailing in a management plan developed with the field officer which
remnant vegetation (and how much) they would be willing to conserve, as
well as the management regime they would implement for the remnants.
The range of proposed management actions ranged from excluding stock,

that this was important concern during early years of CRP).
105 Gordon & Walsh, supra note 102 (citing research by Steven Taff, agricultural economist at
University of Minnesota, that Department of Agriculture officials set secret ceilings on rents they
would pay, but farmers always seemed to know ceilings and “[i]f the maximum was $50 an
acre . . . everybody bid $49.99.”). But see STONEHAM ET AL., supra note 90, at 22, and
Reichelderfer & Boggess, supra note 99, at 10, for argument that similar results could occur
through sequential learning without collusion.
106 STONEHAM ET AL., supra note 90, at 11.
107 Id. at 12.
108 Details of the BushTender case are taken from STONEHAM ET AL., supra note 90, at 11–13,
and Interview with Gary Stoneham, Senior Economist, Victorian Department of Natural
Resources, in Melbourne, Austl. (Oct. 14, 2002). Further details are available on the government
department
website
at
http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/dse/nrence.nsf/LinkView/15F9D8C40FE51BE64A256A72007E12DC
8062D358172E420C4A256DEA0012F71C.
109 Interview with Gary Stoneham, supra note 108.
110 STONEHAM ET AL., supra note 90, at 11.
111 Id.
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retaining large trees, and controlling rabbits, to controlling weeds and
revegetation.112
Because NRE had an estimate of potential biodiversity importance for
each of these sites, they were able to calculate the best value for money
(i.e., by identifying those bids that offered greatest biodiversity value for
least cost per hectare—those squares on the right side of Figure 2,
below).113 Given a limited funding budget, only the most cost-effective
bids were funded.114
FIGURE 2: THRESHOLD-BBI AND BID DATA
[Printer: insert fig2.doc here]
For many landholders, uncleared native vegetation is often viewed as
lost income. The key to the BushTender approach is that it requires
landholders to determine their own price for setting aside or improving
their native vegetation.115 By having to decide how much they are willing
to accept in a competitive setting (because other landholders are also
bidding), the landholders must consider seriously the relative values of the
land in both its current and future managed states.
Beyond the fact that the scheme was well received and
oversubscribed, the environmental benefits seem significant. NRE field
staff concluded that most of the successful bids contained sites of high or
very high conservation significance, including twenty-four new populations
of rare or threatened plant species.116 Perhaps the most important and
unexpected finding, though, was that many of the bids were for less money
than the NRE would have been willing to pay had they negotiated directly
with landholders.117 It is not clear whether the lower price was due to the
market pressures of competitive bidding, the NRE overestimation of
landholders’ willingness to accept, or the fact that once landholders
understood the non-market value of their native vegetation, they were
willing to internalize some of the perceived costs of conservation.118
112 In all, from 126 expressions of interest, field officers assessed 223 sites. In the end, 98
landholders submitted 148 bids for 186 sites. Id. at 14.
113 The total score, known as the Biodiversity Benefits Index (BBI), was calculated by
multiplying the Biodiversity Significance Score and Habitat Significance Score and dividing by
the cost (or price) of the bid. Id. at 12.
114 In the end, the Department of Natural Resources and Environment (NRE) accepted ninetyseven bids, with landholders committing to conserve and manage roughly 3200 hectares of native
vegetation under three-year BushTender Management Agreements for a total cost of
approximately A$400,000. Compliance monitoring occurs through random site inspections. Id.
at 14–17.
115 Id. at 13.
116 Interview with Gary Stoneham, supra note 108.
117 STONEHAM ET AL., supra note 90, at 18.
118 It is an open question whether persuasive instruments, such as brochures or educational
visits from conservation staff, would have achieved the same result as competitive bidding. At
first glance, this seems unlikely because the landholders would not be forced to consider the true
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Based on the success of BushTender, the Victorian government has
funded BushTender II, with a focus on biodiversity and salinity reduction
services.119 The model has also been adopted in the neighboring state of
New South Wales.120
C.

Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (Costa Rica)

Ecosystems provide valuable services in countries rich and poor alike,
and markets are emerging in both developed and developing countries.
Costa Rica has long recognized the importance of services provided by
forested watersheds, providing tax rebates to timber companies for forest
conservation since the 1970s.121 In 1997, Costa Rica launched a nationwide
scheme of payments for provision of ecosystem services, known as Pagos
por Servicios Ambientales (PSA).122 The PSA permits the government to
enter into binding contracts with landowners for the provision of four
services: sequestration of carbon, water quality and quantity (i.e., for
drinking, irrigation or hydroelectric power), biodiversity conservation, and
aesthetic beauty for ecotourism.123
Rather than mandating that beneficiaries of services pay for them, the
law establishes a framework for service payments. Thus, the government is
provided authority to act as a broker, negotiating contracts between
potential service buyers and providers. The government has created a body
value of their willingness to accept land changes.
119 Interview with Gary Stoneham, supra note 108.
120 Inspired by BushTender, the New South Wales government has launched a pilot project
known as the Environmental Services Scheme that pays twenty farmers to take part in a threeyear, A$2 million pilot scheme to provide environmental services on their properties. The
farmers whose bids are successful work with an environmental services team to develop a
management plan that regenerates parts of their land. Once the regeneration work has been
carried out, the government pays the farmers. Unlike the BushTender trial, the Ecosystem
Services Scheme (formerly known as the Environmental Services Scheme) is broader, covering
biodiversity, salinity, acid sulfate soils, carbon sequestration, as well as soil and nutrient
management. It also requires the farmers to take positive action, changing current land
management practices. At the moment, it appears that separate indices of value will be
established for each service and that no attempt will be made to combine the separate values into
a composite environmental benefits index that would account for tradeoffs (e.g., actions that
promote one goal and hurt another, such as tree planting to combat salinity versus other
vegetation that might better promote biodiversity). See N.S.W. Dep’t of Infrastructure, Planning
Environmental
Services
Scheme,
at
and
Natural
Res.
2001,
http://www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/es_scheme.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2004); N.S.W. Dep’t of
Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Res. 2001, Environmental Services Scheme at a Glance 1–2,
12, at http://www.dlwc.nsw.gov.au/care/enviro_services%20_eoi1.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
121 Details of the Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) program are taken from Pagiola,
supra note 10, at 37. “The PSA program did not start with a blank slate. Beginning in the
1970’s, concern over dwindling timber supplies had led Costa Rica to provide incentives for
reforestation. Initial efforts focused on tax rebates.” Id. at 40.
122 Id. at 40.
123 Id.
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called FONAFIFO to administer the program (e.g., to negotiate the
agreements, monitor compliance, administer payments, etc.).124 With the
aid of professional foresters, NGOs, or the Conservation Areas Agency,
landholders develop a sustainable forestry plan of management. This plan
is then adapted into a conservation easement that is entered in the property
deed, so the obligation runs with the title to all subsequent owners until it
expires.125 Most contracts extend over a five-year period (though they can
go up to twenty years).126
The key to the scheme has been its success in finding both willing
buyers and sellers. By the middle of 2000, roughly 200,000 hectares of
forest were being managed for service provision in exchange for
payments.127 An additional 800,000 hectares had been proposed for
conservation management but not included in the program because of
inadequate funding.128 It is important to note, however, that most of the
land has been managed for biodiversity, not water services. This is due
primarily to the available resources and numbers of willing buyers. The
World Bank, with a $32 million loan, and the Global Environment Facility,
with a $8 million grant, have provided the means to pay for biodiversity
conservation.129
By contrast, only about $100,000 has been paid specifically for water
service provision from 2400 hectares.130 While the potential purchasers of
water services might include water suppliers, irrigators, industrial users,
and people in flood plains, so far the payments for water quality have come
primarily from hydroelectric power generators concerned over
sedimentation.131
Deforestation can lead to serious erosion, particularly on hillsides.
Forest cover prevents the rush of sediment loads into streams and,
eventually, dammed reservoirs, which results in much lower maintenance
costs for hydroelectric power plants that would otherwise have to dredge.
There have been no contracts to date from water suppliers.132
124

Id. at 40–41.
Id. at 41, 50.
126 Id. at 50.
127 There have been no studies to date examining the likelihood that this land would have been
cleared for logging. Id. at 53.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 42.
130 Id. at 56. Landowners have been paid $10–42 per hectare per year for water quality
services, based on the principle that payments should be no less than the landowner’s opportunity
cost and no greater than the benefit provided. Id. at 49, 52.
131 Id. at 42. Sedimentation reduces the capacity of a hydroelectric plant’s reservoir and
correspondingly reduces the amount of power that the plant can generate. See Castaldi et al., A
Study of Hydroelectric Power: From a Global Perspective to a Local Application 8 (2003), at
http://ww.ems.psu.edu/~elsworth/courses/cause2003/finalprojects/vikingpaper.pdf.
132 Another Costa Rican initiative worth noting is similar to the Catskills case. Costa Rica’s
125
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IV
NOTES FROM THE FIELD—INSTRUMENT DESIGN CHALLENGES

Part II set out why service markets are so hard to design. Part III
showed that, despite these challenges, service markets can be created and
already exist. Let us now take a closer look, melding the theory of Part II
with the practice of Part III to examine how to design an ecosystem service
market that works. The key starting observation is that, despite the
significant differences among Part III’s market examples in terms of
structure, service provided, and size, they all share fundamentally similar
design challenges. Indeed, as any environmental policy course makes clear
in the first class, these are the same challenges facing any policy
instrument, fiscal or regulatory, designed to conserve natural resources. In
other words, regardless of the policy instrument employed—whether
prescription, penalty, persuasion, property, or payment—one must
determine: (1) what services need to be delivered, (2) how they are to be
provided, (3) who the providers and beneficiaries are to be, and (4) how
much service provision is necessary.133
A.

What Is the Service Being Provided?

In using government instruments to influence ecosystem service
provision, the very first question to consider is which service you care
about or, more to the point, which problem you care about and whether it
can be addressed by land management. In BushTender, for example, the
problem is loss of local biodiversity; the ecosystem service of biodiversity
is provided through conservation of remnant native vegetation. In the case
Ministry of Environment and Energy charges 20,000 water consumers near San José a small
surcharge on monthly water bills. The funds are used to pay upper watershed farmers who have
agreed to conserve and manage their forests. DAILY & ELLISON, supra note 17, at 65.
133 There is a huge body of literature on the general design of environmental policy
OBJECTIVES, INSTRUMENTS, AND
instruments.
See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
IMPLEMENTATION (Dieter Helm ed., 2000) (providing glimpses of potential to apply economic
concepts to environmental policy); PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Paul R.
Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2d ed. 2000) (examining six trends in environmental policy
developments since 1989); THOMAS STERNER, POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2002). Scholarship on instrument design for ecosystem
service conservation, by contrast, is quite meager. The best overall assessment from an economic
perspective is by Geoffrey Heal. HEAL, supra note 14, at 133–41. The best article analyzing
instruments for land conservation is Christopher S. Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives, Gifts, and
Governance: Toward Conservation Stewardship of Private Land, in Cultural and Psychological
Perspective, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 495 (2003). Elmendorf draws upon sociological and
psychological studies of attitudes toward land, community, and environment, and on social
psychology of group conflict. Id. The best legal overview of market instruments for service
conservation (with particularly good examination of instruments to provide instream water flows)
is Thompson, supra note 22, at 295–98 (2000). This Article builds on this scholarship, with the
major addition that my concerns and analysis were driven by the practical need to develop and
implement a pilot program in the field.
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of the CRP, the problem initially was erosion; the ecosystem service of soil
retention was provided through plants’ root systems. In Costa Rica, the
major problem is sedimentation of hydroelectric dams; the service of
sediment retention is provided through forest conservation.
For the Catskills, though, the answers have been less obvious. In
general, the problem is pollution and the service is water purification. But
these descriptions are too broad to help in instrument design because they
do not indicate the appropriate land management regime to provide the
service. Concerns over eutrophication (excessive nitrates and phosphates
leading to algal blooms) implicate the service of nutrient uptake, for
example, while concerns over turbidity indicate the need for greater
sediment retention.
B.

How Is the Service Provided?

The next question concerns how the service is provided. This is a
purely technical question. It requires delineating the biophysical pathways
of the pollutants. If the service in question is nutrient reduction, what are
the landscape processes that keep the nitrates and phosphates from
fertilizers and manure out of the watercourses? Such an analysis leads to a
better understanding of which landscape management practices need to be
encouraged by the policy instrument (such as riparian vegetation or swales)
or, conversely, those that need to be discouraged (such as land clearing).
Consider, for example, the pilot program to combat salinity along the
Macquarie River in Australia.134 Underneath much of Australia the
groundwater is saline, a remnant of the vast salt sea that used to sit atop the
continent. In the drive to settle and tame the country, settlers were often
required to clear most of the native vegetation before they could claim title
to the land.135 As a result, the ecosystem service of evapotranspiration that
had long served as a water pump to keep rainwater from reaching the
groundwater table well below the surface was seriously weakened.136
Large expanses of agricultural areas now face the serious threat of
134 Macquarie River Food and Fibre (Austl.), Welcome to Macquarie River Food and Fibre
(explaining
background
and
purpose
of
reforestation
project),
at
http://www.mrff.com.au/forests.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
135 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Early History of Land Tenure, OFFICIAL YEAR BOOK OF
COMMONWEALTH
OF
AUSTRALIA,
1910,
available
at
THE
http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/88fd067140fc3f4dca2569e300102388?OpenDocume
nt (noting that Land and Pastoral Acts of 1869 required settlers to cultivate land).
136 See David Bennett & D.K. Macpherson, A Salty Bunch of Dates 1772–1899: A History of
Salinity in Western Australia:
Important (and Some Unimportant) Dates, at
http://agspsrv34.agric.wa.gov.au/environment/salinity/intro/history1.htm (last updated March 16,
2004); Dept. of Agriculture, Western Austl., Salinity at a Glance, at
http://agspsrv34.agric.wa.gov.au/environment/salinity/intro/salinity_at_a_glance.htm
(last
updated March 17, 2002).
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salinity—saline groundwater rising to the root zone of plants and stunting
their growth.137 One area that is just starting to feel this effect is the
verdant Macquarie River valley.
As a pilot program to combat salinity, New South Wales State Forests
signed a contract with Macquarie River Food and Fiber (MRFF, an
organization that represents more than 600 Macquarie Valley irrigation
farmers and their families)138 to purchase “salinity control credits.”139 In
simple terms, rather than mechanically pumping groundwater to keep the
water table below the root zone of cash crops, MRFF is purchasing the
ecosystem service of evapotranspiration for ten years by paying grazers to
plant 100 hectares of native forest in the upper Macquarie River catchments
(which, in theory, should lead to a reduction in groundwater levels in the
lower catchments).140 The project has provided valuable public relations
benefits and improved relations between the irrigation farmers (who have
been making money) with the sheep farmers (who have not).141 In theory,
this scheme could provide the extra income that would make timber
production a profitable undertaking in traditional grazing areas that have
been considered marginal tree cropping country.142 It also provides a
steady income stream that can prove significant during lean crop years.
The key challenge in the project has been biophysical uncertainty over
service provision—the link between upstream revegetation efforts and
downstream salinity reduction. The trees were planted in “salinity hot
spots” (i.e., known groundwater recharge zones) and estimated to transpire
53.5 megalitres per hectare over ten years.143 It is not known, however,
137 See MICHELE JOHN & ROSS KINGWELL, A REVIEW OF OPTIONS FOR DRYLAND SALINITY
MANAGEMENT IN LOW RAINFALL AGRICULTURAL ENVIRONMENTS IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA
(Sustainability & Econ. in Agric., Working Paper No. 02/07, 2002), at
http://www1.crcsalinity.com.au/newsletter/SeaNews/dpap0207.htm (last revised May 21, 2003);
Nat’l Audit Office, Administration of the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality
(reporting on planning and governance of National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality
administered by Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Department of Environment
and
Heritage),
at
http://www.anao.gov.au/WebSite.nsf/Publications/F176D586559BC247CA256F6A006E587D
(last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
138 Macquarie River Food and Fibre (Austl.), Macquarie River Food and Fibre (explaining
background and purpose of MRFF), at http://www.mrff.com.au/about.html (last visited Apr. 12,
2005).
139 Macquarie River Food and Fibre (Austl.), Welcome to Macquarie River Food and Fibre
(explaining salinity control credits), at http://www.mrff.com.au/salinity.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2005); Interview with Sue Salvin, Consultant, N.S.W. State Forests, Sydney, (Nov. 18, 2002).
140 Macquarie River Food and Fibre (MRFF) actually pays N.S.W. State Forests, which then
passes on the money as an annuity to landholders in the upper reaches of the Macquarie to plant
and manage native forest on their land. Title to the timber resource and the carbon sequestration
value is retained by State Forests. Macquarie River Food and Fibre, supra note 134.
141 Interview with Sue Salvin, supra note 139.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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whether this change in land use and resulting transpiration will lead to any
measurable reduction in salinity downstream. Because of the complex
hydrology, it is not even known how much land use change is needed for
significant salinity changes. Given the poor understanding of how the
service is provided and the time lags involved, at this point MRFF is
unlikely to expand the pilot project until it has more confidence in the
investment needed (i.e., the amount of upper catchments revegetation) to
cause a significant reduction in lower catchments salinity levels.144
C.

Who Provides the Service and Who Benefits?

To craft a policy instrument, one needs to know not only the behavior
one is trying to influence, but also who the regulatory target is. Take the
problem of biodiversity loss. We cannot simply legislate against
biodiversity loss. We first need to determine the specific actions that are
reducing biodiversity and the parties responsible for these actions. One
clear target for regulation would be landholders who have large patches of
remnant native vegetation under threat on their land. The specific behavior
to encourage would be to halt land clearing. Active management of these
remnants for conservation would be better still.
More specifically, if we are interested in creating ecosystem service
markets, we need a clear idea at the outset of who the buyers and sellers
will be. As noted in Part II, markets for services can be established only if
there are discrete groups of providers and beneficiaries.145 Otherwise,
transaction costs become too high for contract formation. While we all
gain from the insurance service and medicinal benefits of having a vast
store of potential disease cures in nature’s biodiversity, there is no locally
discrete class of beneficiaries with whom landholders can negotiate for
biodiversity conservation efforts.
As a result, to overcome collective action problems, most successful
service markets to date operate as monopsonies, with only one buyer for
multiple service provider sellers.
The only reason biodiversity
conservation contracts were so successful in Costa Rica was because of the
unusual role played by the World Bank and the Global Environment
Facility as a single, surrogate purchaser that stepped in with millions of
dollars to purchase services on behalf of the world. The success of
BushTender was also due to it being a monopsony. Monopsonies have
arisen to create successful markets for other types of ecosystem services as
well. In the Catskills, there was only a single purchaser, namely New York
City’s water authority. Whether for biodiversity or clean water, the
government pays for these services on behalf of the citizenry. Such actions
144
145

Id.
See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
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are entirely appropriate, it should be noted, since they correct the market
failure posed by public goods.
Nor are monopsony buyers limited to governments alone. In Costa
Rica, every water quality contract to date has involved a single dominant
water user in the watershed (i.e., hydroelectric power producers concerned
over sedimentation in their dams).146 One might argue that water utilities
and energy companies operate in a quasi-governmental capacity, but purely
private markets often act as monopsonies, as well. Consider, in this regard,
the case of Perrier Vittel, the largest bottler of mineral water in the world.147
In the early 1990s, seeking to reduce the nitrates and pesticides entering the
springs around its bottling operations in northeastern France, Perrier Vittel
employed a range of payment mechanisms to change land uses in the
catchment area.148 For an estimated $9 million, Perrier Vittel paid abovemarket prices to purchase 1500 hectares around its water springs.149 In an
innovative move, Perrier Vittel then offered to give back free usufruct
rights to the land to the prior owners if they followed prescribed
management practices.150 Perrier Vittel also signed long-term (eighteen to
thirty years) contracts with forty farmers covering an additional 10,000
hectares, paying them to use less intensive dairy farming techniques.151
The net result of these initiatives has been a reduction in non-point source
pollution and significant changes in local dairy farming and animal waste
management practices while eliminating corn cultivation and use of
agricultural chemicals.152
D.

How Much Service Is Needed?

So far we have identified the service to be provided, how it is
provided, and who the providers and beneficiaries are, but we still lack one
critical piece of information—the level of service provision. We need
more precision than simply identifying potential polluters and service
providers. If we choose to regulate, we need to know whom to regulate,
which actions should be proscribed, and by how much. If we decide to tax,
146

Pagiola, supra note 10, at 49.
MARITTA KOCH-WESER & WALTER KAHLENBORN, BISHKEK GLOBAL MOUNTAIN
SUMMIT 2002, LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND COMPENSATION MECHANISMS IN SUPPORT OF
SUSTAINABLE
MOUNTAIN
DEVELOPMENT
§
2.5,
at
http://www.mtnforum.org/resources/library/kochx02a.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
148 Id.
149 PERROT-MAÎTRE & DAVIS, supra note 93, at 5.
150 Id.
151 The payments are intended to cover opportunity costs and average $230/hectare per year
for seven years (an investment of about $155,000 per farm). Perrier Vittel has also provided
farmers with free technical support and paid for farm infrastructure (primarily buildings and
machinery). The company retains ownership and has the right to monitor their proper use. Id.
152 Id. at 4.
147
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we need to know not only whom to tax, but also how much to charge. If
we end up choosing a payment instrument, we need to know not only
whom to pay, but also how much to pay them.
This is a critical point to understand. It is not enough to know that
riparian fencing throughout a subcatchment is a good thing because it will
improve water quality. Given the reality of limited budgets, the key
question becomes which riparian stretches need to be fenced off to provide
the greatest level of water purification. This is necessarily a landscapedependent judgment and is far easier said than done.
The PSA program in Costa Rica, for example, does not really consider
the level of service provision. While some areas might be classified as
priority areas, the program allows any landholder, anywhere in the country,
to participate and to be paid the same amount, regardless of whether they
provide valuable services or not. As one commentator has stated, “There
was . . . no targeting in micro terms (for example, there was no effort to
target particular areas within the watershed that are particularly valuable
from the perspective of water services, such as riparian zones or steep
slopes).”153 As a result, the PSA approach resembles a general subsidy
scheme, virtually ensuring the suboptimal targeting of public funds.
What would be more effective, by contrast, would be targeted funding
with payments based on level of service provision, targeted regulations, or
differential taxes on the critical actors. But determining how much service
a particular landholder provides and, more to the point, can provide,
through land management changes is the greatest challenge to using policy
instruments to ensure provision of ecosystem services.154 The real success
of both the Environmental Services Scheme and BushTender does not lie in
their use of reverse auction mechanisms; that is an efficiency improvement.
The key to their success lies in their field scoring systems. The Victorian
NRE was able to determine the best bids (in terms of ecosystem services
bang for the buck) by dividing the site biodiversity value per hectare by the
bid price. Such calculations are only meaningful, however, if the scoring
systems (which are estimates of service provision) prove credible. If the
assessment of biodiversity value proves to be poor, then there is no
assurance that the money was well spent nor that the public is actually
getting value for money.
BushTender felt it could provide accurate assessments of biodiversity
value through field visits to specific patches of remnant vegetation. Doing

153

Pagiola, supra note 10, at 54.
Note, as well, that in some cases, perhaps many, landscape management may not provide
adequate levels of service provision, and built provisions such as tertiary treatment plants for
water quality problems may be necessary. This is generally the case, for example, in heavily
developed watersheds.
154
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so for other services, such as salinity in the water table, however, would be
far more complicated because of the uncertainties in hydrology models. In
many catchments, for example, the groundwater hydrology is not uniform,
sometimes operating at a small scale with recharge and discharge on the
same properties and sometimes operating throughout an entire
subcatchment. Unless there is a clear understanding of the local hydrology,
one cannot expect payments for services for the simple reason that people
downstream will not know what they are paying for. Nor can one
reasonably set taxes or establish regulations with any certainty that the
desired behavior will result in meaningful service provision. Over time,
such uncertainties may be overcome by better modeling and monitoring
technologies.155 But, at the moment, they confound setting up a market or
other policy instruments. That is the reason MRFF is unlikely to continue
its reforestation pilot with NSW State Forests. Beyond intangible public
relations benefits, MRFF has no idea if it is getting value for the money it
pays to plant trees in the upper catchment.
So how can MRFF and others paying for services ensure the
effectiveness of their investments? They need reliable and robust
monitoring capacity. To assess the impact of vegetative barriers in
preventing salinization, for example, the most reliable salinity models
developed to provide estimates of service capacity per hectare take into
account topography, deep drainage, and runoff under different land uses.156
Yet use of these models is too expensive and time consuming, even if it can
be done with reasonable accuracy157—hence MRFF’s dilemma. Far better
would be a “rough and ready” field estimate based on visual observation
and scoring. BushTender used this approach in valuing biodiversity and
similar rules of thumb potentially could be developed for water quality
(such as proximity to watercourse, slope of land, extent of riparian
vegetation, etc.).158 Whatever the method used, it must be able to take into
account spatial variation and landscape context, reflecting the fact that
some sites are more important to water quality than others, while ensuring
that transaction costs do not swamp the efficiency benefits of markets.159
The net result is that it will be easier to develop markets for some
155 See generally Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 115 (2004) (examining potential of improved information collection and analysis on
environmental protection).
156 Personal communication with David Shelton, Ecosystem Services Group, Commonwealth
Scientific Industrial Research Organization, Canberra, Austl. (Oct. 22, 2002).
157 Id.
Nor has it led to consensus among scientists over its accuracy (because of
disagreements over the hydrology of the area and how salts are mobilized).
158 Personal communication with Rod McInness, Staff Economist, Sydney Catchment
Authority (Mar. 20, 2003).
159 The methodology must also be sufficiently objective to prevent improperly favoring some
beneficiaries over others.
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services than for others, for the simple reason that those buying services
will be more confident that they are receiving value for their money. How
difficult, for example, is linking the contributions of individual land
management decisions to water quality in a water supplier’s subcatchment?
Is this determination more similar to assessments of biodiversity or to
salinity control? The success of an ecosystem services approach for water
quality depends critically on the accuracy and cost of such assessments
and, by extension, the creation of assessment methodologies for use in the
field.160
It is worth pointing out that the assessment need not involve
monetization. Most of the scholarship on ecosystem services reported in
the popular press has focused on the absolute dollar value of services
provided. An oft-cited 1997 article in Nature, for example, calculated the
value of nature’s services at around twice the planet’s GNP.161 While
useful for rhetorical purposes in showing how immensely valuable services
are to our well-being, such monetary estimates face serious methodological
challenges and are not necessary in implementation issues. Most agencies
do not need to bother considering how much the ecosystem services of
water quality, pollination, or flood control are worth in total because,
fortunately, their actions will not wipe out the service.162 Rather, the
relevant comparison is between the costs of built provision and natural
provision of ecosystem services. The key policy comparison in the
Catskills, in other words, had nothing to do with the absolute value of the
service of water provision. The key data, all other things being equal, were
the cost of building a treatment plant and the cost of obtaining a similar
service of water quality provision through managing the landscape.163 And
this cannot be calculated without robust biophysical modeling. While they
grab headlines, monetary valuations of services are more important for
rhetorical or political purposes than market design.164
160 While this paragraph has focused on service markets, the same point could be made for
other policy approaches as well. Absent a clear understanding of causation, no policy instrument
can hope for more than rough effectiveness.
161 Costanza, supra note 16, at 253.
162 This presumes that such assessments are even feasible.
Assessment of benefits is
technically very hard to do on the margins, particularly in monetary terms. One needs to come up
with an aggregate measure of what these complex biophysical processes are worth to people.
This is necessarily a landscape-dependent assessment that is data-intensive. See Salzman, supra
note 16, at 889–98.
163 This assumes, of course, stasis in the existing regulatory regime and entitlements.
164 For example, I believe that a likely reason behind the EPA’s recent creation of the Science
Advisory Board on valuation of ecosystem services is to help the agency counter demands from
the Office of Management and Budget that it justify its regulations through cost-benefit analysis.
For more information on the Board, see EPA Sci. Advisory Bd., Committee on Valuing the
Protection
of
Ecological
Systems
and
Services,
at
http://www.epa.gov/science1/panels/vpesspanel.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
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Ensuring Service Provision

In addition to determining the appropriate level of service provision,
one must also ensure the services are, in fact, provided. This is much easier
to do for certain types of instruments than others. If one is mandating or
paying for specific land use practices or changes, such as in the MRFF or
Perrier Vittel schemes, compliance monitoring need only consist of
ensuring that trees are planted and maintained in the right place or that
particular farming practices are followed. Some of the potentially largest
service markets, however, may prove to be mitigation markets where
service provision is far more difficult to ensure. Under the Clean
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, countries
will be able to sell credits for the service of carbon sequestration through
reforestation and other permitted land use changes.165 As described below,
wetlands mitigation banking poses similar challenges.166
Since President George H.W. Bush’s campaign in 1988, there has
been a consistent national policy to ensure “no net loss” of wetlands.167 On
its face, the primary law conserving wetlands, the Clean Water Act (CWA),
seems to prevent the filling of most wetlands.168 The CWA provides a
limited exception, however, through a permit system administered
principally through the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps).169 These
“404 permits” are necessary for many routine land development activities
before they can proceed. When applying for a permit, a developer must
convince the Corps that no reasonable alternatives exist to the development
165 SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE,
DESCRIPTION
OF
THE
CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM,
at
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_mechanisms/cdm/items/2718.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
166 Buzz Thompson draws a distinction between “markets for nature,” where parties seek to
restore or preserve nature, and “regulatory markets,” where parties such as factories and
developers engage in trades in order to harm the environment. The main purpose of regulatory
markets, he argues, is not better environmental protection but more efficient protection.
Thompson explains that in “providing the regulated community with greater flexibility . . .
[g]overnments superimpose market structures onto these regulatory systems primarily to ensure
that the limited rights to pollute, develop wetlands, and divert water are used efficiently, thus
minimizing the cost of the regulation to the economy.” Thompson, supra note 22, at 262.
167 For a detailed discussion of wetlands mitigation banking, see Salzman & Ruhl, supra note
36, at 648–68. In its National Wetlands Mitigation Action Plan issued on December 24, 2002,
President George W. Bush’s administration continued this trend, stating its commitment to no net
loss
of
wetlands.
See
Nat’l
Wetland
Mitigation
Action
Plan,
at
http://www.mitigationactionplan.gov/maphtml.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2005).
168 Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000). Section 301 of the CWA prohibits
“the discharge of any pollutant by any person” into navigable waters. Id. § 1311 (2000). See
NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975) (finding term “navigable waters” in
Clean Water Act not to be “limited to the traditional tests of navigability” since Congress had
“asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation’s waters to the maximum extent permissible”).
169 Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the Secretary of the Army to “issue permits, after
notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters at specified disposal sites.” Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).
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of the wetlands, that the design of the development minimizes harm to the
wetlands, and, if these two conditions have been satisfied, that other
wetlands have been restored to compensate for the wetlands destroyed
(known as “compensatory mitigation”).170
The EPA and the Corps have traditionally preferred on-site to off-site
locations for compensatory mitigation activities, and have preferred in-kind
mitigation to mitigation that uses a substantially different type of
wetland.171 Over time, however, the Corps and the EPA have allowed
compensatory activities to move from on-site to off-site mitigation,
opening the door for wetlands mitigation banking.172 This program allows
a developer who has mitigated somewhere else in advance of development
to draw from the resulting bank of mitigation “credits” as the development
is implemented and wetlands are filled.173 Wetland mitigation banking now
resembles a commodity market, with freewheeling, entrepreneurial
wetlands banks offering for sale finished off-site wetlands as “credits” to
anyone who is in need of mitigation for their 404 permits.174 There were
between 370 and 400 such commercial mitigation banks operating in the
United States as of January 2000.175
Banking advocates argue that the wetlands market prevents net loss
more efficiently than on-site compensatory mitigation.176 This begs the
question, however, of “net loss” of what? Banking has ensured no net loss
of wetlands acreage, but the implementing regulations require that
mitigation banking operate as a service market.177 In particular, the
mitigated wetland must provide equivalent function to the destroyed
wetland.178 And in terms of conserving ecosystem services, mitigation
170

Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 36, at 651–52.
Id. at 651.
172 Michael J. Bean & Lynn E. Dwyer, Mitigation Banking as an Endangered Species
Conservation Tool, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,537, 10,538–39 (2000) (explaining how mitigation
banking can promote wildlife conservation).
173 Id. Coefficients are usually required, mandating two or three times more mitigated
wetlands to compensate for filled wetlands. New Jersey, for example, “generally requires a 2:1
mitigation ratio for both coastal and freshwater wetlands.” Thomas W. Ledman, Note, Local
Government Environmental Mitigation Fees: Development Exactions, The Next Generation, 45
FLA. L. REV. 835, 855 (1993); see also N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, § 7E-3.27(h)(9)(ii)(3) (2004),
available at www.state.nj.us/dep/landuse/7-7e.pdf (stating that ratio for created wetlands is “two
acres created to one acre lost”).
174 Bean & Dwyer, supra note 172, at at 10,550.
175 See INST. FOR WATER RES. (IWR), U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, EXISTING WETLAND
MITIGATION
BANK
INVENTORY,
SPRING
2000,
at
http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/iwr/regulatory/banks.pdf (listing state, location, and sponsor of all
wetlands mitigation banks).
176 See Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60
Fed. Reg. 58,605–07 (Nov. 28, 1995) [hereinafter Federal Guidance].
177 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 36, at 657–58.
178 The Federal Guidance provides that “[t]he number of credits available for withdrawal (i.e.,
171
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banking has performed poorly.179 In the most comprehensive study to date,
in 2001 the National Academy of Sciences concluded that “[t]he goal of no
net loss of wetlands is not being met for wetland functions by the
mitigation program . . . .”180
There are two reasons for this failure that designers of service markets
need to consider. The first concerns the trading currency. Most mitigation
banks use the simple metric of acreage as the trading metric—three acres of
restored wetland for two acres of destroyed wetland.181 This is fine if the
goal is no net loss of acreage, but useless if the goal is no net loss of
services, since the acreage currency cannot capture any relevant
information on service provision.182 Banks chose the simple currency to
ensure the market remains thick—that is, so that transaction costs to assess
trades are low enough that trading remains attractive. As the currency is
refined, by assessing service provision as well as acreage, for example, the
costs of trades increase, potentially thinning the market.183
The second reason concerns the structure of the mitigation market. In
most markets, the buyer ensures quality. Consider when you buy a bike.
debiting) generally should be commensurate with the level of aquatic functions attained at a bank
at the time of debiting.” Federal Guidance, supra note 176, at 58,611. Wetland values must be
determined “by applying aquatic site assessment techniques generally recognized by experts in
the field and/or the best professional judgment of Federal and State agency representatives,
provided such assessments fully consider ecological functions included in the Guidelines.” See
Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department
of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section
404(b)(1) Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 9211–12 (Mar. 12, 1990).
179 Studies of wetland restorations have found a remarkably low rate of success. The Florida
Department of Environmental Regulation found a success rate of forty-five percent for tidal
wetlands creation and twelve percent for freshwater wetlands creation. Virginia C. Veltman,
Banking on the Future of Wetlands Using Federal Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 654, 669 (1995).
180 COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING
FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 2 (2001), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook/0309067774/html/index.html.
181 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 36, at 660–61.
182 Banking has also led to trades that move wetlands out of areas where they may provide
valuable services to urban populations and into sparsely populated areas where, most likely, their
service provision is either redundant or less valuable. For example, a recent study of wetland
banking in Florida found that trades, even in the same watershed, have produced “a transfer of
wetlands from highly urbanized, high-population density areas to more rural low-population
density areas.” James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 666 (2001) (quoting Dennis King & Luke W.
Herbert, The Fungibility of Wetlands, 19 NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSL. 10, 11 (1997)). In other
words, as can be expected from a market efficiency perspective, developers want to develop
wetlands where land is dear (urban) and wetland banks want to locate where land is cheap (rural).
183 Florida is the only state that has directly addressed this issue. A law passed in 2000
requires state and local agencies engaged in wetland mitigation banking to adopt a uniform
wetland mitigation assessment method that “must determine the value of functions provided by
wetlands and other surface waters considering the current conditions of these areas, utilization by
fish and wildlife, location, uniqueness, and hydrologic connection . . . .” FLA. STAT. ANN. §
373.414(18) (West Supp. 2005).
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If, in your first ride around the neighborhood, you immediately find that the
brakes do not work or that the seat slips out of place, you will be quick to
return it to the store for a refund. In a mitigation market, by contrast, the
buyer does not care about the quality of the mitigated wetland. All the
developer wants is a permit to build the mall. The cheaper she can get the
permit, the better. Nor does the seller (the mitigation bank) care about the
quality of the mitigated wetland, so long as she can get the Corps to sign
off on the bank. As a result, it falls on the regulator, who does not have a
stake in the transaction, to ensure quality, and both the Corps and the EPA
have very spotty records in this regard.184
There is no question that mitigation markets hold great promise for
provision of ecosystem services. Indeed, with the recent entry into force of
the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism may dwarf all
service markets to date.185 But unless buyers and sellers have a direct stake
in the quality of service provision, which will generally not be the case in a
mitigation market, one can expect that services will be underprovided
without strong government oversight.186
V
INSTRUMENT CHOICE IN ROBERTSON, AUSTRALIA—PAYMENTS FOR SERVICE
PROVISION

We have now reviewed the barriers to ecosystem service market
creation, surveyed markets that have overcome these obstacles, and
considered the fundamental design issues for creating and maintaining
markets. This analysis, however, has begged a rather basic question—
whether we should encourage markets for service provision in the first

184 Veltman, supra note 179, at 670 (“The California State Coastal Conservancy (SCC)
sponsored a review of fifty-eight permits issued for creation and restoration projects in the San
Francisco Bay Area between 1978 and 1983. The report found that only two of the fifty-eight
projects could be deemed successful.”); Lawrence R. Liebesman & David M. Plott, The
Emergence of Private Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 341, 341
(1998) (discussing Florida state agency study finding twenty-seven percent success rate of such
projects).
185 The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on Feb. 16, 2005. Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32 (1998). See
also Mark Landler, Mixed Feelings as Kyoto Pact Takes Effect, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2005, at C2.
Even without the Kyoto Protocol in force, there were over $300 million in carbon trades in 2002.
Interview with Adam Davis, Director, Peregrine Consulting, Wash., D.C. (Oct. 30, 2003). This
figure includes payments for both carbon sinks (e.g., paying for reforestation and afforestation)
and carbon reductions (e.g., reducing emissions through technology improvements).
186 And this will inevitably be a concern because, rather than benefiting directly from
provision of the service (as do water drinkers in New York or Perrier-Vittel’s bottling
operations), in mitigation markets the buyers are creating the environmental problem and seeking
to offset the total harm. For a discussion of the different types of markets for nature, see
Thompson, supra note 22, at 266–67.
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place. In this Part, we address the question of instrument choice head-on,
examining whether and when market payments should be preferred for
service provision instead of one of the other “Five P’s,” the more
traditional instruments such as regulations, taxes, or persuasion. Perhaps
surprisingly, instrument selection has received very little consideration in
the ecosystem services scholarship to date. Publications generally assume
payments are desirable and focus on relevant case studies.187 As John
Echeverria has tellingly observed:
The choice between regulation and acquisition represents one of the
most fundamental issues in U.S. environmental legal policy. But the
issue has received remarkably little attention, either as a matter of theory
or practice. Academic commentators can frequently be assigned to one
“camp” or the other, but little scholarly attention has focused on why one
option should be preferred over another. Practicing conservationists can
be roughly grouped as “land dealers” or “regulatory hawks,” but these
different camps pursue their agendas quite independently from each
other and rarely communicate about how pursuit of one strategy might
interact with—or even conflict with—the other.188

Grounding this discussion in practice, Section A describes the
problem of reducing runoff from farms in the area of Robertson, southwest
of Sydney, where I worked in 2003 with the Sydney Catchment Authority.
Section B then presents a range of analytical frameworks to assess the
optimal policy instrument. Employing Coasean, information asymmetry,
efficiency, political, and property rights analyses, this Section identifies
when market payments should be the preferable policy instrument for
provision of most ecosystem services. This finding is controversial and its
critiques, which are considerable, are taken up in Part VI.
A.

The Sydney Catchment Authority

To make this discussion more concrete, I will use as an example a
pilot project I helped design for the Sydney Catchment Authority while in
Australia. The Sydney Catchment Authority (SCA) was created in the
uproar following detection of cryptosporidium in Sydney’s drinking water
in 1998.189 A royal commission formed to examine the outbreak concluded
187 See generally DAILY & ELLISON, supra note 17 (describing use of markets for various
environmental services); LANDELL-MILLS & PORRAS, supra note 5 (analyzing cases of emerging
markets for forest environmental services).
188 John D. Echeverria, Buying Versus Regulating to Achieve Conservation Purposes 1 (draft
paper on file with author). The most useful law review publication assessing instrument choice is
Barton Thompson’s analysis of policies to ensure instream water flows. See Thompson, supra
note 22, at 261–62.
189 Cryptosporidium is a microscopic parasite that causes cryptosporidiosis, a diarrheal disease
that is one of the most common waterborne diseases found in humans in the United States. A
cryptosporidium outbreak also killed over 100 people in Milwaukee in 1993. DAILY & ELLISON,
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that there was inadequate management of the watershed as a single
entity.190 As the report stated, “[t]he most effective element in the multiple
barrier approach to water quality is effective catchment management.
Every effort should be made to prevent contaminants . . . from entering
catchment waters.”191 In response, the State Parliament created the SCA,
charging it with management and protection of the catchment areas and
infrastructure across sixteen local government areas. In many respects, the
SCA was explicitly created as an ecosystem service district, responsible for
ensuring that the landscape of greater Sydney provides the service of water
purification.192
In the context of new land uses, the SCA exercises considerable
authority. Development activities that require permit approval must be
commented on and, in many cases, approved by the SCA.193 The SCA has
considerably less authority, however, when it comes to regulating existing
land uses. Indeed, it has no direct authority absent serious pollution
incidents, relying instead on an assessment process that does little more
than identify land uses that degrade water quality.194
My field work was carried out in the Robertson Township, a lovely
farming area southwest of Sydney in an area known as the Southern
Highlands.195 Robertson’s main claim to fame is its role as the location for
the popular pig/dog/sheep movie, “Babe.” As with the hypothetical

supra note 17, at 62. The outbreak in Sydney occurred during the run up to the Sydney Olympics
and residents had to boil their water for two months. Fortunately, there were no outbreaks of
cryptosporidiosis. SYDNEY CATCHMENT AUTH., WATER QUALITY: WATER AND ITS
TREATMENT, at
http://www.sydneywater.com.au/Publications/Factsheets/WaterAndTreatment.pdf (last updated
Nov. 2003).
190 SYDNEY CATCHMENT AUTH., ANNUAL ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, 2000–01 24 (2001)
(summarizing report’s conclusion that “holistic” approach to managing entire catchment is
necessary), at http://www.sca.nsw.gov.au/publications/37.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
191 2 PETER MCCLELLAN, QC, PREMIER’S DEP’T, SYDNEY WATER INQUIRY: FINAL REPORT
(FIFTH
REPORT),
ch.
14
(1998),
http://water.sesep.drexel.edu/outbreaks/Sydney_5/r5chapter14.html.
192 For further exploration of ecosystem service districts—governmental authorities created to
provide ecosystem services, see Heal et al., supra note 15, at 334.
193 A fascinating institutional issue posed by the SCA’s planning power is its preemption of
land use decisions that traditionally had been the sole decision of local councils. See Sydney
Water Catchment Management Act 1998, Part V, Div. I, § 53 (Austl.) (“[r]egional environmental
plan
to
be
made”),
available
at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/download.cgi/download/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/swcma1998330.txt.
194 See Sydney Catchment Auth., Catchments, Planning and Development Control, at
http://www.sca.nsw.gov.au/catchments/regionalplan.html.
195 My activities as a Fulbright Senior Scholar in Australia focused on the creation of markets
for ecosystem services. My field work in Robertson included close cooperation with the Sydney
Catchment Authority’s field, economics, and policy staff in developing a pilot project to reduce
nutrient runoff into the Wingecarribee Reservoir. This involved a series of interviews with
farmers and members of the Catchment Authority staff.
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watershed discussed in Part II, the SCA’s interest in Robertson stemmed
from concerns over eutrophication in the Wingecarribee Reservoir
downstream from Robertson. The SCA’s field staff believed that most of
the nutrient loading came from manure leaching into streams from the dairy
farms in the catchment. The staff also contended that fencing off stream
banks, known as riparian fencing, would significantly reduce the flow of
nutrients into the reservoir. Installing riparian fencing, they argued, would
increase provision of the ecosystem service of water purification, provided
by vegetative uptake of nutrients and phosphate, in addition to trapping of
sediment and suspended solids that would reduce turbidity downstream.
Given this situation, the SCA wondered, which policy instrument made the
most sense?
B.

Determining the Optimal Instrument

In order to explore which instruments best promote the provision of
ecosystem services, the following sections apply separate analytical
frameworks to the case of the Robertson subcatchment. Despite their
disfavor in the literature,196 each mode of analysis suggests strong practical
and theoretical reasons to support payment schemes in particular settings.
While the analyses in the following subsections focus on the problem of
nonpoint source pollution and the service of water purification, each
analysis has important implications for other ecosystem services.197

196 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 221–22 (2d. ed. 1988) (arguing that subsidies to reduce environmental harms are often
counterproductive).
197 As noted below, there is an extensive literature on conservation payments, some of which
operate as competitive markets. There is also a large literature on payments for water, though
most of this focuses on payments for water quantity rather than services such as instream flow or
water purification. See, e.g., Steven P. Erie & Pascale Joassart-Marcelli, Unraveling Southern
California’s Water/Growth Nexus: Metropolitan Water District Policies and Subsidies for
Suburban Development, 1928–1996, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 267 (2000) (examining potential water
payment schemes between cities and suburbs); Duane Mecham & Benjamin M. Simon, Forging a
New Federal Reclamation Water Pricing Policy: Legal and Policy Considerations, 27 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 507 (1995) (proposing water pricing policies as means of conservation); Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671
(1993) (arguing that traditional water policy can benefit from introduction of market values).
There is remarkably little scholarship, however, contrasting these markets, which differ in
important respects. The distinction is important, because researchers working in the same area
can draw very different “general conclusions” depending on whether they are focusing on a
“water case” or a “biodiversity case.” For a similar point on the importance of case studies and
general conclusions, see Carol Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2197
(1997); this work discusses the necessity of realistic assumptions in drawing accurate deductions.
For the relative focus of scholarship on policy instruments to promote biodiversity compared to
other services, see supra note 54.
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Coasean Bargaining

Created by an act of the New South Wales Parliament, the SCA was
granted a range of powers over new land development, but it deliberately
was not granted regulatory or financial penalty authority over existing land
uses.198 Therefore, on its face, the entitlement under the act clearly lay
with the party providing the service—that is, farmers had the right to have
manure flow into the stream. Because the entitlement lay with the farmers,
only two viable policy instruments remained—persuasion and payments.
Persuasion can be effective in particular settings, but is necessarily limited
in its reach.199 The argument for payments therefore arose from sheer
necessity—it was the only real arrow left in the SCA’s policy quiver.
A basic law and economics analysis of this situation clearly supports
payments. The argument might go something like this: Farmer has a legal
entitlement to graze cows on her farm and have her soil and nutrients flow
into the watercourse after a storm. Water supplier wishes to alter this
entitlement to ensure a supply of clean water in the downstream reservoir.
Farmer and Water Supplier engage in a Coasean solution where Farmer is
paid compensation for the costs of riparian fencing, maintenance of the
fencing, and lost grazing pasture.200 This is comparable to the PSA
program in Costa Rica and other payments to refrain from changing land
uses. Landholders have a clear entitlement to log their forests and are
being paid to forgo this activity.
2.

Information Asymmetry

The preceding argument is decidedly pragmatic, suggesting that even
if one believed regulations or taxes were theoretically preferable, they still
would not be preferable in practice because the SCA has no regulatory or
taxation authority. Payments are the best we can get. This section
addresses a more controversial position, examining whether a payment
scheme would be the optimal policy instrument for the SCA even if it could
regulate or tax land uses.
In this context, it helps to think of the SCA’s service provision
challenge as a problem of asymmetric information.201 There is no doubt
198 Email from Elizabeth Hanlon, Staff Attorney, Sydney Catchment Authority, to Judith
Birrell, Senior Resource Planner, Sydney Catchment Authority (on file with the New York
University Law Review); see also SYDNEY CATCHMENT AUTH., SUSTAINING THE CATCHMENTS:
THE REGIONAL PLAN FOR THE DRINKING WATER CATCHMENTS AND ADJACENT REGIONAL
CENTRES (2004), at http://www.sca.nsw.gov.au/publications/files/Section1chapter1_10.pdf
(2004) (comparing first draft of plan with revised version which removed planning control table
and offered protection for existing land use rights).
199 See supra Part II.C.
200 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
201 See STONEHAM ET AL., supra note 90, at 19–21; Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Carel Van der
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that landowners know their property better than the government. We often
think of such information asymmetry as a negative situation. In the context
of the Endangered Species Act, for example, it has given rise to the “shoot,
shovel, and shut up” mentality, where landowners actively drive
endangered species from their land before the government learns of their
presence, or preemptively alter their land to make it less attractive as
habitat.202 Indeed, the importance to landowners in maintaining this
information asymmetry may explain in part the vociferous (and successful)
opposition to the proposed National Biological Service that would have
inventoried biodiversity and habitats across the nation.203
Information asymmetry need not have negative consequences,
however. After all, landholders know both the opportunity cost of a
specific land use change and the price they are willing to accept to
implement this change. For its part, the government agency or water
supplier knows how much it is willing to pay and which types of land use
changes would be most valuable for service provision. The design
challenge is how most efficiently to transfer both types of information—
(1) willingness to pay/accept, and (2) service provision resulting from a
land use change—from one party to another in a mutually reinforcing
fashion.
Prescriptive measures are inefficient at information exchange for the
simple reason that they are primarily a one-way discussion—the
government telling regulated parties what they can or cannot do. The
farmer’s knowledge of which land use changes are least costly is ignored.
While the opportunity for the public to comment on proposed agency rules
ensures that regulatory discussion is at least informed by parties outside of
the government, this does nothing in the instance of specific application of
the rule and is a classic shortcoming of approaches that mandate specific
technologies.204
Financial penalties suffer the same shortcoming. It falls entirely on
the government to determine not only which actions to encourage or

Hamsvoort, Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and An Application, 79
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 407, 414 (1997) (an examination of design issues for conservation
contracts).
202 Elmendorf, supra note 133, at 432 (citing Robert H. Nelson, Shoot, Shovel, and Shut Up,
FORBES, Dec. 4, 1995, at 82); see also Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat
Destruction Under the Endangered Species Act, 46 J.L. & ECON. 27 (2003) (discussing influence
of this phenomenon in endangering woodpecker species).
203 Elmendorf, supra note 133, at 437.
204 One could certainly imagine an ambient approach that allowed more flexibility at the level
of source-specific regulation but, as noted in the earlier discussion on field assessment
methodologies, the information costs for such an approach are significant. See supra Part IV.D.
One might also point to zoning laws that closely reflect local landscape attributes. Interview with
Chris Schroeder, Professor, Duke University Law School, Durham, N.C. (Nov. 18, 2003).
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discourage, but also how much financial penalty is needed to induce the
appropriate behavior. In theory, one might imagine a perfect Pigouvian tax
that internalized externalities but, as with regulation, the costs of gathering
such information would be high. Persuasive instruments can foster
information exchange but, as voluntary approaches, their success will
necessarily be spotty.
And what about payment schemes?
Of the four classes of
governmental intervention, one might assume that payment schemes hold
the greatest promise of ensuring information exchange between the
government and regulated entities. After all, at their core markets are
simply an exchange of information about willingness to pay and
willingness to accept. The market mechanism necessitates that each side
reveal information to the other. Indeed, if set up carefully, payment
schemes can shift the information burden to the landowners. In the
BushTender market, for example, farmers now have an incentive to “selfidentify” as potentially valuable service providers.205 This can considerably
lower the cost of information gathering. As demonstrated above, it is
difficult to obtain the sort of information necessary to precisely target a
regulation, tax, or general subsidy. By partially privatizing a public good,
payment schemes can create a mechanism to shift the costs of providing
this information, but the scheme must be carefully designed, for without the
landholder’s information, the government is at risk of overpaying. Equally,
without the government’s information, the landholder has little sense of the
relative value of the alternative land use or how to optimize the service
provision.
a.

Information Costs of Payment Schemes

Knowing that payment schemes can encourage low cost information
exchange does not, in itself, tell us which type of payment scheme should
be used. The fundamental question in comparing them is which results in
the lowest cost per unit product (i.e., marginal improvement in water
quality).206 The following paragraphs describe the range of payment
schemes and their relative costs.
The simplest type of payment scheme is general subsidy—deciding
how much you are willing to pay for certain types of land use measures that
will increase the service provision and then working off of a “first-come,
first-serve” basis or a loosely prioritized scoring system such as the one

205

See Thompson, supra note 22, at 280.
This analysis assumes that we wish to change behavior rather than purchase land in fee
simple. Fee simple purchase might be appropriate in the case of particularly significant
biodiversity habitat or watershed lands, but one would be restricted to the options of negotiation,
reverse auction, or condemnation.
206
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used in the CRP.207 Such an approach has lower information and
administrative costs than other payment schemes described below and,
when scientific uncertainty is greatest, may allow for a period of
experimentation to see which sort of land management changes provide the
most benefit. General subsidies, however, cannot meaningfully distinguish
between those parties who can provide high value services and those who
provide low value services. This was a problem with the PSA program in
Costa Rica.208 Indeed, given the opportunity, one would expect farmers to
propose changing the management of their least productive land, which
may or may not correlate with service provision.209
Does fencing off a particular stretch of stream provide valuable
services? A flat subsidy program cannot determine this, nor does it care.
As a result, the program will almost certainly not ensure value for money,
nor will it likely spur farmers to think of service provision as a viable
“crop.” While designed as a more tailored scheme (similar to the reverse
auction described below), in practice the CRP has effectively operated as a
general subsidy, with loose scoring criteria and a none-too-secret clearing
price.210 One could, of course, imagine a general subsidy scheme that
effectively encouraged service provision (e.g., with more precise
requirements for eligibility) but, as with regulations and taxes, the
information required to get it right would be considerable.
In contrast to a subsidy approach, an ecosystem services payment
scheme should start with the assumption that different landholders can
provide different levels of service and should be compensated accordingly.
One obvious mechanism for such targeted payments is direct negotiation,
where individual negotiations can take into account differing levels of
service provision. The service beneficiary sits down with each service
provider and strikes a deal. This is the approach used in the PSA Program
in Costa Rica and by Perrier Vittel in France. It has the advantage of
allowing individually crafted agreements, but can be labor intensive if
carried out with a large number of landholders. It also lacks the
mechanism of farmers competing against one another to provide services
207 Subsidies can also take the form of tax credits, tax deductions, technical assistance, or costsharing schemes.
208 See supra Part IV.D (stating that PSA program does not really consider level of service
provision, allowing any landholder to participate regardless of whether they provide valuable
services).
209 Indeed, in some instances fixed payments can reveal the opposite information that either
side needs to know. The farmer nominates the land he thinks will be most important to the
government for service provision, while the government reveals the acceptance price without
knowing the farmer’s actual opportunity costs in dedicating the land to service provision rather
than agriculture. See STONEHAM ET AL., supra note 90, at 20.
210 The problem of rent-seeking to channel subsidies to particular parties discussed infra at
note 268 is worth bearing in mind, as well.
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and requires the purchaser to assess accurately the landholder’s willingness
to accept. Perhaps most important, because the negotiations will likely take
place in a serial fashion, it may be hard to develop a catchment-wide
strategy for service provision measures if proceeding farm by farm.211
Reverse auctions are used in the BushTender and Environmental
Services Scheme models and rely on a publicized competition among
landholders who provide sealed bids to the government of how much they
are willing to accept for changes in land use management. BushTender’s
benefits include effectively communicating goals to the target community,
getting farmers to weigh the costs and benefits of land use changes
(deciding for themselves which actions to undertake), and changing the
way landholders think about the benefits their land produces. This type of
payment scheme most effectively creates a market dynamic, where
potential purchasers bid against one another for the payment. Reverse
auctions are particularly well suited to the special market situation of
monopsony, when there is only one buyer and many sellers. Based on the
results of the BushTender program, such an approach appears to provide
the ecosystem service of biodiversity from private lands in a far more costeffective manner than general subsidies. If there are few sellers, though,
there are potential problems of bid-rigging through collusion.212
A final option is to follow the New York City example of paying a
third party, either local government, an existing nongovernmental
organization, or a specially-created funding body, rather than the
landholders directly. While a reasonable strategy for ensuring the proper
disbursement of millions of dollars, this may be too administratively
burdensome for smaller scale programs. Moreover, it simply passes down
the problems detailed above—the difficulty in determining how much to
pay for particular actions.213
211 It is worth noting that direct payments are the norm for private habitat conservation.
Groups such as The Nature Conservancy and Conservation International usually purchase
conservation easements or land in fee simple. For more details on such schemes around the
globe, see Paul J. Ferraro & Agnes Kiss, Direct Payments to Conserve Biodiversity, 298 SCIENCE
1718, 1718–19 (2002). For a useful list of projects and websites, see the list maintained by Paul
J.
Ferraro,
Global
Conservation
Payment
Initiatives,
at
http://epp.gsu.edu/pferraro/special/special.htm (July 2002).
212 Spurred by the spectrum auctions in the 1990s, there is a well-developed economics
literature on auction design, addressing issues such as how much information should be revealed,
multiple round auctions, etc., that could be applied to service auctions, as well. See, e.g.,
STONEHAM ET AL., supra note 90; R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Analyzing the Airwaves
Auction, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 159 (1996) (analyzing auction-based approach).
213 Scholars have proposed a number of different third-party models. Christopher Elmendorf,
for example, calls for the creation of landowner-controlled special districts. Elmendorf, supra
note 133, at 426. Buzz Thompson has suggested environmental brokers. Thompson, supra note
22, at 308–09. And Geoffrey Heal, myself, and others have urged the creation of Ecosystem
Service Districts—governmental authorities charged to provide services but given zoning and tax
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In the negotiation and reverse auction approaches, the government lets
the landholder know the non-market value of the land (because of the lack
of a functioning market for most services, it is worth recalling, the
monetary value of the services may well be perceived as zero). This may
prove a wise strategy because it provides an opportunity for the landholders
to internalize these values and lower the price they would be willing to
accept for changing their land management (as appears to have happened in
the BushTender scheme).214 Conversely, though, this may cause the
landholder to raise her price because of the now realized scarcity of her
service provision (as appears to have happened with land purchases in the
Catskills).
3.

Efficiency Analysis

Simply because payments can reduce costs of information exchange
does not mean, of course, that payments are therefore the optimal policy
instrument for service provision. In fact, when information costs are low,
the savings from self-identification will be low as well, and the potential
problems of payment schemes (such as creating moral hazards or rent
seeking, discussed in Part VI) may well favor regulation or taxes. As
information costs increase, however, payment schemes become
increasingly attractive compared to regulation or taxation. Importantly, as
demonstrated below, this is likely to be the case in the SCA example and in
other service settings because of heterogeneous preferences and service
capacity in the target audience.
The Sydney Catchment Authority’s goal is deceptively
straightforward—to reduce nutrient runoff from land upstream of the
Wingecarribee Reservoir at lowest social cost. The target audience consists
of landholders, mainly farmers. It stands to reason that, in the absence of
significant government intervention, there will be a normal distribution of
land care practices in the catchment. The bell curve in Figure 3 below, for
example, shows the range of preferences for land stewardship.215 At one
end will be those who will refuse to alter their land management practices
unless forced to do so. They are balanced at the other end by those who
already manage their land in an environmentally sensitive manner and have
no need for government inducement or sanction to do so. Most farmers are
in the middle of these extremes, willing to change their land uses to provide
more services but concerned over the costs involved.216 To display this in a
authority throughout the relevant natural boundary where the service is produced. Heal et al.,
supra note 15, at 343. To date, however, these remain merely proposals.
214 This may provide an interesting twist on the polluter-pays principle. If the farmer truly is
internalizing costs, then the polluter is paying to reduce her negative externalities.
215 This graph was suggested by Carl Binning, Director, Greening Australia, Canberra.
216 For a more sophisticated description of the range of farmers’ land stewardship preferences,
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concrete setting, those farmers who have put in place riparian fencing to
maintain their streambanks are to the right of the dotted line on the graph
(though this could just as easily represent farmers who have built swales to
reduce erosion or barn drain systems to collect manure). We will assume
that these preferences are relatively stable over time.
FIGURE 3
[Printer: insert fig3.doc here]
One might expect that the challenge for the policy analyst is how best
to change the behavior of the middle group of farmers—graphically, to
shift the riparian fencing line to the left. Some instruments will prove more
effective than others. As shown below in Figure 4, for example, an
information approach, such as one involving field visits and demonstration
projects, may increase the number of farmers who put in riparian fencing.
But it is likely that a regulation requiring riparian fencing for farms with
more than one hundred head of cattle, for example, will impact an even
larger group, as would a stiff tax per meter of unfenced streambanks or per
head of cattle.
FIGURE 4
[Printer: insert fig4.doc here]
While seemingly obvious, this kind of analysis turns out to be
misguided if we care about efficiency. The proper analysis is more
complicated because the potential provision of services by landowners is
also heterogeneous. Riparian fencing on some farms will be more effective
in reducing algal blooms than fencing on other farms, depending on
distance from the reservoir, land slope, number of cattle, proximity to a
watercourse, etc. Put simply, landscape context matters. Some landowners
have greater potential to improve the level of service provision than others.
Indeed, one can also expect a normal distribution of potential provision of
services, as shown below in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5
[Printer: insert fig5.doc here]
As a result, we do not really care about changing the behavior of most
of the farmers. This is an example of the “80/20 rule” so common in
business management. We may be able to obtain eighty percent of the
desired result by focusing on twenty percent of the actors (the group circled
above). The problem, though, is that a priori we often do not know who
these farmers are. Importantly, there is no reason to think that those
farmers with the greatest capacity for increased service provision are also
those with the greatest preference for land stewardship activities. In fact,
see Christopher Elmendorf’s discussion of Gerry Walter’s scholarship, Elmendorf, supra note
133, at 442 (citing Gerry Walter, Images of Success: How Illinois Farmers Define the Successful
Farmer, 62 RURAL SOC. 48, 55–64 (1997)).
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the relationship is likely to be the opposite, since those who care most
about land stewardship will likely have already put in riparian fencing and
thus have a low capacity to further increase their service provision. This is
depicted below in Figure 6 by combining the land stewardship and
potential for service provision graphs.
FIGURE 6
[Printer: insert fig6.doc here]
If these figures accurately represent the distribution of land
stewardship preferences and the potential for increased service provision in
a watershed, then regulation will likely be inefficient. To change the
behavior of the target twenty percent, prescriptive regulation will likely
have to be significantly overinclusive, requiring land management changes
for most of the farmers when only a relatively small number are relevant.
Making the regulation more restrictive will increase the number of target
farms but, equally, require costly land use changes in farms that contribute
little to the problem. While one could imagine a regulation that required
riparian fencing for all landholders that contribute significantly to
eutrophication (e.g., requiring fences where runoff is above 110 kg per year
and has a travel time to the reservoir within six hours), we do not often see
regulations like this in real life. Much more common are regulations that
identify targets based on proxies such as technology or size.217 In our case,
that would present itself as applying to farms with over one hundred head
of cattle or to lands adjacent to watercourses that feed into the reservoir.
This will help narrow the regulated audience, but still result in overbreadth.
Financial penalties are no better. One could imagine taxing farms per
head of cow or as a function of proximity to the reservoir, with taxes
reduced if riparian fencing is in place. But this will surely be
overinclusive, as well. As with regulations, one could certainly imagine
Pigouvian taxes on nonpoint pollution that contributed to eutrophication in
the reservoir, but the information burden on the government to generate
this information would be daunting.
Depending on how the instrument is applied, one can see why in some
instances (and perhaps many), the social costs of taxing or regulating for
discrete service provision will be higher than necessary because they end
up over-regulating landowners who are neither the source of the problem
nor the solution.218
217 One might point to the possibility that states can impose tailored, facility-specific
regulations to account for heterogeneity through airshed modeling (i.e., modeling the impacts of
emissions by specific sources on ambient pollution across an area) under State Implementation
Plans in the Clean Air Act. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2000). Whether this often
occurs in practice, though, is less clear. Interview with Mark Squillace, Professor, Toledo Law
School, Provo, Utah (Aug. 4, 2003).
218 A related issue which I do not analyze in this Article is the cost of administration. This
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Payment schemes will be overinclusive, as well, if operated as general
subsidies. Directed payments tendered on a competitive basis, however,
can be narrowly targeted to those farmers (our circled twenty percent) who
are interested in changing land use practices and have a high potential for
service provision. As noted above, this is the case because competitive
payments shift the information burden to the landowners. Farmers now
have an incentive to self-identify themselves as potentially valuable service
providers (hopefully as members of the targeted twenty percent) and
compete for the government funds against other service providers. Not
only does this considerably lower the cost of information gathering but,
because farmers are being paid, one might expect the beneficiaries to pay
more attention to compliance than might be the case with the threat of
regulatory or tax compliance monitoring, thus lowering both monitoring
and enforcement costs.219 Indeed, if the experience of BushTender is any
guide, one can expect some farmers to lower their acceptance price.220
It is important to note that this conclusion may seem contrary to
traditional economic wisdom. In economic theory, penalties and payments
are regarded as equivalent—the net social cost is the same; the only issue is
distributional—whether the public pays through subsidies/tax breaks or the
farmers pay through fines/taxes.221 While true as a theoretical matter, in
practice this need not be the case. As the analysis of the Robertson
situation demonstrated, if information costs are high enough, they can be
dispositive in instrument choice because of the savings generated by
payment schemes from self-identification.

will likely be higher up front for negotiation and reverse auction schemes than for general
subsidies, regulation and taxes because of the costs of contracting. Monitoring costs for specific
contractual arrangements also will be higher than generalized commitments. As described below,
this will be reduced by the presumably lower costs of compliance monitoring and enforcement.
But effective compliance monitoring will be essential. As the history of wetlands mitigation
makes clear, see supra Part IV.D.1, lax monitoring by the government can doom even the bestdesigned program. As the Australian projects continue, there should be good empirical data that
can address these questions.
219 In the context of markets for instream flows, Barton Thompson suggests that payments
may “lead to the development of significant new conservation measures . . . [that] could be
substantial.” Thompson, supra note 22, at 276.
220 In his study of attitudes among rural landholders, Elmendorf suggests why this
phenomenon might occur in the context of paying for familiar values (such as open space) that
are connected to “rural heritage” and experience, prior to paying for conservation unconnected to
the landowners’ core values, such as biodiversity. See Elmendorf, supra note 133, at 469
(“Positive financial incentives also imbue ecological resources with a new use value.”).
221 As an example, we can encourage a farmer to put in riparian fencing either by granting her
a $200 tax credit for doing so or taxing her $200 for not doing so. The net result is the same, as is
the net social cost. The only issue is distributional—whether the cost is borne by the government
or the farmer. Personal communication with Nathaniel Keohane, Professor, Yale School of
Management and Organization, New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 9, 2004). But see BAUMOL & OATES,
supra note 196, at 213 (arguing that fees and subsidies are not symmetrical in practice).
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Political Analysis

In the preceding examples, we considered cases of absolute
entitlements. In our Coasean analysis, farmers held the right to graze cows
and have manure run off their land. In our efficiency analysis, government
held the right to halt this runoff. A more interesting, common, and difficult
issue arises when these entitlements either conflict or are unclear.
Consider, for example, the case where the government has a de jure
entitlement and farmers have a de facto entitlement. What if, for example,
the government has the legal authority to reduce manure runoff from farms
(e.g., through public nuisance suits) but never exercises the right? As a
result, farmers allow their cows to graze and do not put in riparian fencing.
Why should the government pay farmers for fencing when it can tax or
regulate instead?
While written in a different context, scholarship by Jonathan Wiener
on the influence of voting rules on instrument choice in international
environmental law sheds useful light on our analysis.222 Using the climate
change negotiations as an example, Wiener’s basic point is that the choice
of voting rule affects the choice of policy instrument.223 Wiener identifies a
spectrum of rules, from a “Fiat” rule, where the sovereign authority can
compel participation by dissenters, to a “Majority” rule (so long as over
fifty percent of the voting body supports the action), to a rule of “Voluntary
Assent,” where the lack of a sovereign authority over nations means that
rules bind only those who wish to be bound, and finally to a “Unanimity”
rule.224 Of particular relevance to our concerns is that in the shift from
domestic to international law, there is a corresponding shift from a Fiat rule
to a Voluntary Assent rule. In such a setting, ensuring meaningful
participation is no easy matter, because regulatory targets can now walk
away from the table. Since there is no coercive force to require
participation by independent sovereign nations, each party must be
persuaded that compliance with the agreement is in its best interest. A
necessary implication of this state of affairs, Wiener argues, is that:
222 See generally Jonathan B. Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice
in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677 (1999) [hereinafter Wiener, Global Environmental
Regulation] (addressing whether polity’s legal framework affects type of regulation it prefers);
Jonathan B. Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J.
749 (1999) (stating, inter alia, that voluntary assent voting in international law makes adopting
regulation cooperative enterprise rather than coercive, making it difficult to enact broadly
applicable regulation); Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal
Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295 (2001)
(comparing consent voting rule of international environmental regulation to general voting rules
for national legislation and international treaty development and tracing borrowing of legal ideas
from national law into international law, focusing on emissions trading).
223 Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation, supra note 222, at 685.
224 See id. at 736–38, 751–52.

NYU FINAL DRAFT

June 2005]

9/2/2005 10:22 AM

CREATING MARKETS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES

153

[T]he “Polluters Pay Principle” cannot succeed under the Voluntary
Assent rule. Under such a voting rule, polluters will simply decline to
participate in a regime that imposes net costs on them. Trying to
establish such a regime will encounter stalemate. . . .
Under the Voluntary Assent voting rule, regulatory instruments must
instead follow a “Beneficiaries Pay Principle.” The beneficiaries of
global environmental protection must attract non-beneficiary sources to
participate, because the former cannot compel the latter to comply under
Voluntary Assent. This is the converse of the standard approach in
national regulatory law. In the national context . . . [o]ur conventional
notions of pollution regulation are built on the crucial unstated premise
that Fiat or Majority rule enables sources to be compelled to participate.
Under the Voluntary Assent rule, this coercive power is missing, and
instrument choice must be differently conceived.225

Unable to force the polluting source to pay for the costs it imposes, the
beneficiaries must instead pay the source to reduce its activities. Such side
payments have clearly occurred in the Convention on Biological Diversity,
the Montreal Protocol, and the Kyoto Protocol through the Global
Environment Facility.226
The key point to note is that, while Wiener’s assertion concerns
international environmental law, his insights may well be equally
applicable to the Robertson example of nonpoint source pollution.227 In
practical terms, the history of efforts to regulate nonpoint source pollution
from farms has more closely resembled international than domestic law,
more Voluntary Assent than Fiat. J.B. Ruhl, for example, who has
undertaken a comprehensive assessment of the environmental impact and
regulation of farms, bluntly concludes that the federal government’s
225 Id. at 752–54. Wiener cites a number of prominent economists who have made similar
assertions, including Baumol and Oates, Aronson, d’Arge and Kneese, and Merrill. Id. at n.277;
see BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 196, at 21–22, 29 (discussing consequences of pareto-optimal
state); Ralph C. d’Arge & Allen V. Kneese, State Liability for International Environmental
Degradation: An Economic Perspective, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 427, 433–34 (1980) (discussing
pareto-optimal state as discouraging action); Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for
Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 968–71 (1997) (providing example of coercive
power in absence of pareto-optimal state); see also Adam L. Aronson, Note, From “Cooperator’s
Loss” to Cooperative Gain: Negotiating Greenhouse Gas Abatement, 102 YALE L.J. 2143,
2160–74 (1993) (proposing move towards pareto-optimal state as means of inducing
cooperation).
226 See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1501–
02 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing Global Environment Facility as mechanism for providing financial
resources to implement these conventions).
227 Wiener notes that non-international settings (such as local residential neighborhood control
of externalities) can also exhibit assent-based decisions and require a beneficiary-pays approach.
Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation, supra note 222, at 782 (arguing that quantity-based
instrument coupled with side payments would work in Voluntary Assent contexts and would not
create same perverse incentives as pure payment scheme or tax and payment scheme).
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“[e]fforts to address nonpoint source water pollution in the CWA and other
statutes have been feeble, unfocused, and underfunded.” Nor have the
states done any better.228
One might argue that the context of nonpoint source pollution is
fundamentally different than that of international law because the
background rule clearly is Fiat. That is, because farmers are part of the
polity, subject to local, state and national coercion, they cannot walk. For
political reasons the rule is not enforced, but one can certainly imagine
situations in which opposition to nonpoint source controls was overcome
and effective regulations imposed. Arguments for payment in this context
are controversial. To some, they smack of throwing in the towel, giving up
even though effective nonpoint source regulation and enforcement would
be feasible with a new administration in Washington.229 To others, this is
normatively disturbing—paying polluters to reduce their harms is simply
wrong.
Despite these objections (which are explicitly addressed in Part VI),
the effective opposition to meaningful nonpoint source controls stands tall
at the moment and seems unlikely to bow any time soon.230 While
Voluntary Assent rules may effectively be operating in the shadow of
background Fiat rules, the Fiat rules are so far in the background that we
can treat the current context as a sunny Voluntary Assent world. The
actions of legislatures provide strong evidence in this regard. As described
in the Catskills case study, Mayor Dinkins’ attempt to impose nonpoint
source controls in the Catskills met with such effective opposition that the
regulations were withdrawn and payments were offered instead. In a
remarkably similar series of events following the commencement of the
SCA’s operations in 1999,231 the harsh backlash from farmers, rural
communities, and Members of Parliament forced the New South Wales
Planning Authority to back off its draft enabling regulations for the SCA
228 J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 263, 298 (2000). This stalemate makes sense when viewed through a public choice analysis,
since the concentrated interests of the powerful agricultural lobby organize far more effectively
than the diffuse population of those harmed by nonpoint source pollution. For a detailed review
of the federal nonpoint legislation and why it has been ineffectual, see id. at 299–300.
229 Indeed, Lois Schiffer, the Assistant Attorney General for the Environment Division in the
Clinton Administration, contends that nonpoint sources would now be regulated if Al Gore had
won the election in 2000. Interview with Lois Schiffer, Former Assistant Attorney General,
Environmental Division, Department of Justice, Cambridge, Mass. (Nov. 7, 2003).
230 This can also be seen in the successful Congressional rider in 2000 that blocked funding of
the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulations Concerning Total Maximum Daily
Load, Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106–246, 114 Stat. 511, 567
(codified at 40 C.F.R. § 130.7 (2000)).
231 HELEN CHENEY ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES, REVIEW OF SYDNEY
CATCHMENT AUTHORITY’S ENVIRONMENTAL AND ESD INDICATORS: FINAL REPORT 26 (June
2004), at http://www.isf.uts.edu.au/whatwedo/SCAreview.pdf.
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and explicitly grant SCA regulatory authority over only new land uses.232
5.

Property Rights Analysis

Finally, consider the case when entitlements directly conflict with one
another. Imagine, for example, a property owner who wishes to burn brush
on her property. While she might argue that her right to do whatever she
wants with her landholding is absolute, property rights are not absolute and
likely never have been.233 In this instance, the law immediately recognizes
at least two limitations. A duty of care may exist under statutory law (e.g.,
a party may not emit air pollutant particles in excess of 100 parts per
million)234 or common law precedent (e.g., a property owner must pay for
nuisance harm caused by downwind air pollution).235
232 Email from Elizabeth Hanlon, supra note 198 (discussing changes in draft regulations
regarding extent of SCA regulatory authority). The harsh backlash over land use regulation was
the reason why the SCA asked me to examine the use of a market in Robertson in the first place.
Kevin Rozzoli, The Devil in Development: What’s Gone Wrong?, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Jan. 15, 2003, at A1 (discussing community protests against first draft of SCA regulations). A
similar course of events followed the 1997 outbreak of pfisteria in the Chesapeake Bay. Pfisteria
is an aquatic microorganism that, in nutrient-rich waters, produces toxins responsible for largescale fish kills and is potentially responsible for a range of human health effects ranging from
nausea to memory loss. For more information on pfisteria, see EPA, Pfiesteria Piscicida, Fact
Sheet, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/estuaries/pfiesteria/fact.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). Due
to a harsh backlash from chicken and pig farmers, Daina Savage, County Farmers Face
“Pfisteria Hysteria,” INTELLIGENCER JOURNAL (Lancaster, Pa.), Apr. 13, 1998, at 1, whose
manure runoff had likely caused the problem, OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACTS
OF
ANIMAL
FEEDING
OPERATIONS
B27-B28,
at
http://www.epa.gov/ostwater/guide/feedlots/envimpct.pdf (Dec. 31, 1998), the state legislature
opted not to regulate and instead paid them off—increasing its funding to farmers for “Best
Management Practice[s]” such as riparian fencing and planting. The federal-state initiative is
called the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) and offers farmers and
landowners a one-time sign up bonus of up to $150 an acre and up to 87.5% cost-share for most
practices as well as maintenance payments. The program operates as a flat subsidy, however,
with noncompetitive funding of applicants. For further details, see MD. DEP’T OF NATURAL
RES., CREP FACT SHEET, at http://www.dnr.state.md.us/wildlife/milo.asp (last visited Mar. 4,
2005); MD. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., COST-SHARE BENEFITS AND PRACTICE INCENTIVE
PAYMENTS (PIP), at http://www.dnr.state.md.us/download/crep_brochure_2.pdf (last visited Mar.
4, 2005).
233 Henry Smith describes the nature of interdependent property rights, stating:

No longer can the owner of Blackacre claim with much force that ownership entails the right
to use the resource without interference. As long as the ownership of Blackacre is a bundle
of sticks, any given right—say the right to exclude others from a beach—can just as easily
be assimilated to anyone’s bundle as to the owner’s. Thus, the idea that a property right is a
right to a thing that avails against the world has been replaced with the idea that a property
right is only one possible entitlement plucked from a wide range of equally privileged
results.

Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1105, 1106 (2003).
234 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 60.390–98 (2004) (limiting air emissions for automobile and light
duty truck surface coating operations).
235 See, e.g., Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904)
(requiring payment to downwind farmers harmed by smelter’s air pollution but allowing activity
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In the water quality context, the relevant question becomes: Do
farmers have the right to manage their land such that manure and soil run
off into watercourses and, if so, does a corresponding duty of care limit this
right? After all, farmers surely should not be paid to reduce their pollution
loads if they never had the right to pollute in the first place.
As Coase pointed out, this is fundamentally not a pollution problem,
but a cost problem.236 The issue of assigning property rights is not simply
one of internalizing externalities or stopping pollution, but rather of
minimizing total social cost.237 There is no easy answer as to who should
end up with the entitlement. If we stop the farmers from polluting, we
harm them, but if they continue to pollute, they harm the public. The fact
that property entitlements are currently unsettled or conflicting makes the
resolution more complicated, but does not change the basic choice—
deciding who should get the initial entitlement. The preceding analysis has
demonstrated that when information costs are high and there are
heterogeneous preferences and service capacities, payments to farmers may
be the preferable option because they lower information costs through selfidentification.
Poorly defined rights play out in another way, as well. As noted in
Part II, the farmer who has already put in riparian fencing is not being paid
for the benefits of water purification her vegetation provides. These
benefits are public goods, enjoyed by downstream consumers for free. But
because the landowner cannot get anyone to pay for the service, because
she cannot effectively exercise a property right to the clean water she has
generated, there is no financial reason to continue to provide it. From this
vantage point, by paying the farmer, we are doing no more than
overcoming the market failures that arise from public goods and poorly
defined property rights.
Implicit in this argument is the assumption that the farmer is
generating a good rather than imposing a harm. I have characterized her
actions of putting in riparian fencing as providing the beneficial service of
water purification. But even with the fencing, one can still describe the
farmer’s overall actions as generating a harm—a classic nuisance—by
releasing something into the water (increased sediment or nutrients because
of the lack of vegetative cover) that flows off her property and harms those
downstream. There does not appear to be a clean way to determine which
description is more accurate beyond reaching deeper to one’s vision of the
nature of property rights (e.g., communitarian versus individual). In
addressing a comparable dilemma, Justice Scalia argued in Lucas v. S.C.
to continue).
236 Coase, supra note 200.
237 See id.
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Coastal Council that a legislature’s description of an action as harmpreventing or benefit-conferring is too malleable to serve as a guide for
judges.238 Instead, he stated, background common law nuisance principles
should guide the characterization;239 but this simply laid him open to
charges that the common law is just as manipulable.240
Robert Ellickson’s analysis of this dilemma is worth considering. In
an influential article written in 1973, Ellickson assessed whether a nuisance
action should succeed against a particular land use by relying on a common
measure of “normalcy.”241 He argued that evaluative terms such as
beneficial and harmful are meaningful because “people have remarkably
consistent perceptions of normal conditions and thus can agree in
characterizing deviations from normalcy. In any community, observers
empirically establish standards of normal conduct for repetitive
activities.”242 As a result, “legal rules should seek to transfer wealth from
those whose actions have unusually harmful external impacts and to those
whose actions are unusually beneficial to others.”243
In the Robertson case, however, normalcy is difficult to determine.
The region is agricultural and allowing cows to graze near streams has long
been common practice. Grazing by the stream bank has little effect on
downstream properties beyond the impact on water quality. The direct cost
imposed by this practice falls on the municipal water supplier (and
ultimately on water consumers). Does that make it “unusually harmful”?
Discussion of the difficult dilemma of distinguishing between beneficial
and harmful practices is re-engaged at the end of this Article.
VI
CRITIQUES OF PAYMENTS AND THEIR (SOMETIMES) DISTURBING IMPLICATIONS

As described earlier, because most service markets function as
monopsonies (with a dominant buyer and many sellers), the market
effectively takes the form of a payment scheme. In addition, as the last
section demonstrated, payment schemes can offer important advantages
238 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 1029–31 (1992). Professor Peter
Byrne has observed that this schism of describing activities as providing benefits versus causing
harm closely mirrors nineteenth century debates in America over takings. Interview with Peter
Byrne, Professor, Georgetown Law School, Wash., D.C. (Oct. 23, 2003).
239 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
240 For a critique of Scalia’s position in Lucas, see John S. Harbison, Constitutional
Jurisprudence in the Eyes of the Beholder: Preventing Harms And Providing Benefits in
American Takings Law, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 57 (1997) (arguing that balancing method to
determine whether harm is nuisance is also malleable).
241 Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 729–31 (1973).
242 Id. at 729.
243 Id. at 729–30.
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over prescriptive instruments. Nonetheless, by this point you may have
started forming some nagging doubts. Service markets may seem like
clever and, in some cases, optimal mechanisms for encouraging provision
of ecosystem services, but difficult issues need to be confronted. There are
good reasons, after all, that “payments” and “subsidies” are four-letter
words to many economists. Indeed, payment schemes can lead to what
some might view as quite disturbing policy implications: Are we paying
the right people? Are we sending messages that encourage or undermine
an ethic of land stewardship? Are we effectively paying for rights that
farmers never had? Perhaps most centrally, service markets raise the
fundamental question of when we should encourage land use changes
through payment rather than coercion, and what this means for our
understanding of landholders’ rights and responsibilities.
This Part explores these difficult issues, addressing in turn the
problems incurred through violating the polluter-pays principle, the
perverse incentives created by subsidies, and their expressive
consequences. Each criticism, while valid in theory, proves to be less
problematic in actual practice for many services. This Part ends by
considering hybrid instrument designs, building off of literature in other
fields on the use of payments to bridge transitions of entitlements. At
worst, this analysis suggests that payments may sometimes be no better
than a second-best solution but, in the practical world of environmental
protection, it may be that some second-best solutions are still worth striving
for.
A.

The Polluted-Pay Principle

The pilot project proposed for the Robertson subcatchment suggests a
tension. Those farmers who have already put in riparian fencing no longer
have a significant potential for increased service provision and, as a result,
are unlikely to be paid.
Should every landholder who provides
environmental services be paid? Given a finite budget, the answer to this
would seemingly have to be “no.” It is hard to imagine a practical scheme,
for example, that pays everyone whose vegetation reduces nutrient flow in
the watershed. As the examples in Part V demonstrated, ecosystem service
approaches are best suited to the case of heterogeneous land
management—that is, where, in encouraging provision of a public good,
the agency desires specific land management changes in discrete parts of
the landscape.244 If one seeks to pay for discrete cases of ecosystem service
provision, however, clearly some land uses are more important than others.
244 As discussed infra at note 261 and accompanying text, if certain types of land management
are desired throughout the landscape, then regulations or taxes are likely more effective because
transaction costs are lower than with direct payments and overbreadth is not a major concern.
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But how should one decide who gets paid and who does not?
In the case of Costa Rica, landholders are being paid to keep their
lands forested—these are conservation payments not to change the land
use, and instead to maintain current practices. In the case of New York
City, payments are made both for maintaining the status quo and, in some
cases, for changing land use practice. In significant contrast to the Costa
Rican example, though, some of those being paid in many respects also are
causing the problems. For example, because some dairy farmers have not
built sufficient infrastructure or established riparian vegetation, their cows
are discharging significant nutrient loads into streams.
Which landholders should be supported by ecosystem service
payments—those who currently provide services or those whose properties
pose the greatest nutrient or sediment problems (and hence the greatest
potential for increased service provision)? This proved to be a real
conundrum for the SCA pilot project and will continue to be to be so for
many other service markets. To frame this dilemma more starkly, imagine
two adjacent farmers, A and B, who raise cows for a dairy operation on
gently rolling land beside a stream that flows into a reservoir. Concerned
over streambank erosion, five years ago Farmer A constructed fencing
alongside her streams, creating a ten-foot riparian buffer on either side of
the bank. This change in land management has significantly reduced the
amount of nutrients and soil washing off her land and, consequently, has
reduced the eutrophication and turbidity downstream. Farmer B, by
contrast, has continued to manage her land much the same way as her
predecessors, with nutrient and soil runoff after large storm events affecting
water quality in the downstream reservoir. Should the water supplier be
willing to make ecosystem service payments to address eutrophication and
turbidity control? If so, which farmer should receive payments, and how
much?
Posing these questions more fundamentally, what is the proper
paradigm for ecosystem service provision by farmers? Should we think of
farmers as polluters, and therefore subject to the polluter-pays principle, the
touchstone for much of modern environmental policy? If so, they
presumably should not be paid, but regulated or taxed instead. Or, by
contrast, are farmers potential providers of valuable services who are as
deserving of payments as water treatment plant operators?
To demonstrate this in an absurd example, one might argue that
farmers should not be paid to reduce their water pollution any more than I
should be paid to stop mugging people.245 But is this an apt analogy? This
sounds absurd only because I clearly do not already have the right to
assault. My duty of care in this case is clear—I have no entitlement that I
245

Interview with Mike Young, Division Chief, CSIRO, Adelaide, Austl. (Apr. 25, 2003).
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can exchange for payment because criminal sanctions already prevent me
from robbing people. But is the duty of care sufficiently strict and clear in
the land management context such that paying farmers not to allow manure
and soil into watercourses sounds equally absurd? At least at the moment
in Robertson, the answer is “probably not.” Otherwise, payments would
seem ridiculous because regulations already made riparian fencing and
grass swales mandatory.246 And, as noted above in the discussion of
unclear or conflicting entitlements, without a clearly defined duty of care
the argument for payments becomes much stronger.247
In evaluating the relative merits of this argument, it is helpful to
consider whether it makes sense in any other setting. Take a step back, for
example, and consider this in the pollution context. What would your
immediate reaction be to a proposal that we should pay a factory to stop
polluting because we all benefit from clean air? Sounds silly, right? But
are farmers any different, in that the service they provide by putting in
riparian fencing is really little more than reducing the contribution of their
cows to eutrophication downstream?
This turns out to be a less than compelling argument because, as noted
above, payments to the factory only seem silly because the duty of care for
factory pollution has clearly been established. More importantly, if we
want them to improve upon the current standard to obtain even cleaner air,
we essentially do pay them. In the EPA’s regulatory innovation program
during the Clinton Administration, known as Project XL, the agency
promised greater flexibility (an administrative law payment of sorts) in
exchange for superior performance.248 And trading schemes under the
Clean Air Act provide a similar lesson.249 When initial sulfur dioxide
permits are distributed based on historical emissions rather than auctioned
off, existing plant owners are effectively allocated permits to pollute.
Companies that emit less than permitted are rewarded by being allowed to
sell their excess allowances to other sources.250
246 The answer is not definitive because, while there are laws on the books that perhaps could
regulate nonpoint source pollution, they are either ineffective or not implemented. See supra Part
V.B.4. Whether this state of affairs justifies calling the farmers’ ability to emit nonpoint source
pollution a property right or a de facto entitlement is debatable. We return to this point in Part
VI.C.2.
247 Recall that the analysis of how to resolve conflicting entitlements suggested that we choose
payment schemes so that farmers will self-identify and reduce information costs. See supra Part
V.B.3.
248 EPA, WHAT IS PROJECT XL?, at http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/file2.htm (last visited Feb.
19, 2004); see also Dennis D. Hirsch, Symposium Introduction, Second Generation Policy and
The New Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001) (discussing regulatory flexibility of Project
XL, EPA initiative allowing regulated entities to demonstrate excellence by developing
innovative pollution control projects across multiple media).
249 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–61 (2000).
250 See, e.g., SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 57, at 96–97 (describing operation of
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Indeed, according to Robert Ellickson, just such an approach favoring
incentive payments over penalties was endorsed by the father of
environmental economics, A.C. Pigou.
Modern scholars may be surprised that Pigou thought the proper way to
handle air pollution was to give bounties to factories that cleaned up
emissions, rather than to tax polluters. In an era when it was normal to
pollute with coal-burning fireplaces, Pigou was probably right in
recognizing that rewards were the most efficient internalization system
and in perceiving the rare nonpolluter as a producer of beneficial
externalities.251

And what about payments in the context of wetlands regulation? The
implication of the argument would seem to be that, instead of the
prescriptive regulation of the 404 permit process, we should pay wetland
habitat owners not to develop them.252 Why might this seem like a foolish
suggestion? In part, because paying nationwide for wetlands protection
would be extremely expensive and, in part, because the alternative we have
already adopted seems to work pretty well and is “free” for the general
public. Because the program is enforced, it establishes an effective
baseline presumption in the field against the right to develop wetlands.
Costs are directly borne by developers.
Yet we also must keep in mind what the program is trying to achieve.
If our sole concern were the service of water purification provided by
wetlands, the 404 program would be a tremendously inefficient means of
service provision, since conservation of many (perhaps most) wetlands
would have little impact on drinking water quality. The nationwide and
uniform 404 permit regulations make the most sense because we have
reached a political decision that the combined contributions of wetlands to
social welfare (including not only the services of water quality and flood
control, but also wildlife habitat, recreation, and non-use values) justify a
environmental trading markets); Richard L. Revesz & Jonathan R. Nash, Markets and
Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants,
28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 575 (2001) (describing function of typical tradeable emission permit
regime). Hence the acid rain trading program under Title IV of the Clean Air Act is an example
of effectively paying a business to go above what is required (i.e., by allowing it to profit from
further reductions). 42 U.S.C. § 7651. It should be noted, though, that tradable permits phase out
this reward over time, as the allocation of permits based on historic use is phased out over time.
SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 57, at 96–97. Purchasers of tradable permits do not need to
repurchase the pollution reduction repeatedly over time—once a permit is sold, that is the end of
the story.
251 Ellickson, supra note 241, at 731. It is important to note that this strategy endorses
payments on the margins (i.e., to super-beneficial performers).
252 Section 404 of the Clean Water Act requires those who discharge dredge and fill material
into navigable waters to first obtain a permit. Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)
(2000).
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uniform regulatory approach that is far more efficient than a complicated,
multi-factor assessment of each wetland’s contribution to these values. In
the context solely of water quality provided by wetlands, by contrast, a
payment system might be preferable if we can easily identify the extent to
which particular habitats and management practices affect water quality.
Realize, though, that this logic cuts both ways. If our concerns over
nonpoint source pollution were generalized, and not focused on water
quality in particular local reservoirs, then payments likely would not be a
preferable policy instrument to broad regulation.253
Finally, what are the implications of the argument for payments in the
biodiversity context? There, the core assertion of property rights advocates
has long been that property owners with endangered species on their land
should have their critical habitat purchased by the government rather than
effectively having it zoned against certain types of development with no
compensation.254 At issue are both the definition of property rights and
when compensation should flow from infringing those rights through
regulation. At a certain level, the argument goes, restrictions on land use
rise to the level of a Fifth Amendment taking.255 The cost borne by these
landowners, critics of payments reply, is the price of living in a society
where benefits and burdens are not evenly distributed.256 As Justice
Holmes famously noted, “government hardly could go on” if payment were
required in all cases of property value reduced by regulation.257
The similarities between biodiversity and runoff from farming seem
striking. In the biodiversity case, the landowner is not compensated for the
public good of endangered species conservation. Unlike wetlands, the
253 Thus if our primary concern were hypoxia, leading to the creation of the dead zone in the
Gulf of Mexico caused by runoff into the Mississippi, for example, the information needs would
be low—we want a large overall reduction in nonpoint source pollution throughout the river’s
watersheds—and we would likely be served best by broad restrictions on nonpoint sources.
254 Some property rights advocates focus on Section 5 of the Endangered Species Act, which
provides authority to purchase habitat from the Land and Water Conservation Fund. 16 U.S.C. §
1534 (2000). The agency should rely on this authority, they contend, rather than restricting land
uses. See, e.g., Michael Vivoli, “Harm”ing Individual Liberty: Assessing the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 32 CAL. W. L. REV. 275, 320–321 (1996) (arguing
that Section 5 offers “constitutionally palatable method” of land acquisition).
255 To date, only one case has found a taking under the Endangered Species Act. See Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314 (2001) (finding that
plaintiffs’ contractual right to water use was taken when federal government enforced water use
limitations under Endangered Species Act); see generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity
and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 85–98 (1997) (exploring potential takings arising from
biodiversity conservation).
256 A number of scholars, most notably Eric Freyfogle, build off the imperatives of Aldo
Leopold’s land ethic, arguing that property rights are a construction of public policy and must
yield to ecological needs. See generally ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD (2003); see also Elmendorf, supra note 133, at 500–01.
257 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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benefit is discrete and the habitat is relatively easily identifiable. Given
that, the argument that we should use nationwide regulations because we
cannot adequately account for heterogeneity seems inapt. One might
contend that, as in the case of air pollution, the duty of care to conserve
endangered species has been established by Section 9 of the Endangered
Species Act, so payments are unnecessary.258 But this political fact does
not demonstrate that prescriptive regulation should always be the preferable
policy instrument. Indeed, in countries without the statutory hammer of the
Endangered Species Act (i.e., most of the world), payments for biodiversity
protection are commonplace.259
There is an immense literature on the intersection of property rights
and environmental regulation that goes well beyond the scope of this
paper.260 My immediate claim is modest—if one applauds the practice of
ecosystem service payments in the case of water purification,
acknowledging that they may be preferable to coercive measures, one must
also acknowledge that payments may be a more appropriate instrument
than regulation for certain aspects of biodiversity conservation.261
B.

Subsidies and Their Ills

While common in public policy, subsidies and payment programs
raise all sorts of red flags for policy analysts. These criticisms can be
grouped into three broad categories—payments are inefficient because of
holdouts and free riders, payments lead to rent-seeking and the diversion of

258

16 U.S.C. §1531 (2000).
See LANDELL-MILLS & PORRAS, supra note 5, at 25. Indeed, they are common in
America. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s “Partners for Wildlife” program, for example,
offers technical and financial assistance to private landowners to voluntarily restore fish and
wildlife habitats. From 1987 to 2002, the program was responsible for the restoration of nearly
640,000 acres of wetlands, over 1,000,000 acres of prairie and other uplands and over 4700 miles
of streamside and in-stream habitat. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., PARTNERS FOR FISH AND
WILDLIFE PROGRAM—OUR PARTNERS, at http://partners.fws.gov/What_we_do/overview.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2005).
260 See, e.g., Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental
Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347, 353 (1998)
(examining theory of “green wood” and its place in both property and environmental law);
Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct “Spin” on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1422 (1993)
(arguing that Lucas decision makes it easier for environmental protection measures to survive
takings claims); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1455 (1993) (criticizing Court’s
decision in Lucas for adopting antiquated view of property incompatible with ecological
awareness).
261 I do not go so far as many property rights proponents who advocate the general principle
that payments will (and should) be forthcoming to conserve and provide services. As described
earlier, payments may be appropriate where entitlements are unclear or performance above the
current entitlement is required, but in other cases prescriptive instruments likely will prove more
efficient.
259
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funds from more socially worthwhile causes, and payments create moral
hazards that encourage undesirable behavior. The relevance of these
concerns varies a great deal depending on the service in question.
1.

Holdouts and Free Riders

The problems of holdouts and free riders are most easily seen in the
context of biodiversity conservation. The functional value of a reserve
design or wildlife corridor depends critically on contiguous parcels. If
successful, the benefits from the sum of land parcels managed for
biodiversity conservation should be greater than its parts. This can be
frustrated, though, by the actions of a very small number of landholders
who can hold out for prices well above market rates. Without their
participation, it may be impossible to create effective habitats. Moreover,
neighbors of those who dedicate their lands to biodiversity conservation
may choose not to conserve biodiversity on their own land but, instead, free
ride on the wildlife amenities on adjacent land.262 Given these two
obstacles to competitive markets, one can understand the calls for coercive
instruments. It remains an important and unresolved empirical question,
however, whether these theoretical problems are important in practice.
After all, there has been a boom in land trusts since the 1990s.263
Holdouts and free riders are likely much less of a concern in the
context of water purification services because the effectiveness of
landscape management, for example, is less likely to turn on the actions of
a handful of landholders. Certainly, if the targeted twenty percent
identified in Figure 6 hold out, there will be a significant increase in
price,264 and collusion is surely a possibility if the number of eligible
262 Chris Elmendorf, who structured conservation land deals before entering academia,
similarly argues that reliance solely on voluntary conservation is inadequate. “[V]oluntarism
unmodified is not an attractive alternative, given the harvest that holdouts and free-riders would
reap.” Elmendorf, supra note 133, at 503.
263 There were over 1200 land trusts in the United States in operation by the end of 2000, with
nearly sixty-five percent of those having been created since 1981. These trusts permanently
protect nearly 6.5 million acres of land. Roughly forty percent of this land is protected by the
over 11,670 conservation easements deeded by private landowners to local, state, and regional
land trusts. Nancy A. McLaughlin, The Role of Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conservation on
Private Lands, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 453, 454 (2002). Nor is acquisition limited to land. For a
description of groups that purchase instream flows, see Thompson, supra note 22, at 271. The
success of the land trust movement does not, of course, prove that holdouts are not an important
or common occurrence—just that they are not sufficiently significant to block payments and
markets. As Chris Elmendorf, who worked on conservation easements and real estate
transactions in practice, notes, such concerns are very much on the minds of people trying to
bring these deals to fruition. “I can attest that the basic attitude of many practitioners to the
holdout problem is ‘hope against hope.’” Interview with Chris Elmendorf, Professor, U.C. Davis
Law School (Oct. 1, 2003).
264 This seems to have occurred in the Catskills, where land prices have been much higher

NYU FINAL DRAFT

June 2005]

9/2/2005 10:22 AM

CREATING MARKETS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES

165

landholders is low. But if the BushTender and Environmental Services
Scheme experiences with reverse auctions are any guide, this will not play
out in practice so long as the reverse auction is competitive. The danger of
holdouts can also be reduced through selective information disclosure. In
the BushTender program, for example, farmers are told which land
management changes would be most valuable (their Habitat Significance
Score), but not told how valuable their biodiversity is. By not being told
their Biodiversity Significance Score, farmers have difficulty knowing
whether their land is critically important and, therefore, are more likely to
bid based on the opportunity cost of fencing off native vegetation.
So long as payments are a one-off exercise, our analysis to this point
is sufficient. Realistically, though, it is incomplete in one important
respect, because the relative advantages of policy instruments shift
depending on the time period. In other words, if payment schemes prove
successful in providing services efficiently, one might expect that payments
could become a regular process. If so, then the issues raised by a payment
scheme change significantly over the longer term, implicating problems of
rent seeking, moral hazard, price equilibrium, and norm shaping. If
payments continue into the future, for example, then collusion becomes
more likely. This may well be what has happened with the CRP program
and the problem of bid prices at or near the clearing price.
The possibility of repeat players recasts the problem of holdouts in the
guise of extortion. For instance, a landholder who had signed a ten-year
contract for a particular land management regime might compete for a new
contract. Consider, for example, a barely concealed threat along the lines
of, “Now that the first ten years have passed, I’d like payments for another
ten years (at a premium of twenty percent to take inflation into account, of
course) or else I may have my cows start visiting the streams again.” In the
context of water quality, without payments how likely is it that a farmer
will change her land use in a manner that degrades water quality, perhaps
removing the fencing and swales?
In theory, repeat payments for water purification services need not be
expensive. If most of the payment covers capital costs, then after the initial
payment the farmer will be providing more services than before and, when
the next round of payments occurs, will likely get no more than
maintenance payments, since there will be other bidders offering greater
potential increases in service provision. There may be an argument to pay
more than maintenance costs if there is a credible risk of losing service
provision. Such payments would act as a type of insurance premium. Even
with such payments, however, some farmers may be tempted to hold out
for still higher payments.
than New York expected. See supra Part III.A.
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The likelihood of holdouts who have already received payments will
depend in large part upon three considerations—the competitive dynamic
among the landholders, the landholder’s contribution to upfront costs, and
the size of future opportunity costs. If the landholder contributed
significantly to the costs of putting in swales or fencing, for example, then
taking them out will be less likely. Indeed, in economic terms, the land
management should only change when the profits from new land uses
outweigh both the current income and the land management transition
costs. And even if the farmer did not pay for the initial capital costs, she
may well now regard the fencing and swales as an asset, adding value to
her farm.
It turns out that the threat of holdouts is much more significant in the
context of biodiversity than in water quality. If a farmer is paid to fence off
a stretch of native vegetation and, when payments cease, allows her cattle
to roam through and graze, then most of the benefits of biodiversity
conservation may be lost, as the available habitat for an endangered
population becomes scarcer and extortion becomes more likely.265 With
water quality, in contrast, the benefits from the service of water purification
have been enjoyed throughout the contract, and if the services are not
received from one farm, hopefully a comparable level of service or better
can be received from another.266 Moreover, changing the land use to
discourage biodiversity (such as mowing the lawn) imposes fewer costs on
the farmer than removing riparian fencing that may lead to soil loss from
erosion or loss of stream banks.
2.

Rent Seeking

Whenever public funds are made available, one can expect potential
beneficiaries to channel the funds to themselves and to increase funding.
The CRP, for example, which was launched as a short-term program to
promote better stewardship of erodible lands, is now a huge, stable $1.6
billion dollar annual farm subsidy.267 Efforts to closely tailor its
implementation seem to have been largely frustrated in practice in order to
ensure broader participation. The history of the Agricultural Conservation
Program is also a case study in how well-intentioned programs can be

265 This assumes that such an action would not constitute a Section 9 violation of the
Endangered Species Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (Section 9 prohibits “taking,” harming, or altering
habitat of endangered species).
266 The likelihood of repeat players does suggest, however, that there will be less
heterogeneity of bids as farmers come to learn which aspects of their land are valuable and which
bids have been successful in other markets. This may provide an alternate explanation to
collusion as to why the CRP bids are just below the clearing price. See supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
267 CRP Monthly Summary, supra note 95.
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overtaken by local political interests.268 Even if a payment scheme were
established that created a competitive dynamic among farmers to provide
services at least cost, there is a very real possibility that, over time, this
could follow the path of the CRP and transform into a blunt subsidy.269
3.

Moral Hazards

Returning to our Farmer A and Farmer B example, recall that Farmer
A carefully managed her land, putting in riparian fencing on her own
initiative to prevent streambank erosion, while Farmer B followed
traditional practices, allowing her cows to graze in the stream and not
putting in fencing. At first glance, paying Farmer B to improve her
property through riparian fencing makes good sense. This will reduce
pollution loading in the reservoir. But how can this be described as an
ecosystem services payment scheme? On its face, this seems to be paying
more for the lack of ecosystem services. That is, Farmer A is already
providing services but will receive less than Farmer B, who currently
provides few. The key point to recognize is that we are not really paying
for ecosystem services but, rather, for improvements in service provision.
Our goal, after all, is improved water quality. In that respect, we
should value most those actions that improve the water quality on the
margins, and those will primarily be actions taken from today that improve
the status quo. Through this view, then, we should pay more initially to the
268 Agricultural Conservation Program Objective, 7 C.F.R. § 701.3 (2004). Elmendorf, supra
note 133, at 497 n.426 (describing how, in Agricultural Conservation Program, “Congress
overrode the USDA and forced it to subsidize whatever practices the local ‘county committees’
wanted subsidized.”). Whether rent seeking amounts to agency capture is a complex question
that turns on transparency and concentration of impacts, among other factors. Personal
Communication with Michael Levine, Professor, Yale Law School, New Haven, Conn. (Feb. 20,
2004).
269 A study of farmer-irrigators in Arizona provides an interesting insight into the farmergovernment political dynamic. The researcher, Helen Ingram, was trying to figure out why
farmers were supporting a water project that would charge more per acre foot than they could
afford. Why would rational economic actors support a water project they could not afford to use?
Ingram found that support for the project was, on its face, economically irrational because the
projected water costs were greater than the farmers’ willingness to pay. Instead, farmers made a
political judgment, deciding on what Ingram termed their “willingness to play.” If they could get
the government to build the project, farmers reasoned, the government would bail them out if it
proved too expensive and would provide a subsidized supply. As Joseph Sax describes:

[F]armers were willing to “play” the game of politics, and to bet that the rules of the game
would change. In fact, a long history of western water projects gave credence to the
farmers’ tactic: in decade after decade, the government had effectively forgiven agricultural
debts on projects that legally required repayment.

Joseph L. Sax, The Fate of Wetlands in the Face of Rising Sea Levels: A Strategic Proposal, 9
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 143, 149–50 (1991) (citing research done by Helen Ingram,
William E. Martin, & Nancy K. Laney, A Willingness to Play: Analysis of Water Resources
Development in Arizona, in WATER AND AGRICULTURE IN THE WESTERN U.S. 139, 139 (Gary D.
Weatherford ed., 1982)).
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Farmer B’s of the world who change their land use than to the Farmer A’s
who have already made the improvements, for the simple reason that the
actions of Farmer B will lead to greater marginal improvements.
This approach, however, may pose a problem known as a “moral
hazard.” If we say people are being paid to provide a service, then how can
we ignore those who already provide it? What kind of message does that
send? Are we not essentially paying off the bad actors and thereby
encouraging undesirable behavior? More generally, how do we equitably
account for the baseline that is already out there? Those farmers who have
already made the investments and managed their land responsibly may not
receive any payments. Only those who have been less responsible will
benefit, the argument goes, creating a disincentive to land stewardship. As
critics of the CRP program have made clear, responsible land managers can
become dispirited if those who employ less responsible land management
practices effectively are paid for doing so. This surely is not conducive to
the kind of land management ethic we are trying to encourage.
These are not easy challenges to answer. One response, though not
entirely satisfying, is simply that life’s not fair. Governments subsidize
some agricultural activities more than others all of the time. Sugar cane
growers in Florida may receive more federal money than grain farmers in
South Dakota; peanut growers in Georgia may receive more advice from
extension services than apple growers in Washington. Moreover, neither
subsidy politics nor markets are based on equity. Markets are designed to
exploit differences among buyers and sellers, not remove them. A market
that seeks to eliminate heterogeneity will be a flat market.
Nor do all landholders need to be paid. As described above, if land
care preferences follow a normal distribution (as shown in the bell curve in
Figure 3), at one end will be those who refuse to alter their land
management practices unless forced to do so. They are balanced at the
other extreme by those who are willing to manage their land in an
environmentally sensitive manner, with or without government
intervention. They do not need payments as an inducement. The Nature
Conservancy and Greening Australia, for example, work with many
landholders who are willing to pay the legal fees to place conservation
easements on their properties.270 Those between the extremes, willing to
change their land uses to provide services but concerned about the costs
involved, are the prime target audience for a service payment scheme, not
those who have already incorporated a stewardship management ethic.
Nonetheless, there is a likelihood of unnecessary payments. In other
words, a payment scheme will attract bids not only from those who are
270 Interview with Carl Binning, Director, Greening Australia, Canberra, Austl. (Mar. 23,
2003).
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willing to change their land management practices because of the
payments, but also from those who would have made the changes in any
case, but appreciate a handout when they can get one. However, this
problem of “consumer surplus” may not be very large in practice, because
presumably most people who would change land management on their own
have already done so. The use of a reverse auction, as in BushTender, will
also reduce the cost of these payments, because these farmers’ bid prices
should be quite low (in the sense that they would have done it for free, but
some payment is better than none).271
These points address issues of equity, though, not of perverse
incentives. Of possibly greater concern is the likelihood that the Farmer
B’s of the world will delay improving their land management practices in
the expectation that they will eventually be paid to do so. Indeed, paying
farmers for biodiversity conservation has been criticized by some as
tantamount to granting landholders an implicit right to hold the
environment ransom.272 In the extreme, one might imagine farmers
actively worsening their land management practices to increase payments
for their potential service provision.273
To place this in a more domestic setting, imagine that your condo
association wants to address the problem of noisy parties by having the
loud apartment owners place a restrictive covenant in their leases
prohibiting loud music after 10 p.m.274 Would offering payment to the
noisy neighbors in exchange for restrictive covenants be a good solution?
Not if it created a perverse incentive for other neighbors to start cranking
up their stereos so they also could be bought off or, worse yet, if word got
around and heavy metal fans moved into the building expressly so they
could be paid to use headphones. Indeed, a standard economic criticism of
subsidies is that they can unwittingly reward the very behavior they are
trying to suppress.275
271

Thompson, supra note 22, at 284.
MIKE YOUNG ET AL., DUTY OF CARE: AN INSTRUMENT FOR INCREASING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF CATCHMENT MANAGEMENT 15 (CSIRO Draft Options Paper prepared for
Victoria
Catchment
Mgmt.
Council
&
Dep’t
Sustainability
Env’t,
2003),
http://www.vcmc.vic.gov.au/Web/Docs/Duty%20of%20care-final.pdf.
273 Wiener has also criticized this approach in the context of climate change, arguing that
“making actual payments to enlist the cooperation of nonbeneficiary sources is essentially a
subsidy for abatement, and in like fashion it creates moral hazard . . . . The subsidy for
abatement—paying the source’s costs of externality control—induces recipients to increase their
risk-making activities.” Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation, supra note 222, at 755–56.
274 This example is adapted from Wiener, which presented a hypothetical in which a
homeowners’ association wants to limit noise but also requires the assent of its residents
regarding restrictive covenants. Id. at 782.
275 In their well-known book on environmental economics, for example, Baumol and Oates set
out an economic proof showing that subsidies given to a polluting industry are counterproductive.
272

[A]lthough a subsidy program may reduce the emissions of each firm by itself, the subsidies,
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While theoretically and intuitively an obvious problem, how serious a
concern should this be in the field? We have a good understanding of how
to address moral hazards that arise under the polluter-pays principle (i.e.,
victims inviting the harm),276 but in the service payment scheme such
approaches are not easily applicable.277 Nonetheless, in the context of
ecosystem services, moral hazard concerns do not seem worrisome unless
the expected private benefits of poor land management exceed the costs.
Actively encouraging erosion of the topsoil or stream banks on your farm is
far different than cranking up Aerosmith after 10 p.m. or increasing
production at a polluting factory. Increasing your attractiveness for
potential service payments can carry a significant cost in long-term farm
productivity. Such a strategy also carries a significant risk if payments are
granted on a competitive basis, since some farmers may receive no funds
for running down their land. After all, given the likely budgets for
payments, it is probable that less funding will be available than the
potential recipients request. Both BushTender and the Costa Rican
programs, for example, were oversubscribed.278 In sum, if the relative
value of payments is low compared to losses from strategic behavior, then
moral hazards are less likely a problem.
Once one moves away from moral hazard actions that impose costs,
however, the problem becomes more difficult, as in the case of biodiversity
conservation. There may be little direct cost in switching to crops or field
management that degrade critical habitat, and moral hazard concerns
cannot be as easily dismissed.

far from yielding a reduction in total industry emissions like a pollution tax, may, in fact,
increase emissions from their unregulated level! . . . In a competitive industry, where
polluting emissions are a fixed and rising function of the level of industry output, equal tax
and subsidy rates will normally not lead to the same output levels or to the same reductions
in total industry emissions. Other things being equal, the subsidy will yield an output and
emission level not only greater than those that would occur under the tax, but greater even
than they would be in the absence of either tax or subsidy.

BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 196, at 221–22 (emphasis in original).
276 One can require the polluter to pay the state rather than the victim, or reduce compensation
through doctrines such as mitigation of damage or contributory negligence. See Wiener, Global
Environmental Regulation, supra note 222, at 771.
277 Wiener argues that a trading regime is more effective at reducing moral hazard problems
than payments. Id. at 780. This may well be the case in the general context of polluting
industries; the practical challenges of creating a cap-and-trade regime for nonpoint source
pollution are considerable. Indeed, no truly effective trading programs have been established for
this problem. Interview with Tom Tietenberg, Professor, Colby College, Santa Barbara, Cal.
(Aug. 20, 2003).
278 The CRP guards against the moral hazard problem by requiring that the farmland be
cultivated in four of the past six years. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. To guard
against providing an incentive for poor management (i.e., worse than the status quo), one could
also condition eligibility for payment on a variant of the neutral or beneficial effects test—recent
evidence of land management that has not degraded water quality.
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Hazards to Morals

A further concern over creating markets for ecosystem services
centers on the impact this might have on the public’s norms toward land
stewardship. Do public payments for service provision send the message
that private provision is unnecessary or not valued? As Buzz Thompson
describes in the context of purchasing water rights for instream flows,
by paying for instream flow, the government also may undercut an ethos
of conservation.
Aldo Leopold (one of the most influential
environmental thinkers of the 20th century) believed that the only
effective means to achieve sustainable resource use was by developing a
new norm, a ‘land ethic,’ under which property owners would
incorporate the needs of the ecosystem as a whole into their stewardship
of land, water, and other resources. Several recent scholars, in turn,
have suggested that legal regulations or standards may encourage the
development of new norms consistent with those regulations or
standards.279

Government payment programs may risk undermining the land ethic
by commodifying environmental stewardship, “making environmental
stewardship an issue of money rather than fundamental values.”280
Mike Young, Tian Shi, and Jim Crosthwaite have raised similar
concerns in assessing markets for services in Australia. Once payments
become commonplace, they charge, this risks eroding common notions of
an environmental duty of care and discouraging private investment in the
environment by creating the impression that environmental stewardship is
the duty of governments rather than individuals.281
These are difficult concerns to address. Laws clearly can influence
norm formation. As Carol Rose has explained, “our laws are not just our
controllers, but our teachers. For better or worse, normative or hortatory
279

Thompson, supra note 22, at 277–78.
Id. at 278.
281 YOUNG ET AL., supra note 272, at 15. Carol Rose has made a related observation in
comparing the moral suasion of property (which she calls PROP) and prescriptive instruments
(RIGHTWAY). Property and payment schemes may be more efficient than direct regulation, but
their lack of moral grounding can weaken their effectiveness.
280

PROP loses RIGHTWAY’s moral thrust by surrounding pollution with rights-talk, by using
a rhetoric of entitlement to pollute. When we reconceptualize the use of common resources
as individual property rights, we attenuate the moral rhetoric of contribution and trying
harder for the common good. This attenuation occurs even though economic incentives may
persuade would-be polluters, on self-interested grounds, that they indeed should try
harder. . . . [I]t may be well to consider that the adoption of the sophisticated PROP
techniques, without attention to their rhetorical message, may come at the price of a
diminution in a certain element of moral suasion. In turn, this moral diminution may work
against the overall effectiveness of PROP by creating a cultural climate in which one is not
expected to do the right thing unless it is in one’s direct interest to do so.

Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls:
Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 34.

Management Strategies for Common
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lessons are embedded in our laws, and we need to think about the education
they impart when we adopt legal institutions to manage resources . . . .”282
But how norms change and influence behavior is a complicated process.
Indeed all instruments have normative objections. Regulations can be seen
as denigrating private ordering and, in turn, can lead to private resistance.
Markets and taxes, by contrast, have negative connotations of
commodification and abdication of governmental control.283 Nor do
empirical studies provide clear direction on the messages policy
instruments send and their impacts on social learning.284 The role of
service markets in norm transformation is simply not known.285 It is worth
considering, though, why payments should be any more harmful to
development of a land ethic than regulations or taxes directed at the same
policy goal. Regulations and taxes certainly have not created a Leopoldian
land ethic to date. To the contrary, as noted in the Introduction, one can
imagine how a transformation of farm commerce from growing crops to
growing services truly would inspire a different vision of the land.
Regardless of the merits of payments versus regulation or taxes for
shifting norms, John Echeverria’s description of Aldo Leopold’s views on
the proper balance among policy instruments provides a useful dose of
humility for how much any policy instrument can achieve in this regard.
While Leopold would have welcomed the commitment of public funds for
282

Id. at 38.
See generally STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES?: ECONOMISTS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1981) (discussing ethical concerns with trading pollution rights); Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 966 (1982) (arguing that certain objects,
such as body parts, should not be subject to commodification unless they are separated from
oneself and quintessential property of personhood severed).
284 In studying problems of collective action and the NIMBY (“not in my backyard”)
phenomenon, Daniel Kahan has reviewed payment schemes that reward communities in exchange
for siting noxious facilities. He has found that such compensation-based siting policies, though
lauded as clever alternatives to mandated siting decisions, were a major disappointment.
Communities continued to oppose proposed sitings, regardless of revenue sharing offers.
283

Indeed, there is evidence that compensation schemes sometimes make the NIMBY problem
worse. According to some studies, residents often bridle at “compensation offers . . . as
attempts to buy them off or bribe them.” . . . . It would be a mistake, however, to conclude
that compensation schemes never work. At least some opinion studies have shown that
offers of compensation can significantly increase willingness to accept the siting of a
noxious facility. Moreover, compensation in one form or another has nearly always been a
part of the successful waste-facility siting efforts in the United States and Canada in recent
decades.

Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV.
71, 86–87 (2003) (emphasis added).
285 The law has played a role in norm formation in many areas. See generally Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999) (examining
corporate law); Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000) (examining criminal law); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design
and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1997) (examining commercial
law).
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conservation payments, Echeverria notes, he thought the “fallacious
doctrine that government must subsidize all conservation” would ultimately
“bankrupt either the treasury, the land, or both.” Public ownership “can
cover only a fraction of what needs to be done, and then only awkwardly,
expensively, and with frequent clashes of interest.”
At the end of the day, he thought that those concerned about the problem
of maintaining the health of the land had to grapple with the reality of
private land ownership. “The basic problem is to induce the private
landowner to conserve on his own land, and no conceivable millions or
billions for land purchase can alter that fact, or the fact that so far he
hasn’t done it.”286

Payment schemes may be preferable in some instances to coercive
instruments, but they can only get us so far.
C.
1.

Instrument Choice Revisited

Transition Payments

To what extent can instrument design address the problems of moral
hazards and holdouts described above? While not written in the context of
ecosystem service markets, there is a significant legal literature on
transition losses and gains.287 A number of commentators have argued that
payments best serve a temporary transition purpose, while instruments such
as regulations or taxes provide longer-term instruments that can be
subsequently introduced. Recall Robert Ellickson’s endorsement of
Pigou’s insights, for example, “that rewards were the most efficient
286 John Echeverria, What Would Aldo Leopold Say?
(May 11, 2000), at
http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/3094.
287 Writing in the context of tax policy, Kyle Logue raises the same basic concerns that are
raised by ecosystem services.

That unexpected rule changes produce losers and winners is uncontroversial. Disagreement
arises over the question of what, if anything, should be done about these transition effects.
To put the question slightly differently, what should our “transition policy” be? Or put
differently still, to what extent should the government deliberately try to alleviate the
“retroactive” effects of rule changes?

Kyle D. Logue, If Taxpayers Can’t Be Fooled, Maybe Congress Can: A Public Choice
Perspective on the Tax Transition Debate, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1507, 1507 (2000) (reviewing
DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF
TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (2000)). See generally Holly Doremus, Takings and
Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2003) (arguing that, with regard to regulatory
takings, key factors to consider in allocating costs of rule transitions between property owners
and government are justification for transition, foreseeability, abruptness, and generality); Farrier,
supra note 54 (focusing on formal mechanisms employed by federal government and private
organizations to induce private landholders to conserve biodiversity in United States); Neil
Gunningham & Mike D. Young, Toward Optimal Environmental Policy: The Case of
Biodiversity Conservation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243 (1997) (analyzing costs and benefits associated
with multiple-instrument and single-instrument approaches to environmental regulation).

NYU FINAL DRAFT

174

9/2/2005 10:22 AM

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:600

internalization system and in perceiving the rare nonpolluter as a producer
of beneficial externalities.”288 It may be efficient, in other words, to pay on
the margins to jump-start the transition and then penalize those who later
refuse to change. Carol Rose has similarly observed the role initially
played by payments through the takings doctrine in clarifying or adjusting
entitlements. As legislatures begin to assert public rights over pre-existing
private entitlements, there are both fairness and estoppel reasons to ease
this transition by compensating owners, particularly if the public authorities
have been “quite late in determining that particular private land uses cause
damage to other persons and to public resources, or . . . have suggested that
these uses could continue.”289
Takings claims are not appropriate every time expectations of property
use change, of course,290 but such “legislative grace” may be justified for
people whose reasonable expectations of land use have been upset. Such
transitional payments can reduce the moral hazard problem and, more
fundamentally, address the normative charge of the polluter-pays
principle—that farmers should not be paid indefinitely for costs that they
can internalize. Figure 7 represents these approaches graphically.291
The x-axis shows time from point zero while the y-axis shows the
duty of care. The higher up the y-axis, the greater the duty of care (e.g., the
larger the amount of land that must be fenced off along streams). At time
zero the duty of care has not been imposed and there is a range of land
management practices by the farmers (represented by rectangles).
FIGURE 7
[Printer: insert fig7.doc here]
As time passes, though, the policy instruments of payment and
prescription are used in tandem. Those below the duty of care are paid to
raise their performance by service payments, but in time the duty of care
288

Ellickson, supra note 241, at 731.
Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New
Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 284 (1996). A variant of this approach was
used in the Wilderness Act of 1964, where mining was allowed for twenty years following
passage of the Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2000) (originally enacted in 1964). Personal
communication with Richard Lazarus, Professor, Georgetown Law Center, Wash., D.C. (Nov. 13,
2003).
290 As Robert Ellickson notes, housing standards improve all the time (e.g., requirements for
flush toilets or fire alarms) but takings challenges for losses incurred as a result of these changes
invariably fail. Personal communication with Robert Ellickson, Professor, Yale Law School,
New Haven, Conn. (Mar. 22, 2003); see, e.g., Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80
(1946) (upholding laws requiring lodging houses to install automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems);
Hutchinson v. City of Valdosta, 227 U.S. 303 (1913) (upholding ordinance requiring property
owners to connect to sewer system). A more recent decision showing the same trend is Stern v.
Halligan, 158 F.3d 729 (3d Cir. 1998) (denying takings claim based on town’s requirement that
landowners connect their property to municipal water supply).
291 Figure 7 was suggested by Mike Young, Division Chief, CSIRO, Adelaide, Austl.
289
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also rises, payments stop and penalties kick in. In Figure 8, those
underneath the dotted line are now fined. One might imagine an official
telling a farmer, “In 10 years, either you meet the standard or we will
sanction you. Because we are changing expectations (and perhaps
entitlements), though, in the meantime we will help you make the
transition.” This approach sends a clear message that farmers must
internalize their land management costs, does not obligate future payments
with revenue streams that are not guaranteed, and avoids the problem of
continuing transaction costs into the future.
FIGURE 8
[Printer: insert fig8.doc here]
Thus, for example, imagine a scheme where the duty of care will
require in ten years that everyone fences watercourses twenty meters on
either side of the stream. There could be a payments scheme in which if
you fence off the land this year, you are reimbursed $100/km of fencing; if
you fence off next year, the payment is $90/km; and so on until after ten
years there are no payments, but instead are penalties. The Swedish city of
Malmo used this type of fixed payment scheme to ease the transition to
new requirements for sewage tanks.292
One could use service payments rather than fixed payments, but the
point is the same. Through this approach, short-term transitional payments
act as “circuit breakers,” easing the internalization of and transition to a
higher duty of care. Such short-term and conditional payments help retain
support of the political and local communities as contested or uncertain
property rights are redefined. Payments are being used to clarify the
standard of care so that it benefits the public—that is, farmers are being
paid not to exercise their right to allow manure and soil to flow into
watercourses. As Young notes, however, the guideline is that “where
compensation is necessary, it should only be offered for a transitionary
period as an equitable means of bringing about a faster and irreversible
transition.”293
This approach also addresses the moral hazard of farmers degrading
their land in expectation of payments because a clear and increasing duty of
care baseline has been established. It goes some way in addressing those
farmers who delay improving their management practices in the hope they
will be bought out, since this practice risks becoming a liability as the duty
of care increases. Realize, though, that in paying farmers to change their
land management practices, the government is now effectively
292 Personal communication with Mike Young, Division Chief, CSIRO, Adelaide, Austl. (Apr.
25, 2003). One could equally operate the payments as a market, allowing potential beneficiaries
to submit competitive bids during a limited time period.
293 Gunningham & Young, supra note 287, at 296.
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acknowledging (and perhaps redefining) the farmers’ entitlements. As
Young, Shi, and Crosthwaite have argued, this is the “point where the
‘polluter pays principle’ ends and the ‘beneficiary pays principle’
begins.”294
Realize, as well, that under this approach, the size of ecosystem
service payments is directly correlated to the transition to the new duty of
care.295 The farmer’s willingness to accept (as expressed in her bid price)
depends on what the duty of care standard will be three, five, and ten years
from now. Such an approach becomes much less effective if the tightening
of standards is unlikely to occur over the medium to long term. As Figure
9 shows, if the progression of the duty of care “flatlines” (to borrow a
popular phrase from TV hospital dramas), then payments effectively take
the form of purchasing an entitlement—paying the farmer not to exercise
her right to manage the land in certain ways—rather than a transition
payment easing internalization of costs.
FIGURE 9
[Printer: insert fig9.doc here]
The key question, then, is whether the relevant agency has (1) the
authority, (2) the political capital, and (3) the political will to raise the duty
of care and threaten coercive instruments unless standards are met by a
certain time. If the agency has a credible big stick that it is willing to use
soon, then the payments will justifiably be regarded as transition payments
that will end over a period of time. Given the history of regulatory efforts
to address nonpoint pollution from agriculture, though, a bit of skepticism
may be in order if this strategy is used for water purification.296
There may well be an implicit fourth question that must be considered,
as well—whether the public believes that the property right is correctly
identified as privately rather than publicly held, that is, whether there is
general agreement that the provision of services “stick” is initially part of
the property owner’s bundle. Property rights come from prescriptive
statements by government and courts, but these pronouncements are
inextricably bound up with popular notions of who owns what.
294 YOUNG ET AL., supra note 272, at 5. In the same vein, one of the main conclusions of the
Wentworth Group was to “provide financial support to landholders who supply environmental
services to the rest of the community above agreed definitions of duty of care.” WENTWORTH
GROUP, supra note 9, at 13 (emphasis added). This fails to note what we should do, however,
when the duty of care is not clear.
295 Nor is it clear that this can be described as a market. It seems more accurate to call this a
side payment, similar to grandfathering old power plants under the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. §
7411(d) (2000).
296 See Ruhl, supra note 46, at 298 (describing attempts to regulate nonpoint source water
pollution as “feeble, unfocused, and underfunded”). Such an approach also raises the question of
what should happen if the duty of care is tightened after the transition period: Should there be a
further series of payments?
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Determining whether an entitlement “clearly” should be a public property
right takes us back to the earlier discussion of whether the farmer is
generating a good or preventing a harm. Presumably, one reason that
paying farmers for water purification may prove hard for some people to
accept is that it looks like the owner’s activity is generating a negative
externality—pollution—which she initially had no right to generate.
Although nonpoint pollution may not have been traditionally regarded as a
nuisance, it fits comfortably within that common law box.
One can argue away these concerns, but the characterization of
polluter versus service provider remains a difficult one to settle. One may
be able to argue persuasively for payments on efficiency grounds; but
realize that efficiency is a normative goal, one that can conflict with
another normative goal—the principle that pollution is a blameworthy
action and that polluters should internalize the costs of their pollution.
Choosing between these goals is ultimately a value judgment. This point
was made abundantly clear by the consistent reactions of participants in the
workshops where I presented this paper. Almost without exception,
economists were untroubled by payments while environmentalists were
disturbed and, in a few cases, outraged by paying the farmers to put in
fencing.
Management of habitat, by contrast, presents a different line-drawing
challenge. Although one can imagine settings where degrading critical
habitat can create obvious negative externalities, such as erosion, making
habitat less attractive to species seems closer to eliminating positive
externalities, such as providing nesting and foraging grounds and water
retention. In this setting, it does seem harder to argue that society should
demand generation of positive externalities without payment.297
As a result, a reasonable strategy may be to follow a variant on Robert
Ellickson’s proposal. For ecosystem service markets, this would entail
deciding where entitlements popularly rest now, paying for those services
dependent on clear private rights, and having a transitional system for those
services that already are, or should be, public property rights.298 This
recognizes the fact that, in the real world, there is genuine uncertainty
about the bundle of rights and it may make sense to pay for some rights,
even if you do not think they started out in the right place.
While I have focused on the policy approach of transition payments
linked to a rising duty of care, there are other instrument hybrids that

297 Though, as noted earlier in the text, arguing that regulation should not demand the
generation of positive externalities is subject of course to the qualification that the distinction
between harm-preventing and benefit-conferring activities is easily manipulable. See supra Part
V.B.5.
298 Ellickson, supra note 241, at 683.
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should be considered in the context of service provision. One instrument
might be the “command and covenant” approach, which relies on
negotiation between the government and regulated parties over
performance and information generation.299 First pioneered in Europe,
command and covenant is gaining increasing attention in America and,
while it has focused to date on traditional industrial pollution,300 it might be
transferable to service provision. Following the lead of the PSA program
(and standing BushTender and CRP on their heads), one might pay those
who currently provide valuable services (Farmer A’s) and not those who
manage their land poorly, thus providing an incentive to improve service
provision below a certain baseline. Such an approach could also be used to
divide and conquer political opposition to prescriptive regulation.301
Depending on the service, a cap-and-trade approach might work, rewarding
the most efficient service providers, as well as other innovative instruments
that rely on a predetermined mix of mandatory and compensated actions.302
Ian Ayres has suggested a pay-or-be-paid approach.303 Theoretically, then,
clever instrument combinations can overcome the problems of holdouts,
299 The main idea is that the government sets basic requirements which the regulated parties
and government then “bargain around,” relaxing controls in some places and tightening them in
others so as to achieve the most efficient result. See E. Donald Elliott, Toward Ecological Law
and Policy, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
170, 183 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) (discussing shift “‘From Command
and Control’ to ‘Command and Covenant’”); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW.
U. L. REV. 1227, 1231–32 (1995) (describing range of “self-referential” reflexive environmental
regulations).
300 The “payments” in this setting have taken the form of regulatory relief rather than money.
See Elliott, supra note 299, at 182; Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere, Introduction:
Environmental Contracts and Regulatory Innovations, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS:
COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE 1, 5–11 (Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001) .
301 Christopher Elmendorf has suggested such a policy approach that would combine
proscription by regulating “really bad” land uses and payments for landowners who chose to
make “exceptional” improvements. This combination, he argues, is politically attractive because
the promise of payments could fracture the usually quite homogenous landowner lobby (creating
hope for a breakthrough in the policy logjam). At the same time, the presence of minimal
baseline regulations would satisfy some of the environmentalists’ expressive concerns, and their
desire not to create (by implication) a new property regime that absolves landowners of any
ecological duty. Email from Christopher Elmendorf, Professor, UC Davis Law School, Davis,
Cal., to the author (Oct. 1, 2003).
302 The Central Valley Project Improvement Act in California, Reclamation Projects
Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 3401–12, 106 Stat. 4600,
4706–31 (1992) (Title XXXIV of Act is Central Valley Project Improvement Act), for example,
mandates reallocations of over 800,000 acre-feet of water when there is an acute need for
instream flows (such as to protect an endangered species of fish) but, when needs are less
pressing, also authorizes the voluntary purchase of hundreds of thousands of acre-feet.
Thompson, supra note 22, at 278.
303 See Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of
Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001) (discussing polluter’s option to pay for right to
pollute or to be paid not to pollute).
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moral hazards, and rent-seeking. The challenge is to move beyond theory
and see how they perform in the field.
2.

The Dynamic Between Payments and Prescription

Part V considered in detail the challenges in instituting a services
market for water purification in the Robertson catchment and the
implications for other service markets. As the transition payments example
demonstrated, however, few policy instruments operate in isolation. This
last Section rounds out the analysis by considering the dynamic
relationship between payments and coercive instruments.
Despite their seeming attractiveness to politically powerful
landholders, in practice, service payments may not be preferable to taxes or
regulations. From the politician’s perspective, payments have to come
from a budget that seeks to satisfy many other constituencies. From this
vantage point, regulations are attractive as a much smaller drain on the fisc,
while taxes and fees provide revenue.304 Moreover, payment schemes can
be highly controversial.305 Part of this is due to rural landholders’ distrust
of government involvement in land use. As was evident in the challenge to
the Memorandum of Understanding in the Catskills case, part of the
opposition stems from a sense of unfairness that local development is being
sacrificed for the interests of distant urban water consumers, even if
payments are provided to offset the opportunity cost.306
Part of the opposition also comes from the concern over a slippery
slope—that payments will lead to coercive restrictions down the road. The
preceding section explored how payments can be used to ease transition
costs to more coercive instruments. Thus some landholders may view
payments with suspicion, as the thin end of a wedge that eventually leads to
regulation. If landholders view regulation as a likely consequence of
payment schemes, not only will there be opposition to the scheme, but also
a key benefit of service markets, self-identification resulting in lowered
information costs, simply will not occur. Why provide the government
information on a beneficial change in your land management for possible
payment if they can simply turn around and fine or force you to make the
change, instead?307
304 In the context of instream flows, Buzz Thompson notes that “[b]udgetary outlays for
voluntary acquisitions have historically been quite low, and political theory would suggest that
legislative appropriations are unlikely to fully reflect public support for instream acquisitions.”
Thompson, supra note 22, at 276.
305 A 1989 legislative proposal in Montana, for example, sought to create a voluntary
conservation program that would pay for instream acquisitions. Surprisingly, the proposal
“created a public policy controversy seldom seen in the halls of the [Montana] Capitol.” Id. at
274 (citation omitted).
306 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
307 John Dwyer suggests a similar dynamic to explain why the Clean Air Act offset markets
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Payments can also tip the balance toward coercive measures through
backlash. If payments are preferred because nonpoint source controls
cannot be mandated in a Voluntary Assent world, one would expect that if
the payments become high enough, then the political economy dynamics
will change. It may now be worth the effort for buyers of services to
oppose the concentrated interests of providers and to jolt the political
equilibrium enough to change entitlements (i.e., to overcome the challenge
of collective action). In the example of water quality, this would play out
as the demand for effective implementation and enforcement of nonpoint
source restrictions in combination with, or ultimately in place of, payments.
Conversely, payments could strengthen the entitlement, rather than
cause a buyer’s backlash and a demand for command-and-control
regulation. Payments both strengthen the landowner constituency and give
them more to lose if the regime shifts from payment to coercion. Because
of path dependence, a payment strategy may effectively rule out a later
transition to prescriptive instruments. In other words, once the government
has started down the path of payments (and environmental groups have
supported such schemes), it may not be politically feasible to actively
oppose them or to transition toward regulation. Witness the difficulty, in a
related context, of trying to change the ridiculously low fee for mining
patents established by the General Mining Law of 1872.308 Thus, in the
context of instream water flows, Buzz Thompson has argued that paying
some water users has undercut the argument for regulation, noting that
even though “mandatory reallocations may be a tough political sell, some
environmentalists would prefer that fight over under-funded acquisition
programs that give regulatory opponents yet another argument against
mandatory reallocations.”309
John Echeverria, by contrast, contends that payments may create a
sense of entitlement and may influence takings decisions. If public
conservation payments to landowners become commonplace, he warns,
“then the courts may more readily find that government has a constitutional
obligation to pay compensation to landowners to enlist their participation in
conservation programs.”310
In the final analysis, it simply is not clear whether acceptance of

have been so thin. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54
MD. L. REV. 1183, 1199–204 (1995) (describing attempts by EPA to force states to implement
EPA requirements, since EPA lacked administrative resources, expertise, and necessary technical
data on emissions to adopt specific criteria for land use and transportation controls).
308 See JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 1034 (2004) (noting
that miners pay $2.50 or $5.00 per acre for mining claim, making this probably “one of today’s
great real estate bargains”).
309 Thompson, supra note 22, at 277.
310 Echeverria, supra note 188.
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payments makes subsequent regulation more or less likely. In either case,
though, it is important to emphasize that instrument choice and design must
be, as my Australian colleagues would say, a case of “horses for
courses”—specific solutions for specific problems. I am not suggesting
that markets and payments replace coercive instruments for all provision of
services. Indeed, in many settings, markets for service provision may
prove a poor policy. My concern is that, in most settings, the service
markets’ horse isn’t even entered. And that needs to change.
VII
CONCLUSION

In recent years, increased recognition of ecosystem services’ critical
contributions to our welfare has spurred new initiatives to ensure provision
of services. While our understanding of the theory of service provision has
tracked this growth, our insights into practical implementation have not
kept pace. There is no substitute for doing and, whether the initiatives end
in failure or success, notes from the field lay the foundation for bettercrafted initiatives to follow. By exploring in detail the practical and
theoretical issues raised by service markets currently operating, I have
sought both to draw some preliminary conclusions and to lay out a research
agenda for scholars.
Theory already tells us a number of preconditions for successful
service markets—there must be discrete consumers and providers of
services, clear biophysical understanding of service provision and delivery
pathways, and determination of the service levels required. By drawing on
field experience and theory, I have suggested that payments for services
may be preferable to other policy instruments in a wide range of settings—
(1) when entitlements lie with service providers and regulatory authority is
lacking; (2) when there is information asymmetry between providers and
consumers of services and information costs are high; (3) when there is a
heterogeneous landscape, we seek discrete land use changes that will
provide beneficial services, and entitlements are either conflicting or below
desired land use practices; or, (4) when the political context creates the
equivalent of a Voting Assent world and coercive measures are infeasible
(i.e., service consumers cannot impose regulations or taxes on service
providers). My sense is that these different scenarios cover more situations
than we commonly assume, and an initial research task lies in categorizing
the different landscapes and political settings for service provision.
The larger research agenda for service markets also leaves open many
areas for study. While I have drawn from a number of service examples,
most of the analysis has come from my work on water quality and cattle
grazing; and how transferable the findings for water purification markets
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are to other services, such as carbon sequestration, biodiversity, or flood
control, remains an open question. I have not touched on a range of design
issues, such as how big the market needs to be, who bears the risk of
innocent loss, whether payments should be based on inputs or outputs (e.g.,
installation of riparian fencing or improvement in water quality), et
cetera.311 I have not empirically assessed the relative costs of payment
schemes compared to coercive instruments. Do the information burdens of
regulations or taxes exceed the implementation costs of payment schemes?
How likely are holdouts or moral hazards in practice, and when are these
most likely to appear? Nor have I considered how payment schemes could
change farm economics. Could paying more to potential service providers
than current service providers (more to Farmer B’s than to Farmer A’s)
create a sufficient competitive advantage that would, perversely, allow
them to undercut the better steward of the land? Conversely, are service
payments more likely to save farms operating on the margin than
regulations or taxes would? Is that environmentally a good or bad thing?
A whole array of questions exist dealing with which markets make
most sense in developing countries and what types of services, such as
biodiversity, are most valuable. An additional important question is how
service markets can be made to work in a country with limited institutional
capacity and a weak rule of law.312
The determination of willingness to accept also offers a rich area for
study. To be sure, decisions of landowners to bid for service provision, and
how much to accept, are not driven purely by the bottom line. The
influences of peers, social norms, and local experience matter and need to
be considered in market design. In some areas, local opposition to a
particular service provision, such as providing large-scale habitat for prairie
dogs, may be so deeply ingrained that payment schemes will likely fail.313
While market logic might counsel paying those landowners who offer the
biggest biodiversity bang for the buck, social psychology suggests a
different strategy of targeting landowners who have the most persuasive
force within the community.314
311 These are addressed in detail in the report I wrote for CSIRO, entitled, “A Scoping Study
for Provision of Ecosystem Services in the Sydney Catchment” (available from author upon
request), and in STONEHAM ET AL., supra note 90, at 483–87 (examining auction and contract
design issues).
312 See generally LANDELL-MILLS & PORRAS, supra note 5 (using case studies to explore
development of ecosystem service markets in developing countries); Ferraro & Kiss, supra note
211, at 1718 (detailing challenges of creating markets in context of uncertain land tenure, limited
opportunities for contract enforcement, and unfamiliarity with particular market mechanisms).
313 Elmendorf, supra note 133, at 470–71 (noting that beliefs held by ranchers that prairie dogs
compete with livestock for forage reduce feasibility of prairie dog reintroduction).
314 Thus Chris Elmendorf proposes focusing on an area’s ecological and social landscape. He
notes:
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Finally, we need to understand far better the normative assumptions
underlying creation of service markets. At what point should we pay for
beneficial land use changes rather than regulate or tax? The Article has
addressed this question through an efficiency analysis (arguing that
coercive instruments can prove more costly than payments), a political
analysis (coercive instruments are infeasible in a Voluntary Assent world),
and from other vantage points, but these different arguments all eventually
seem to find themselves in the same corner, grappling with a far more
difficult analysis—deciding whether landowners’ activities are
fundamentally a beneficial service to be encouraged or a harm to be
prevented. Early in the piece, in considering the case of dairy farmers and
riparian fencing, I urged the reader to “recognize this situation for what it
is—the provision of valuable services to consumers.”315 As we have seen,
though, reasonable observers might recognize this situation instead as the
imposition of a harm. Should we be punishing polluters or paying
providers? This may well be an intractable question that, at root, turns less
on biophysical measures or ecological modeling than on our sense of what
the allocation and definition of entitlements ought to look like and how
they should change over time. These questions, in the end, are value
judgments.
Service markets clearly pose potential concerns but, in an imperfect
world, may well provide the most effective and desirable means of
providing services in many more settings than we currently assume. While
an ecosystem services approach can sharpen insights at a theoretical level,
perhaps its greatest power is as a practical lens, focusing the attention of
service providers on landscape management as an alternative to built
solutions, and on the use of markets as an efficient alternative to more
prescriptive policy instruments.
In fact, if one ventures to be thoroughly optimistic, the potential of
service markets could be very exciting, indeed. Imagine, for example, how
things would change if ecosystem service markets were commonplace
twenty years from now. A farmer would no longer gain income solely, or
perhaps even primarily, from growing commodity crops. Instead, as
demonstrated in Table 1, she could “grow services,” earning a regular
income from provision of ecosystem service. One could imagine, for
example, how a farmer’s balance sheet today might compare with her
Of course the field representative should target areas of ecological significance, but within
these locales she would do better to make contact with the most respected landowners or, if
local gradients of esteem elude the outsider, the most objectively typical landowners. If
respected or typical landowners collaborate with the environmentalist, others are likely to
follow.

Elmendorf, supra note 133, at 468.
315 See supra Part II.C.
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accounts twenty years from now in an economy where ecosystem service
markets had become commonplace. 316
TABLE 1
[Printer: insert table1.doc here]
If sufficient new markets arise, farmers will continue to earn money
growing crops and raising livestock but, in addition, also enjoy revenue
from provision of services, whether that be storing carbon, conserving
biodiversity, slowing floodwaters, or purifying water. The implication of
such a visionary accounting exercise is that landowners of the future would
manage their land very differently than today. Is this just crazy musing?
Time will tell. In the meantime, the challenge lies in creating the
conditions for these service markets to be understood, improved, and
transplanted to places where conditions are fertile for the creation and
growth of new ecosystem service markets.

316 Adapted from presentation given by Steve Cork & David Shelton, CSIRO, in Brisbane,
Austl. (Sept. 2001).

